tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-66277549466504361302024-03-08T09:50:14.580-08:00Democratic CoreUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-33625763104101553892010-07-27T13:53:00.000-07:002010-08-06T14:50:45.724-07:00Reconstruction As A Failed SysAdmin OperationFirst of all, anyone reading this blog should get off his or her ass and go to New Orleans. It is the most amazing place in America. I was down there last week. There is of course the food and the music. But the museums are also extremely good. The National World War II Museum is remarkable - one of the best historical museums I have ever been to. They have a film narrated by Tom Hanks (who seems to have staked out some kind of personal ownership interest in WWII) that goes a bit over the top in its special effects on occasion, but on the whole, is extremely moving. The collection of artifacts from the war is also fascinating, including a handwritten version of the statement that Eisenhower prepared apologizing to the American people in case D-Day turned into a fiasco.<br /><br />The battlefield cite in nearby Chalmette (War of 1812) is also worth a visit. While I've never been much of a fan of Jackson, I must say that the Agincourt-like casualty numbers (over 2,000 British casualties and only 71 American casualties) are truly remarkable. Interesting that prior to the Civil War, January 8, the date of the battle, was a national holiday.<br /><br />By the way, the reason why the WWII museum is located in New Orleans is in honor of Andrew Higgins, founder of Higgins Industries in New Orleans that had manufactured boats capable of operating in shallow waters in the bayous. Higgins designed the landing craft used at D-Day. Eisenhower once commented, "Andrew Higgins is the man who won the war for us." The design of the landing craft made it possible not only to land massive numbers of soldiers on the Normandy beaches, but also to land heavy equipment such as trucks and tanks directly on the beaches. D-Day was a first in this respect. In prior amphibious landings, it was necessary to capture a nearby port, where heavy equipment could be off-loaded. The design of the "Higgins Boats" enabled them to carry heavy loads in shallow water and thereby made it unnecessary for the Allies to capture a French port city in order to bring heavy equipment ashore.<br /><br />Another museum that my son and I visited in NOLA was the African-American Museum located in the Treme section of the city. Treme is the historical center of African-American culture in New Orleans, and is generally considered to be the birthplace of jazz. Nearby Congo Square in Louis Armstrong Park was the only place in the ante-bellum South where Africans were permitted to perform their traditional songs and dances. The neighborhood originally consisted of a series of plantations that were bought up by Claude Treme in the late 18th Century, who subdivided the land to provide homes for the many free persons of color living in New Orleans.<br /><br />The museum is centered in a beautiful mansion that was part of one of the original Treme plantations. The exhibits at the museum are actually housed in three separate houses, all connected by a very pleasant courtyard. The collections are fascinating, including some rather grisly relics of slavery such as grotesque wrought-iron neck collars and advertisements for slave auctions that sound a bit too much like some sleazy advertising pitch for Ginzu knives or land in Arkansas that you will likely hear late at night on cable TV. It is always worth remembering that all of this was going on in America less than 150 years ago, without most white Americans having much of a problem about the whole thing.<br /><br />The exhibit included some portraits of the African-American Senators and Congressmen who were elected in the South during Reconstruction. As I looked at the faces of these proud, confident men (unfortunately they were only men) I was struck by the incredible human devastation brought about by our legacy of racism. After the "compromise" (sell-out) of 1876 that resulted in the withdrawal of Union troops from the South, these men were all removed from office. They spent the rest of their lives terrorized by the Klan. Many ended up in jail on trumped-up charges. Others were killed.<br /><br />I asked my son if he thought that there was any way that Reconstruction could have been carried out differently, so that African-Americans could have been integrated into American society then and there, making the outcome of the Civil War much more meaningful. My son said that he doubted it, since it would have required a Union military occupation of the South that probably would have had to go on for decades. Very few in the North had the kind of commitment to the rights of African-Americans to support such a long-term occupation. My son was of course right. But as soon as he said it, a very familiar bell went off in my head.<br /><br />Dedicated readers of this blog (are there any?) are probably familiar with my fascination with the writings of military theorist Thomas P.M. Barnett. To recap the basics, Barnett's principal thesis is that military operations should viewed as having two distinct aspects. The first is what Barnett calls the "Leviathan" phase, which is essentially what we traditionally think of as "war." The second is what Barnett calls the "sysadmin" phase, which is essentially a "postwar" operation. Barnett's thesis is that in the 21st Century, the goal of most warfare will be to "shrink the gap", which means integrating more and more of the world into the global economy. Barnett's contention is that most conflict in today's world emanates from the "gap", namely the parts of the world that remain unconnected to the global economy, so strengthening connectivity must be the goal of America's global security strategy. This can only be accomplished through successful "sysadmin" operations. Most importantly, Barnett emphasizes that if a war is undertaken without due consideration of what will be required in order to carry out an effective postwar "sysadmin" operation - a process that is likely to be protracted, expensive and labor intensive - it is highly unlikely that the original goals that initiated the war can be achieved.<br /><br />In thinking about the failure of post-Civil War Reconstruction, it seems to me that Barnett's analysis applies. At one level, the North fought the Civil War for the narrow and specific goal of preserving the Union. However, if we dig down to a deeper level, we have to ask why it was necessary in the first place to pursue a very destructive and bloody civil war in order to preserve the Union? The answer is fairly obvious to me. The South had evolved into a society which was in virtually every aspect - social, economic, cultural - built upon the institution of race-based slavery.<br /><br />Thus, the North could on a surface level obtain a military victory over the South, as it did, and thereby achieve the narrow objective of preserving the Union. However, if the North wanted to do anything about the underlying forces that had caused the Union to break apart so violently in the first place, it would have had to address the problem of re-making Southern society. And that would have meant dealing with the issue of race in a big way by fostering the full integration of African-Americans into the economic, political and cultural life of America. To do that, the North would have had to have been prepared to "shrink the gap", that is, carry out a real-live Barnettian "sysadmin" operation, including a long-term occupation of the South by Union troops, in order to fully connect the South, including the African-American population, to the economic, political and social life of America.<br /><br />As it turned out, the North had no stomach for such a long-term occupation of the South. Instead, the North basically adopted what in some circles has been characterized as the "cut and run" strategy. Following the election of 1876, Northern politicians entered into a corrupt bargain with the traditional Southern elite, which only a few years earlier had been the leadership of the greatest act of treason in U.S. history. The North accepted Jim Crow laws that kept African-Americans in a legal status that was only a marginal improvement upon slavery; the North did nothing to foster the economic development of the African-American community; and the North agreed to tolerate the actions of terrorist organizations such as the Klan designed to oppress the African-American population and maintain a culture in the South grounded in the principle of white supremacy.<br /><br />We have been living with the consequences of the corrupt bargain of 1876 ever since. If nothing else, the racist bleating that seems to have been emboldened by the election of President Obama should remind us that a belief in white supremacy remains strongly entrenched in too much of this country.<br /><br />As we contemplate America's future course of action in Afghanistan, we have to wonder about the consequences of any kind of future "deal" that would leave the Taliban in power. Would we be repeating the events of 1876? Would we be leaving the door open to generations of oppression, genocide and terrorism? Perhaps we need not look beyond our own history for the answers.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-64770983147889626652010-04-28T16:36:00.000-07:002010-04-28T17:30:32.701-07:00Welcome Fellow "Wretched Refuse"I had a very personal reaction to this story. It goes under the headline, "Rep. Duncan Hunter [Republican of California] backs deporting US-born children of undocumented immigrants." <a href="http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/04/rep-duncan-hunter-backs-deporting-usborn-children-of-undocumented-immigrants.html">http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/04/rep-duncan-hunter-backs-deporting-usborn-children-of-undocumented-immigrants.html</a> The guts of the story is as follows:<br /><br /><blockquote>Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine) says the federal government should deport U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants.<br /><br />"Would you support deportation of natural-born American citizens that are the children of illegal aliens," Hunter was asked. "I would have to, yes," Hunter said. "... We simply cannot afford what we're doing right now," he said. "... It takes more than just walking across the border to become an American citizen. It's what's in our souls. ..."<br /><br />Hunter made his comments at a "tea party" rally in the San Diego County city of Ramona over the weekend.</blockquote><br />Fortunately, we do have something called a "Constitution" in this country, and it unambiguously prohibits what this unspeakable ignoramus Hunter is proposing. The Fourteenth Amendment specifically provides,<br /><blockquote>All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.</blockquote>So, I think we can all rest pretty well-assured that this raving lunacy can be dismissed as nothing more than that, the ravings of a bunch of lunatics. Still, the headline hit me in a very personal way. You see, if Mr. Hunter had his way, I wouldn't exist.<br /><br />My grandparents emigrated to the United States from Wales in 1910. At the time, the United States had no restrictions on immigration. My grandparents were among the millions who came through Ellis Island looking for something better. They were recently married and they liked the idea of starting a family that had real prospects of living better than their parents had. They settled down in Upstate New York having two children, the younger one being my mother.<br /><br />After the end of World War I, they started to get a bit nostalgic for the "old country." They missed their relatives. They missed the beauty of the hills of North Wales. So they decided to go back, taking their two young children with them.<br /><br />It didn't take very long for them to remember why they had left Wales in the first place. There was no work to be found. As my grandfather always used to say, "You can't eat scenery." My grandmother had been slated for a life "in service" working in an estate owned by local aristocrats. The prison that is the British class system was opening its gates to welcome them back. They soon realized that they had made a dreadful mistake.<br /><br />In the interim while they were away, the United States had passed its first laws imposing restrictions on immigration. When they sailed back past the Statue of Liberty, it was no longer clear that the "golden door" was going to be open for them. Fortunately, my mother and her brother had been born in the United States, so under the Constitution, they were citizens of the United States. Unlike Mr. Hunter, immigration officials in those days understood that that meant something. My mother and her brother could not be excluded from their country, and the family was allowed to return.<br /><br />My mother went on to grow up during the Roaring Twenties, go to college and get a job, fall in love with and get married to a handsome and thoughtful man, make it through the Depression and the War, and raise a family of her own. Thanks to the Constitution, I am now sitting here writing this blog.<br /><br />But I guess that Mr. Hunter would say that my mother wasn't a real American, at least not in her "soul." I shudder to think what is in Mr. Hunter's "soul".Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-81314898278604668092010-03-25T07:37:00.000-07:002010-03-25T07:43:24.422-07:00Not A Failure of Capitalism - A Failure To Understand CapitalismI recently finished reading A Failure of Capitalism by Richard Posner. It is really a very good book, one of the best things I have read about the recent financial crisis. I recommend it highly to anyone who wants to understand how this all happened, and get some insight into the kinds of reforms that might make sense as a way of preventing a recurrence.<br /><br />Before getting into the basic ideas of Posner's book, a bit of background. Posner is a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, located in in Chicago. He is regarded as a leading libertarian conservative who was often on the "short list" of possible Republican nominees to the Supreme Court (although his generally libertarian instincts might make his positions on social issues unacceptable to the religious right). Generally speaking, he is not someone with whom I would ordinarily find a lot of ideological common ground (I once clashed with him in print over something he wrote about one of my cases). Before being appointed to the Federal Bench, Posner was a Professor at the University of Chicago law school, where he was one of the founders and leading proponents of the "law and economics" school of legal thought. This legal philosophy attempts to apply the libertarian economic philosophy of Milton Friedman and other leading lights of the Chicago school of economics to legal analysis. In essence, it is a legal philosophy grounded in principles of laissez faire economics.<br /><br />Given Posner's intellectual background, A Failure of Capitalism is a remarkable work. It is, almost, a mea culpa for the financial collapse. Posner shows with clear-headed and irrefutable logic that the financial collapse and resulting economic depression - yes, Posner calls it a depression because of the potential danger of deflation, and not just a recession - is attributable to the failure of the U.S. government adequately to regulate financial institutions. The prime culprits in this debacle are (a) the Federal Reserve, particularly under the leadership of Alan Greenspan, at first for failing to recognize the existence of the real estate "asset bubble", and later for assuming that "market forces" would work everything out and that the financial system would correct itself without government intervention; and (b) the political leadership of both parties, including President Clinton and the Republican Congress, for enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act without implementing any alternative regime for regulating the financial industry.<br /><br />Posner's step-by-step economic analysis of the forces that led to the collapse is a tour de force. I must confess that Posner's grasp of technical economic analysis exceeds my own; I could follow it as I was reading it, but I would be hard-pressed to reproduce it. In summary, Posner disposes of the many myths that have sprung up about the origins of the financial collapse:<br /><br />1. Posner demolishes one of the right-wing's favorite hobby horses, namely, the claim that the Community Reinvestment Act was responsible for the financial collapse by promoting subprime mortgages for unworthy borrowers. In fact, this Act had a very limited scope and it had almost nothing to do with the events that led to the financial meltdown of 2008.<br /><br />2. Posner offers a nice rejoinder to the conventional assertion that the financial collapse was attributable to too much "greed" on Wall Street. Posner argues that "Wall Street" acted exactly the way it is supposed to act, and that blaming the financial collapse on "Wall Street greed" would be like blaming a lion for killing a zebra - it is the nature of the beast. It is precisely for that reason that the government must regulate financial markets, and again, Posner demonstrates that the collapse was clearly the result of a massive regulatory failure.<br /><br />3. Posner also dismantles the claim that the collapse was attributable to irrational, panicky behavior by financial institutions. Again, Posner's meticulous economic analysis shows that at every step of the way, financial institutions acted rationally, exactly the way you would expect them to act as rational profit-maximizers in a "free market" system - and that rational market-based behavior nevertheless resulted in a meltdown of the financial system.<br /><br />In sum, Posner concludes that the financial collapse was attributable to the mistaken belief that markets are always self-correcting; that if financial institutions are left to their own devices such that market participants can act in an unregulated rational profit-maximizing manner, an end-result beneficial to society will be achieved; and that any form of governmental regulation is not only unnecessary, but harmful. Posner shows just how wrong these beliefs have proven to be, and that to the contrary, governmental regulation of the financial industry is essential. Having come to this realization, Posner therefore describes the financial collapse as "a failure of capitalism." It is here, however, that I part company with Posner.<br /><br />By characterizing the financial collapse as a "failure of capitalism" Posner is accepting the idea that "capitalism" is at odds with government regulation. By promoting the very notion that the "free market" can be set up as something inconsistent with government regulation, so-called "libertarians" - often including Posner himself - have done the public an enormous disservice. The idea that capitalism is something that can exist without government regulation, and that any form of government regulation is inherently destructive of capitalism, is an idea that originated with the Austrian economists Ludwig Von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, got promoted in the U.S. by Milton Friedman and the rest of the Chicago school of economics, was popularized and dumbed-down in the trashy novels of Ayn Rand (of whom Greenspan was a devotee), and ultimately worked its way into mainstream politics through Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who always spat out the word "government" as though it were the foulest sort of cuss-word imaginable. The consequences of this fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of capitalism have been dire indeed, ultimately bringing about the global financial meltdown of 2008, as Posner so forcefully demonstrates.<br /><br />In many respects, it is a mistake to think of capitalism as an "economic" system at all. In reality, it is a legal/political system. Markets do not exist in a state of nature. Markets exist because governments establish laws and rules that make market transactions possible. Government is not the enemy of the free market; government is the creator of the free market.<br /><br />To illustrate this, let's consider a very simple example of a market transaction that can be found in one version or another in virtually every basic economics textbook. Buyer wants some widgets; Seller has some widgets. They get together and they consummate a transaction at a price determined by the supply of available widgets and the demand for widgets among consumers. While this simple example might be helpful in understanding the principles of supply and demand, it only works in the Garden of Eden where widgets are simply lying about and nothing has to be done to produce them. The example has very little relevance to understanding the actual operation of capitalism.<br /><br />Assume that Buyer wants widgets and Seller knows how to produce widgets and has the means to do so. Once again, they shake hands and agree upon a transaction at a price for the widgets determined by supply and demand. It will take about thirty days for Seller to produce and deliver the widgets. Suppose that as the thirtieth day approaches, something has happened that has affected the supply and demand for widgets, e.g., a war has broken out; or there has been a natural disaster; or there is a new craze making widgets more popular; or conversely evidence has come to light that widgets may cause cancer making them very unpopular; or there has been some technological breakthrough that makes it much cheaper to produce widgets, etc., etc. On the thirtieth day, Buyer may decide he no longer wants the widgets or at least he doesn't want them at the agreed-upon price, or on the other hand, Seller may decide that he no longer wants to sell the widgets at that price. If Buyer and Seller knew that all of these eventualities could happen and that the other side might renege on the deal, they probably would not have entered into the transaction in the first place. So, the government has to step in and set up a bunch of rules to determine when agreements between buyers and sellers either are or are not enforced. That is called the law of contracts, and without it, capitalism cannot exist.<br /><br />Most libertarian conservatives would agree that it is appropriate for the government to enforce contracts and property rights, but not to do much of anything else. This restriction on the scope of appropriate governmental action, however, is entirely arbitrary. Indeed, it does not take very much imagination to see that there is a plethora of reasons why the government must be actively involved in laying out and enforcing rules in order to enable capitalism to work. Going back to my simple example of Buyer, Seller, and their widgets:<br /><br />- Suppose Seller has built a factory to produce these widgets, but there are armed gangs roving the neighborhood who are threatening to damage the factory if Seller does not pay them protection money, which may make it difficult to deliver the widgets in thirty days. The government now has to step in and enforce some criminal laws.<br /><br />- Suppose Buyer isn't sure that Seller is the best producer of widgets, so Seller gives Buyer some information about the quality of his widgets. It turns out that Seller's widgets are actually of very poor quality and that the information Seller gave to Buyer was not true. We now need the government to enforce some consumer protection laws.<br /><br />- Suppose the workers in Seller's widget factory are not happy with the wages they are being paid and they want to form a union so they can get into a stronger position to negotiate with Seller. The workers are threatening a strike, which again may affect Seller's ability to deliver the widgets within thirty days. We now need some labor laws.<br /><br />- Suppose Buyer has gone around and worked out a secret deal with everyone who might be in the market to buy widgets to ensure that no one will pay more than a particular price for widgets. Welcome to antitrust law.<br /><br />- Suppose these widgets do cause cancer, and ultimate consumers of the widgets would like to get some redress against both Buyer and Seller for the damages they suffer. We now need products liability laws.<br /><br />- Suppose Buyer and Seller are both concerned that they are going to be held liable for damages caused by the widgets, and if they are going to continue in this business, they'd like to do it in a way that limits their personal liability. Corporate law now comes into the picture.<br /><br />- Suppose Seller decides that having set up a corporation to own and operate his widget factory, he can vastly expand the factory by soliciting additional investments in the corporation from members of the investing public. We now need a law of securities regulation.<br /><br />- Suppose that the government that is making and enforcing all of these rules needs some money to fund itself, and it decides that it is appropriate for Buyer and Seller to bear some of the cost of operating the government. Now we need tax laws.<br /><br />Obviously, I could go on spinning off examples like this for some time - indeed, law school is generally a three-year program. However, even this very simple example shows how absurd it is to think of capitalism as a system that can possibly exist without government regulation. The Reagan/Thatcher formulation of "markets good, government bad" is just childish poppycock - poppycock that has done a great deal of damage.<br /><br />Thus, the concept of regulation vs. de-regulation represents a false choice. It is inevitable that you are going to have some kind of regulation in any capitalist society. The real question is whether you are going to have regulation that works as opposed to regulation that doesn't. The ultimate test is relatively simple to state, but very difficult to implement in practice: good regulation enables markets to function efficiently.<br /><br />In an earlier post, I set forth the view that no one can seriously put forward the argument that socialism is a viable alternative to capitalism as a model for organizing a society's economic activities. <a href="http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009/04/brief-history-of-socialism.html">http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009/04/brief-history-of-socialism.html</a> The mistaken belief that any form of governmental activity is the equivalent of "socialism" is really the flip-side of the mistaken belief that "capitalism" means the absence of governmental activity.<br /><br />So, Judge Posner, while you have written an outstanding book, I take issue with your title. It was not a "failure of capitalism" that nearly destroyed the global financial system; it was a failure to understand that capitalism necessarily requires governmental regulation in order to function.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-40531087354892734642009-12-11T14:46:00.000-08:002009-12-15T09:05:23.312-08:00My Healthcare PostI've been holding off doing anything on the subject of healthcare, even though it is the subject that just about every would-be pundit is spouting off about these days. It is really extremely technical stuff and frankly I don't feel particularly qualified to contribute much of value on the subject. Apparently, however, that hasn't stopped others from shooting their mouths off, and a lot of the nonsense going around about healthcare is incredibly misleading, both from pundits on the right and the left. So, I figured that I might as well join in.<br /><br />First of all, I think it is helpful to draw the distinction between healthcare reform and health insurance reform. For the most part, the various pieces of legislation that pundits have been gnawing on for most of this year deal with health insurance reform, and not so much with healthcare reform. This limitation is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is important to remember this clarification of what we are talking about. Healthcare reform would address the quality and cost of healthcare, and to be sure, those are subjects that very much need to be addressed. I will say more about that towards the end of this post, but again, it bears repeating that in large part, this is not something being addressed by the current legislation.<br /><br />That does not mean that the current legislation dealing with health insurance reform is unimportant. On the contrary, it is extremely important. Health insurance reform goes to the question of how Americans pay for healthcare. That is something that very much needs to be addressed. Indeed, I would argue that unless we deal with the problem of health insurance reform first - the way Americans pay for healthcare - we cannot deal with the more general problem of healthcare reform in a rational way.<br /><br />In order to talk intelligently about health insurance reform, one first really ought to be able to talk intelligently about insurance. That is something right off the bat that has made me hesitate to try to pontificate on this subject. Talking about insurance inevitably gets you into subjects of "risk management" and actuarial tables and the like, at which point, I generally find my brain turning to mush. I don't know why my mind tends to recoil at the subject of insurance. I think I'm a reasonably intelligent person - I've even read Stephen Hawking's <em>A Brief History of Time</em> and understood a lot of it. Nevertheless, insurance eludes me. It always reminds me of the <em>Seinfeld</em> episode in which George was charged with the responsibility of doing a speech on "risk management" and somehow the notes for the speech got mixed up with Kenny Bania's comedy routine and hilarity ensued, but I digress.<br /><br />What gave me the confidence to try to write something on the subject of health insurance reform was my recent reading of an excellent book on the subject, <em>The Healing of America</em> by T.R. Reid. Reid gives a pretty good rundown of the healthcare systems in various foreign countries, contrasting them with the shortcomings of the American system of paying for healthcare. I think this is a good way to approach the subject, because there are two salient facts that we do know about the American system of paying for healthcare: (1) the U.S. is the only advanced country that does not provide universal healthcare coverage; and (2) recent worldwide surveys rate the quality of healthcare in the U.S. very poorly, generally around #37 in the world. That statistic is somewhat misleading because it reflects an average, but that in itself is very revealing about what is wrong with the American system of paying for healthcare. If you have good health insurance in the U.S., you probably have access to excellent healthcare, among the best in the world, but the problem is that too many Americans can't pay for <em>any</em> access to healthcare, and that drags our average way down.<br /><br />So, how do other countries pay for universal healthcare? There are three basic models analyzed in Reid's book, although I would argue (this isn't in Reid's book) that it is useful, particularly as it pertains to the U.S., to subdivide the third model into two sub-categories.<br /><br /><strong>1. Socialized Medicine</strong>: This is the U.K. system, developed by Lord Beveridge and Aneurin Bevan and implemented by the Labour government following World War II. In this system, the government actually operates the healthcare system. The British government owns and operates hospitals and employs healthcare professionals to staff them (although most British physicians are private actors). The British National Health Service (NHS) is fully funded by the government out of tax revenues and its services are available to everyone free of charge.<br /><br /><strong>2. Single Payer</strong>: This is the Canadian system, developed by Saskatchewan Premier Tommy Douglas (Kiefer Sutherland's grandfather) in the early 1960s. Unlike the British system, the Canadian healthcare system itself is privately owned and operated; there are private hospitals, clinics, etc., and doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals are private actors. However, all healthcare costs, for everyone, are paid entirely by the government, financed out of tax revenues.<br /><br /><strong>3. The Bismarck System</strong>: This is the German system (followed in variations by many other European countries), developed by Otto Von Bismarck in the 19th Century. In this system, all persons are required by law to have health insurance, and you may choose from any number of different private not-for-profit insurance funds to provide coverage (in Germany, there are over 200 of these "sickness funds"). The amount a person pays for coverage depends on their income level, which is implemented through tax adjustments, with taxes imposed on the rich and credits and subsidies available to the poor. If you don't like the coverage offered by any of the funds, you may opt out of the system and buy health insurance from a private for-profit company; but again, all persons are required to have some form of health insurance coverage.<br /><br />As I said, I would also include a variation on this last system which Reid does not discuss, namely, the Dutch system. Like the Bismarck system, the Dutch system mandates that all persons have health insurance, but instead of using not-for-profit insurance funds, the Dutch system implements universal coverage through for-profit private insurance companies. The government maintains an intensive system of regulation over health insurance companies to prevent premiums from being excessive and to ensure that there is a high level of competition among the private health insurance companies. As in the Bismarck system, government subsidies are provided to the poor to pay for health insurance.<br /><br />Reid applies these categories to the American system of paying for healthcare, and shows how these categories do in fact apply to various segments of the American population:<br /><br /><strong>Category One - Socialized Medicine</strong>: In fact, one segment of the American population does receive socialized medicine, namely, veterans. The Veterans Administration owns and operates hospitals and staffs them with doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals who are employed directly by the Federal government. The VA operates a system that is every bit as much an example of pure socialized medicine as the British NHS, perhaps even more so.<br /><br /><strong>Category Two - Single Payer</strong>: Senior citizens are covered by a single payer system, namely, Medicare. Notably, the Canadian single payer system is also known as "Medicare". In Canada, however, everyone is covered by Medicare, while in the U.S., Medicare is only available to senior citizens.<br /><br /><strong>Category Three - Private Health Insurance</strong>: Most employed Americans are covered by private health insurance. Generally, this is provided as a benefit of employment. This system is encouraged by the tax laws, which make health insurance coverage tax deductible for the employer and non-taxable for the employee.<br /><br />People falling into these three categories comprise about 84% of the American population, which of course leaves about 16% who have no coverage. This translates into roughly 40-45 million Americans without coverage. Those without coverage include employed persons whose employers do not provide health insurance; unemployed persons; persons who have "pre-existing" medical conditions and as a result are rejected for coverage by private insurance companies; and persons who for one reason or another choose not to purchase health insurance. This last group includes many young people who do not perceive catastrophic illness to be a significant threat and accordingly elect not to incur the cost of purchasing health insurance.<br /><br />Before talking about different possible approaches to reform, it is helpful to think of this last group - Americans without coverage - as comprising a distinct fourth category. As one healthcare expert pointed out in a lecture I attended, we do have a form of "universal" healthcare coverage in America; after all, American cities do not look like a third-world country, with untended sick people dying in the streets. However, the manner in which the U.S. provides "universal" healthcare to people falling into Category Four is barbaric. America deals with this fourth category in a manner that is both extremely expensive and extremely ineffective as a means of providing healthcare services, which can be summarized as follows:<br /><br /><strong>Category Four - Welfare, Charity and Emergency Rooms</strong>: Persons falling into Category Four lack the means of paying for "wellness" healthcare such as routine check-ups and regular doctor visits. However, if these persons are poor enough and sick enough, they will get some form of healthcare, generally paid for by various forms of welfare, primarily Medicaid, and frequently administered in hospital emergency rooms. This is a method of providing healthcare that is extraordinarily inefficient in that it is both extremely expensive and ineffective as a means of promoting good health. This is reflected in a particular statistic about the quality of American healthcare that I find to be extraordinarily damning. The rate of death from treatable illnesses is far higher in the U.S. than in any other even moderately advanced country. This is clearly a product of the fact that for persons falling into Category Four, the healthcare that they receive is not only too little, it is often too late.<br /><br />I find it very helpful to use these four categories as a way of thinking about the nature of the problem of trying to reform the manner in which Americans pay for healthcare. This categorization is also very useful in understanding the political problems that are posed to attempts to reform health insurance, and the deficiencies in the approaches to reform of both the left and the right.<br /><br />For the right, the deficiency in their approach to the problem is obvious. The right acts as though it either does not believe or simply does not care about the fact that Category Four exists at all. I find this attitude appalling and unacceptable. We cannot accept an America in which more than forty million Americans simply do not have any means of paying for decent healthcare. Indeed, as I discuss in more detail below, it seems clear to me that if we do not do something about Category Four now, the condition of persons falling into this category will soon deteriorate markedly, and in a few years, America may very well begin to resemble a third-world country in which we routinely expect to see bodies of the dead or dying strewn about the streets due to lack of medical attention.<br /><br />The deficiency of the approach of the left is a bit more subtle. The left, to its credit, is very much aware of the existence of Category Four, and its goal is to eliminate Category Four by making access to quality healthcare a universal right. I absolutely join in that objective.<br /><br />The problem with the point of the view of the left, I would submit, is that it does not pay enough attention to the needs and interests of Category Three, which consists of the overwhelming majority of American workers - and voters. For almost everyone on the left, the ideal means of achieving universal coverage would be to enact a single payer system. While most people on the left do recognize that this is not politically feasible, there is a tendency on the left to believe that this lack of political feasibility is solely due to the power of insurance company lobbyists. I think this is a mistake; in my view, the real reason why a single payer system is not politically feasible in the U.S. is because it would not be acceptable to most of the Americans who fall into Category Three.<br /><br />It is helpful to step back and look at the history of how the U.S. came to have a system, unlike any other advanced country, in which most Americans' access to healthcare is financed not by the government, but by private health insurance obtained as a benefit of employment. This system did not come into being either because of a nefarious conspiracy perpetrated by private insurance companies, as some on the left believe, or because the free market dictated that private health insurance companies provide better services than government agencies do, as the right believes. Ironically, the American system of employment-based private health insurance actually came into being because of government interference in the marketplace. During World War II, the government imposed strict wage and price controls as a means of guaranteeing the smooth production of war materials. Labor was very scarce during the war, but employers were nonetheless barred from offering higher wages as a means of competing for the services of scarce workers. However, government wage and price controls permitted employers to offer benefits other than wages, such as health insurance, as a means of attracting employees. Thus, by the time World War II ended, the provision of health insurance as an added benefit of employment had become widespread and very popular with both employees and employers (as noted, the tax laws reinforced the attractiveness of employee health insurance). At the very time that the postwar U.K. was establishing the NHS, and most of continental Europe was adopting different versions of government-subsidized Bismarck-type health insurance schemes, there was relatively little enthusiasm in the U.S. for a government-financed system of universal healthcare.<br /><br />For those Americans falling into Category Three, employment-based private health insurance continues to be quite popular. Surveys generally show that most Americans who do have private health insurance are relatively satisfied with their coverage. To be sure, Americans who have private health insurance are sufficiently satisfied with it that they become very nervous if they think that politicians are threatening to force them to relinquish their private insurance in favor of a government-run program; this is why the "Harry and Louise" ads and similar scare tactics have resonated with the American public and have successfully killed prior efforts at reform. And, as I will discuss below, I also believe that the preference for private health insurance as opposed to a single payer system is by no means irrational.<br /><br />Nevertheless, the problem with a system that relies so heavily on private health insurance to pay for healthcare is that it leaves you with Category Four - a large segment of the population dependent upon welfare and charity to pay for even minimal levels of healthcare. Thus, the goal of health insurance reform ought to be to try to eliminate Category Four by folding Category Four into Category Three, using government subsidies and regulations of health insurance companies to deal with the costs entailed. This would produce something in the U.S. that resembles the Bismarck system, particularly as modified by the Dutch, while of course leaving socialized medicine in place for veterans (the VA) and single payer in place for senior citizens (Medicare).<br /><br />The basic elements of what would be required to move Category Four into Category Three are fairly straight-forward. First, you need regulations requiring insurance companies to cover everybody, prohibiting denials of coverage based on pre-existing conditions and the like. Second, you need subsidies to enable the unemployed and other poor persons to be able to buy insurance. Third, you need to require most employers to provide health insurance as an employee benefit. Finally, as a sort of mopping-up device, you need an "individual mandate" requiring <em>everyone</em> to have health insurance, prohibiting "free riding" by those (mostly young persons) who are willing to gamble on the possibility that they will remain healthy and not need health insurance.<br /><br />A lot of people have trouble understanding why you have to have the mandates - why can't we just require insurance companies to offer insurance to everyone who wants it regardless of pre-existing conditions and the like, but continue to allow people who are so inclined to choose to take the gamble that they will not need health insurance? The answer to this question lies in those nasty, arcane principles of "risk management" that have always made insurance such an opaque subject for me. I'll do my best to lay out the issues as I understand them.<br /><br />The idea of "risk management" works as follows. The "product" that an insurance company sells is the right to receive a benefit upon the occurrence of a particular event; in the case of health insurance, that "event" is the need to see a doctor or possibly the need to receive some more extensive, and expensive, form of healthcare services such as a long-term stay in a hospital. The price that the insurance company charges for the product comes in the form of the premiums paid by insureds, and the amount of the premium depends upon a computation of the likelihood that the insurance company will have to pay out these benefits. This in turn gets you to those actuarial tables, which enable the insurance companies to compute the likelihood of an "event" occurring that will require the payment of benefits. "Risk management" is the process by which an insurance company minimizes the risk that it will have to pay out benefits relative to the amount of premiums paid by insureds. Successful risk management enables an insurance company to maximize its profitability, which of course is the raison d'etre of any private business.<br /><br />There are two different ways in which risk management enables an insurance company to maximize its profitability. First, the insurance company can shrink its pool of insureds so as to eliminate those who present the greatest risk of being likely to claim entitlement to benefits. That is why health insurance companies want to deny coverage to persons having pre-existing conditions, because those persons present the greatest risks of being in need of benefits. There is, however, another way that an insurance company can use principles of risk management to enhance profitability. The insurance company can expand its pool of insureds, so that even though the insurance company is providing coverage to people who have a high likelihood of becoming entitled to receive benefits, that risk will be counterbalanced by the fact that the insurance company will be receiving premiums from a large number of insureds who have a very low likelihood of being entitled to receive benefits.<br /><br />Thus, if, in order to get to universal coverage, Congress passes a law prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage to persons with pre-existing conditions - the riskiest portion of the population from the perspective of health insurance companies - the inevitable result would be a huge increase in the premiums insurance companies would have to charge its customers; either that, or else a large number of insurance companies would be forced out of business. The way to avoid that is to expand the risk pool by mandating that <em>all</em> persons have health insurance, particularly those young, relatively healthy "free riders" who are unlikely to need much by way of benefits and whose premiums would therefore pay for the benefits to be provided to the folks with pre-existing conditions, who present the greatest risk of needing healthcare benefits.<br /><br />This is the essence of virtually all of the health insurance reform proposals floating through Congress. It is also the essence of the Dutch variation on the Bismarck system. The Dutch system makes it possible to provide universal coverage through private for-profit health insurance companies by spreading the risks, thereby ensuring that everyone is covered and premiums are kept at manageable levels.<br /><br />Before we all celebrate and proclaim "mission accomplished", it should be noted that there are some glitches that make it difficult for the U.S. simply to copy the Dutch system. As I said above, the Dutch system includes intensive governmental regulation of the health insurance industry so as to ensure that risks are truly spread out throughout the system and premiums are kept in check. In addition, the Dutch make sure that there is a high level of competition among private health insurance companies, again, so as to guarantee competitive pricing and competition in the packages of benefits that are offered to consumers. The U.S. currently lacks both of these features. Almost all regulation of the insurance industry is carried out at the state level, and there is very little by way of Federal insurance regulation. State insurance regulators tend to be pretty spotty. In some states, such as New York, state insurance regulators are known to be very active; in other states, however, such as Texas or the Dakotas, state insurance regulation is minimal to non-existent. In addition, the level of competition in the health insurance industry varies widely from state to state. Again, in some states such as New York, there is a good deal of competition among health insurance companies, but in a great many states, there is little if any competition, and single health insurance companies hold virtual monopolies on the business within their states.<br /><br />The Republicans frequently argue that the solution to the problem of lack of competition is simply to allow consumers to buy health insurance across state lines. The problem with this suggestion is, again, the fact that insurance companies are largely regulated at the state level. If a consumer were to buy a health insurance policy from an out-of-state company, the consumer would effectively be buying a policy from an unregulated insurance company. The consumer would have no guarantee that the company in fact has sufficient capital to pay the benefits promised by the policy. It is a virtual certainty that if consumers were permitted to buy insurance across state lines under the current system, a great many consumers would wind up holding the bag in the form of worthless health insurance policies issued by unregulated insurance companies lacking sufficient capital to pay benefits.<br /><br />The only way that permitting interstate insurance sales as a means of promoting competition would make sense would be if you had some sort of interstate compact among state insurance regulators to ensure the viability of the companies and the policies they sell on the interstate market, or better yet, if you had Federal regulation of the insurance industry - in other words, if you had something more like the Dutch system. In my opinion, that would be a very good thing, and it is probably the most likely direction in which the American system will evolve.<br /><br />A "progressive" solution to the problem of lack of competition in the health insurance industry was suggested in 2007 by a political scientist at Berkeley (he is now at Yale) named Jacob Hacker, who originally proposed the idea of a "public option." Hacker proposed that this public option could be integrated into a system of universal mandates, so that consumers would have the "option" of buying into a Federal health insurance program such as Medicare as an alternative to buying private health insurance. The idea was that such a "public option" would guarantee the existence of competition and would thereby prevent private health insurance companies from raising premiums excessively.<br /><br />Conservatives and lobbyists for health insurance companies pounced on Hacker's concept of the public option as nothing more than a backdoor way of implementing a single payer system. This argument is not without some force. A public program such as Medicare does not operate through the marketplace. Rather, a public program such as Medicare finances itself through tax revenues, and it is not forced to support itself by offering competitive services in the marketplace. In addition, a public program such as Medicare keeps its costs down by being able to dictate the reimbursement rates it will pay to healthcare service providers (doctors, hospitals, etc.) by using rates that are set by law, instead of rates that are negotiated in the marketplace. Conservatives argue that no private health insurance company could possibly compete with a public program such as Medicare on these terms, not because Medicare offers "better" or cheaper services, but because Medicare has the ability to finance itself through taxation and it can impose reimbursement rates on service providers by force of law - things that no private insurance company could possibly do. Thus, the argument goes, even though this "robust" public program would only be an "option" available to consumers as an alternative to private health insurance, the inevitable result of having such a "robust" public option would be that private health insurance premiums would go up because healthcare service providers would charge higher rates to privately-insured patients in order to offset the low reimbursement rates dictated by the public option; this, in turn, would inevitably cause consumers to choose the public option over private health insurance, thereby driving a lot of private insurance companies out of business and ultimately leading to a single payer system.<br /><br />In order to counter these arguments, many Democrats, led by Senator Schumer, have backed off of the concept of the "robust" public option (<em>i.e</em>., a government program such as Medicare as an option available to healthcare consumers), and instead have proposed what they call a "level playing field" public option. Under this approach, the public option would not be financed by tax revenues and instead would be required to pay for itself out of the premiums it would be able to collect from consumers; in addition, the "level playing field" public option would not pay Medicare reimbursement rates and would instead negotiate reimbursement rates with service providers just like a private insurance company does. In short, the "level playing field" public option would be no different from any other insurance company, except that it would be owned and operated by the government, and the only function of the public option would be to guarantee some measure of competition so as to "keep private insurance companies honest."<br /><br />Critics of the "level playing field" public option on both the left and the right argue that the proposal does not make a lot of sense. A public health insurance program is unlikely to do the sorts of things that private insurance companies do in order to hold down costs, such as engage in hardball negotiations with consumers over coverage issues and with service providers over reimbursement. Thus, it is argued that the "level playing field" public option will inevitably be at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis private insurance companies. Progressives argue that this means that the "level playing field" public option would not be an effective check on private insurance companies. Conservatives argue that Democrats would not stand by and allow the public option simply to close shop because of its inability to compete with private insurers, and Democrats would instead be unable to resist the temptation to "unlevel the playing field" by providing tax subsidies and other advantages to the public option; this, in turn, would again put us on the slippery slope to a single payer system.<br /><br />Personally, the public option, in either the "robust" or the "level playing field" form, strikes me as an intriguing idea, and I don't see much down side in experimenting with it as part of an overall package of reforms to get us to universal coverage. On the other hand, I can also see the validity of many of the arguments that have been made against the various forms of public options that have been proposed. It seems to me that the issue of whether or not to have a public option has been blown way out of proportion. What is most important is the necessity of universal coverage, and we can achieve that with or without a public option - <em>i.e</em>., by imposing regulations that prohibit health insurers from denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions and other reasons, by regulating premiums, and by mandating that everyone have health insurance, with subsidies available to poor persons who cannot afford it. The Senate Finance Committee bill used these elements to achieve virtually universal coverage without a "public option" of any kind, "robust" or otherwise. Indeed, having a public option really does very little to enhance the ability of a reform package to achieve universal coverage; both the Senate Finance Committee bill, without a public option, and the House Bill, with a public option, achieve roughly the same results in reducing the number of uninsured.<br /><br />Most people on the left are unsympathetic to the argument that a "robust" public option will undermine private health insurance companies and put us on the road to single payer. However, I believe that this attitude is mistaken, again, because it fails to pay attention to the very real reasons why people in Category Three like private health insurance and prefer it to a single payer system. To expand on this point, it is important to recognize the shortcomings of a single payer system, some of which are touched on in Reid's book. A single payer system functions by legal fiat, not through the marketplace. The amount that gets paid into the system depends on the amount of taxes that the government collects (Judge Learned Hand once referred to taxes as "forced exactions" and not "voluntary contributions"). The amount that gets paid out is set by reimbursement schedules that are fixed by laws and regulations, again, not by the market. The mechanism that a single payer system uses to reduce costs is to cut reimbursement rates, much to the dismay of healthcare service providers such as doctors, hospitals, etc. In the U.S., service providers regularly complain about the low reimbursement rates paid by the single payer component of the American healthcare system - <em>i.e</em>., Medicare (Category Two) - but in the U.S., service providers can compensate for low Medicare reimbursement rates by raising the rates charged to privately-insured patients. If private insurance companies were forced out of business and the U.S. system drifted towards a single payer system, service providers would be unable to do this. Low reimbursement rates would have other consequences, namely, it would lead to shortages of healthcare providers. This in turn would result in precisely the kinds of problems we see in single payer systems such as Canada, including long waiting times for medical services and strict government rationing of available medical care. Americans who are currently lucky enough to fall into Category Three would hardly view such developments as "reform."<br /><br />This brings me back to what I said at the beginning of this post - there is a difference between healthcare reform and health insurance reform. Ultimately, the root of the problem lies in the fact that healthcare is very expensive, and it is only going to get more expensive in the coming years. In single payer systems or other government-run healthcare systems such as the U.K.'s NHS, the economic pressure resulting from rising healthcare costs is manifest in the form of shortages, waiting times, and rationed care. In the U.S., the consequence of rising costs is radical inequality, where the insured receive quality healthcare but the uninsured receive none at all. We cannot formulate a rational approach to healthcare reform in the U.S. until we address this fundamental reality - radical inequality - and that is why I believe that enacting health insurance reform and establishing universal coverage now are the top priorities, and the essential first steps towards real healthcare reform.<br /><br />To be sure, the healthcare debate that has now been going on for almost a year has been very frustrating, often excruciating, and a lot of people would like to abandon reform efforts altogether. The right says that the endeavor to reform health insurance should be abandoned and that the sole focus should be on cutting costs. Some on the far left are also proposing that reform efforts be abandoned for now (I'm not sure why the left thinks that things will get better in the future) because of the apparent unwillingness of Senate moderates to accept any form of public option, arguing that without a public option, health insurance reform proposals amount to nothing more than a "giveaway" to health insurance companies - notwithstanding the fact that even the most conservative of the reform proposals on the table, the Senate Finance Committee bill, does in fact achieve something approximating universal coverage. I cannot say this too strongly: both of these positions are wrong, and they are worse than wrong - they are unconscionable.<br /><br />Consider what would happen if health insurance reform were abandoned at this point: This would leave the current U.S. system intact, <em>i.e</em>., we would retain Categories One through Four. As I said, healthcare is likely to get even more expensive in the years ahead than it is today. Indeed, demographics are likely to result in breathtaking healthcare cost increases, as we Baby Boomers get older and sicker. How is Congress likely to deal with the inevitable pressures to make large cuts in the cost of healthcare? Categories One through Three all have a lot of political clout, and it is highly likely that politicians will do everything they possibly can to protect the interests of persons falling into those categories. Category Four, however, has no political clout. It seems unquestionable to me that a future Congress (one that would undoubtedly be dominated by Republicans if Democrats are stupid enough to bungle the current opportunity to implement real health insurance reform) would deal with rising healthcare costs by taking a meat axe to programs like Medicaid and other welfare programs for the very poor and the uninsured. Then the U.S. really would look like a third-world country or Dickensian London in which healthcare for the poor is entirely a matter of charity, if that. Maybe it's just me, but I don't want to live in that country.<br /><br />There is an alternative: eliminate Category Four now by folding it into Category Three. Preserve the system of private health insurance that is popular with the many Americans fortunate enough to be covered by it, and use regulations, mandates and subsidies to make the system universal. Both the Senate Bill (without a public option) and the House Bill (with a public option) effectively move about 75% of the persons currently in Category Four into Category Three. We must not let the opportunity to do that slip away.<br /><br />One final point that bears emphasis: what I have described is just the beginning of the process of reform, not the end. Some projects for future reforms include:<br /><br />1. Implement better regulation of health insurance companies by establishing something at the Federal level like an SEC to oversee health insurers in order to prevent price-gouging on premiums and abusive practices on coverage decisions.<br /><br />2. Get to work on real healthcare reform, in addition to health insurance reform. I will address one aspect of that subject which I actually know something about. Specifically, I believe that there ought to be bipartisan consensus on the need for tort reform to reduce the numbers of abusive medical malpractice suits. However, I think that a lot of the "tort reform" we have heard about in the past is misguided. Most tort reform has heretofore taken the form of caps on damage awards (<em>e.g</em>., the Texas system). Runaway awards are not really the problem. Relatively few malpractice cases actually go to trial, as most cases are settled before trial, and in reality, excessive awards by runaway juries are well-publicized but relatively rare occurrences. Arbitrary caps on damages can leave plaintiffs who suffered from true malpractice with inadequate compensation, while doing little to address the real deficiencies in the way our legal system handles medical malpractice suits.<br /><br />The bigger problem is that there are simply too many malpractice claims and our legal system lacks effective means of weeding out frivolous claims. A reasonably smart plaintiff's lawyer can cobble together a medical malpractice claim that is good enough to survive a motion for summary judgment (not a very exacting standard) and then negotiate a settlement before the case goes to trial. Malpractice defense lawyers hired by malpractice insurers are often motivated to take the same approach, as they have no incentive to try to dispose of a case at an early stage of the litigation (<em>i.e</em>., before the defense lawyers have charged much in fees). The frequent scenario is that cases get settled "on the courthouse steps", just before trial but after a great deal of money has been spent on legal fees. In a rational system many of these cases should never have been brought at all - let alone become the basis for large legal expenses and substantial settlements.<br /><br />There are a number of ways of dealing with these problems. Indeed, as part of governmental regulation of the health insurance industry, panels of medical experts can, and undoubtedly will, set forth guidelines on "best practices" in order to make determinations as to what kinds of medical procedures are appropriate for particular conditions, so as to delineate those procedures that warrant reimbursement. A physician who adheres to these "best practices" ought to be immune from a malpractice suit, provided that the physician did not act negligently in carrying out these practices. Such a rule would go a long way towards weeding out frivolous malpractice suits, thereby reducing the costs of medical malpractice insurance and also reducing the wasteful practice of "defensive medicine", <em>i.e</em>., wasteful and unnecessary medical procedures which are designed to provide a defense against a potential malpractice suit but which do nothing to promote the quality of healthcare.<br /><br />The potential for healthcare reform is vast, and there are many competent professionals who know a lot more than I do about what ought to be done. There is, however, one thing I am certain of. The first thing that we need to do is to establish universal coverage. We have the opportunity to do it now, and we must seize that opportunity. When every American has <em>access</em> to quality healthcare, every American will also have a <em>stake</em> in promoting quality healthcare. That is a constituency that politicians cannot ignore.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-30915631000630030862009-12-07T08:05:00.000-08:002009-12-07T08:07:23.539-08:00Correspondence With Thomas BarnettThomas Barnett was good enough to post some comments I sent along to him concerning my views on imperialism and globalization. <a href="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/12/analysis_imperialism_v_globali.html#comments">http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/12/analysis_imperialism_v_globali.html#comments</a><br /><br />Nice to get the feedback.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-25096672987862970292009-10-28T14:34:00.000-07:002009-10-29T07:29:32.945-07:00Short[er] Follow-Up On AfghanistanI have a feeling that my last post on Afghanistan was a bit too long (and turgid) for most readers to wade through. I'm sorry about that, because I was really proud of it. I thought I did a pretty good job of tying together the history of the region and the current situation. If you have the time, I do hope you will read what I had to say. <a href="http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009_09_01_archive.html">http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009_09_01_archive.html</a><br /><br />My bottom line: I think that the US should continue its military operations in Afghanistan. My view is that US military operations in Afghanistan are necessary but not sufficient to bring about a resolution of the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Real long-term peace and stability, however, also requires a greater diplomatic effort by the US to involve the regional powers - India, China, Iran and Russia - in bringing about a resolution of the conflicts.<br /><br />Here's the clincher on why I think we can't withdraw from Afghanistan anytime soon. Thomas Friedman had a column in today's <em>New York Times </em>proposing that the US begin withdrawing from Afghanistan. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28friedman.html?_r=1&em">http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28friedman.html?_r=1&em</a> You can become pretty much of a foreign policy wizard simply by coming out in favor of the opposite of whatever Thomas Friedman proposes. The man's judgment (or lack thereof) is flawless - he is the George Costanza of pundits. President Obama should give Friedman a big office in the White House so that he can get his opinion on all major issues - and then do the opposite.<br /><br />The <em>New York Times </em>does have a columnist who really knows what he is talking about on international affairs, Roger Cohen, but unfortunately you can generally only find him online and not in the print edition. Cohen's writings about Afghanistan have been right on the mark. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/opinion/27iht-edcohen.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/opinion/27iht-edcohen.html</a><br /><br />Someone with whom I don't usually agree, Henry Kissinger, has also written some very sensible stuff about Afghanistan. <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/216704">http://www.newsweek.com/id/216704</a> Consistent with what I suggested in my earlier post, Kissinger sees the involvement of the regional powers as essential to any resolution of the Afghanistan/Pakistan conflict.<br /><br />Finally, it is important to emphasize that the involvement of the regional powers need not be military in nature; getting them involved economically in Afghanistan is even more important. Military strategist Robert Kaplan pointed out in a recent <em>Times</em> op-ed piece that Chinese companies have been seeking to develop mineral resources in Afghanistan. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/opinion/07kaplan.html?_r=1&hp">http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/opinion/07kaplan.html?_r=1&hp</a><br />Kaplan worries that this will lead to an enhancement of the Chinese "strategic" position in the world and a concomitant decline in the status of the American "empire" - he fears that the Chinese will drink America's milkshake. Nevertheless, Kaplan concedes that Chinese investment in Afghanistan will produce jobs for Afghans in industries other than growing opium poppies, as well as the development of infrastructure such as roads and pipelines running through Afghanistan connecting China to the Indian Ocean. Obviously, economic development in Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries on the planet, is the only thing that will ultimately bring peace. None of this economic development, however, can take place without some level of security. Chinese companies are not going to build roads and pipelines and set up mining operations if radical extremists in the Taliban and al Qaeda are going to blow them up and take Chinese business executives hostage. This is the positive, and necessary, contribution that can be made by continuing US military involvement in Afghanistan.<br /><br />This is what globalization is all about, and it is the reason why Kaplan's concern obout the Chinese "strategic" position is so misplaced. If we think of US military endeavors in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world as being driven by a desire to promote the "American Empire", then I will be the first one on the picket lines cheering for our failure. Imperialism and colonialism in any form, American or otherwise, are the great enemies of globalization. Multilateralism is the antidote. That's what FDR's "New Deal for the world" was all about, and as I have previously written, that is the essence of my ideal of "liberal patriotism". <a href="http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009/07/reclaiming-liberal-patriotism.html">http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009/07/reclaiming-liberal-patriotism.html</a><br /><br />So here, in a more abbreviated nutshell than I was able to set forth in my previous post, is my program for what I think President Obama should do in Afghanistan:<br /><br />1. As I did emphasize in my previous post, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state, and the Pashtun are the largest ethnic group. The Pashtun are divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan (a legacy of British colonialism) and the Taliban, operating in both countries, is today probably the best organized force among the Pashtun. No resolution of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be achieved without the participation of the Pashtun, and that probably means the participation of at least some of the elements currently supporting the Taliban.<br /><br />2. Right now, negotiation with the Taliban is impossible. The Taliban think they are winning. They think that the US has "post-Vietnam syndrome" and that popular opinion will force an immediate withdrawal of US forces. When you read stuff like Friedman's column today - which is rapidly becoming the "conventional wisdom" about Afghanistan - it is hard to disagree with that assessment. Moreover, the Taliban knows that once the US leaves Afghanistan, the Taliban will be able to resume its cozy relationship with the Pakistani military, as had been the case prior to 9/11. Accordingly, the leading forces among the Pashtun currently have no incentive to enter into negotiations towards a resolution of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, as long as the Taliban thinks that it is going to win the conflict, it has no incentive to sever its ties with al Qaeda.<br /><br />3. Therefore, it is essential that the US send the message that we are not leaving. This message needs to be heard loud and clear by the Taliban, al Qaeda, the Pakistani military, and all other factions in Afghanistan. I cannot think of a better way of sending this message than with the announcement of an increase in US troop levels. This is the only way of driving a wedge into the leadership of the Pashtun, and isolating Taliban extremists from other Pashtun tribal leaders. And, establishing a meaningful Pashtun leadership independent of Taliban extremists is the only way of resolving the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.<br /><br />4. Simultaneous with announcing an increase in US troop levels, President Obama should announce a major diplomatic initiative among all regional powers to propose a long-term resolution of the conflict. This initiative could take the form of a multinational peace conference to propose steps towards achieving long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ideally, President Obama should announce all of this - the increase in US troop levels as well as the new diplomatic initiative - at a press conference surrounded by representatives not just of NATO and Pakistan, but also of India, China, Russia, Iran and possibly Turkey.<br /><br />5. The multinational conference of regional powers would then propose a cease fire in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be followed by negotiations for the formation of a coalition government in Afghanistan. All factions in Afghanistan, potentially including the Taliban, would be invited to participate in these negotiations, provided that (1) they abide by the cease fire, and (2) they sever all ties with al Qaeda. A multinational peacekeeping force would enforce the terms of the cease fire.<br /><br />I think it has a shot at working. My basic theme: we can't walk away, but we can't do it alone. I think President Obama is on the same wavelength.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-32824375051593463562009-09-23T11:52:00.000-07:002009-10-22T13:05:07.905-07:00Afghans Are Hounds and Rugs, But ...Are they a people? This is the basic problem that plagues American policy in Afghanistan. Pundits and politicians who oppose continued US military involvement in Afghanistan argue that we should withdraw and let "the Afghans" take responsibility for their own governance and their own military security. Supporters of continued, or escalated, US military involvement argue that we need to fight on in order to defeat an insurgency that seeks to topple the "Afghan government."<br /><br />The problem with both of these positions is that they assume that there is such a thing as "the Afghans" and that it is meaningful to talk about "Afghanistan" as though it were a genuine nation-state. I submit that this is incorrect. Rather, Afghanistan is a quintessential "fake state", that is, a nation that is not the product of the organic evolution of the history of the people living there, but instead, an artificial political entity that was cobbled together by outside imperial forces in order to serve their own ends.<br /><br />Therein lies the fundamental conundrum facing America's involvement in Afghanistan. It is a conundrum that is likely to arise frequently throughout the world during the Twenty-First Century, particularly in Central Asia and Africa. The problems presented by fake states such as Afghanistan pose significant difficulties for traditional military strategies, including the counterinsurgency, or "COIN", strategy currently becoming popular among many younger officers in the Pentagon. Unfortunately, as I have ultimately concluded, as explained below, these very difficulties also make it virtually impossible for the US to end its military involvement in Afghanistan anytime in the near future. The key to US success, however, lies not in military strategy, whether it be the COIN strategy or something else, but in the strength of US commitment to the principle of multilateralism, and the willingness of the US to look to assistance from new allies, including China, India, and even Russia and Iran.<br /><br />Let's first take a look at the question I posed at the outset of this post: who, or what, are "the Afghans"? The word "Afghan" is derived from the Persian name that was given to tribes of people who speak the Pashto language. These people generally refer to themselves as the "Pashtun". "Afghanistan" is basically a Persian word meaning "the land of the Afghans", <em>i.e</em>., the Pashtun. Right off the bat, you have to wonder about the legitimacy of a country the name of which is derived from the name that outsiders gave to the people living there.<br /><br />But is Afghanistan really the land of the "Afghans", assuming that that term actually refers to the Pashtun. The Pashtun are the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan, comprising about 40% of the country's total population, which is roughly 28 million. However, there are several other ethnic groups living in Afghanistan. Tajiks are about 27% of the population. Tajiks are ethnic Persians, but unlike Persians living in Iran who are Shiite Muslims, almost all Tajiks are Sunnis. There is, however, another Persian-speaking ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Hazara, who are Shiites, and they comprise about 10% of the population. The ethnic origins of the Hazara are somewhat mysterious, as many believe them to be descendants of the Mongolian army led by Genghis Khan. You also have groups who are of ethnic Turkic ancestry, primarily Uzbeks and Turkmen, who are also Sunni Muslims and together comprise about 15% of the total population. Finally, there is another ethnic group speaking a Persian dialect, the Baloch, who make up about 2% of the total population.<br /><br />Thus, "Afghanistan" is a land made up of many peoples other than "Afghans", again, assuming that this term refers to the Pashtun. Now consider the flip-side of this fact: there are actually far more Pashtun (<em>i.e</em>., "Afghans") living outside of Afghanistan than there are living in Afghanistan. There are roughly 27 million Pashto speakers living in Pakistan, almost all of them in the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas ("FATA") of Pakistan bordering on Afghanistan. This is more than double the number of the Pashtun living in Afghanistan. So again, one has to wonder how legitimate this country really is -- the majority of the people living in the "land of the Afghans" are not Afghans, and the majority of the Afghans actually live in another country.<br /><br />There is a similar pattern with respect to the various other ethnic groups living in Afghanistan. It is almost axiomatic that there are large numbers of Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks living in the neighboring former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Similarly, most of the Baloch in the world live not in Afghanistan but in the neighboring province of Pakistan called, not surprisingly, Balochistan (sometimes spelled Baluchistan).<br /><br />In short, as I said at the outset, Afghanistan is the quintessential "fake state." Its population is a hodgepodge of different ethnic groups having little in common with each other and no great desire to be part of the same country. On the contrary, all of these groups have far closer ties of language and culture to their country-folk living in countries adjacent to Afghanistan. These factors largely account for conflicts going on today in Afghanistan. Afghanistan exists as a country today only because there are lines on a map that say it exists. The people who drew those lines were not "the Afghans".<br /><br /><strong>Map of Afghanistan showing ethnic groups</strong> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ethnic_Groups_in_Afghanistan,_by_district.svg">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ethnic_Groups_in_Afghanistan,_by_district.svg</a><br /><br />Today's nation-state of Afghanistan is a legacy of imperialism. Specifically, it is a product of two major imperial competitions: the "Great Game" of the Nineteenth Century and the Cold War of the Twentieth Century. These two historical events largely account for the dysfunctionality of today's Afghanistan.<br /><br />The Great Game refers to the competition that took place during much of the Nineteenth Century between Russia and England for control of Central Asia. As the Russian Empire expanded into Central Asia, taking control of the areas that today comprise the former Soviet Republics in the region, England attempted to seize control of the area now known as Afghanistan to serve as a buffer against further Russian expansion, protecting British India as well as Persia, which although technically independent, was essentially a British protectorate. Thus, England fought two wars in Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century (and a third in 1919). The Anglo-Afghan Wars became immortalized in popular culture through the poetry of Rudyard Kipling and the fictional character of Army Surgeon Dr. John Watson, whose service in Afghanistan left him with a lifelong limp and a trusty service revolver that he always brought along on his adventures with his housemate, Sherlock Holmes.<br /><br />The general perception is that the Afghan Wars were a disaster for England, leading in large measure to the cliche that Afghanistan is the "graveyard of empires." While it is true that England never succeeded in conquering the territory that we today call "Afghanistan", and England lost a large number of lives in the effort, it is incorrect to view the results of the wars as nothing more than an exercise in futility from the British perspective. In 1893, a British diplomat, Mortimer Durand, negotiated a treaty whereby a large segment of Pashtun-occupied territory was annexed by England and incorporated into British India. The line of demarcation separating British India from the rest of the Afghan territory was known as the "Durand Line." Modern day Pakistan is essentially the western section of the old British India, and the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan that still exists today is none other than the Durand Line. This is why the bulk of the Pashtun population today lives not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan. It is also the reason why the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is viewed as illegitimate by most of the Pashtun.<br /><br />An independent kingdom of Afghanistan was established in the area of the modern state in the 1920s, following the conclusion of the third Anglo-Afghan War, which again ended with the Durand Line intact. Afghanistan thereafter receded from the attention of imperial powers, maintaining neutrality in World War II and through most of the Cold War.<br /><br />In 1978, a pro-Soviet party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. The PDPA attempted to implement a quasi-Marxist program based on secularism, land reform, and support for women's rights. The Carter Administration, led by the fervently anti-Soviet Zbigniew Brzezinski, attempted to capitalize upon the religious backlash that the policies of the PDPA had engendered by directing covert aid to Islamist opposition forces, generally known as the Mujahideen. In 1979, one of the leaders of the PDPA was assassinated and the Soviet Union launched an invasion of Afghanistan. The United States continued to fund the anti-Soviet Mujahideen, directing aid through Saudi Arabia and the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI. In addition, Islamic fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Muslim world flocked to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets alongside the Mujahideen. These groups became known as the "Afghan Arabs", and their charismatic leader was Osama Bin Laden, a member of a wealthy Saudi family and a fervent Wahhabi Muslim.<br /><br />In 1989, the Soviet army prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan having suffered substantial casualties. Before withdrawing, Soviet President Gorbachev attempted to interest the US in a negotiated settlement that would have established a coalition government in Afghanistan, leaving the pro-Soviet President Mohammed Najibullah with a share of power. By this time, the first Bush Administration believed that "victory" had been achieved in Afghanistan and that the Soviets had no leverage to negotiate anything; accordingly, the US rejected the proposal for a coalition government. Gorbachev thereafter carried out the withdrawal of the Soviet troops without a negotiated settlement.<br /><br />The Najibullah government collapsed in 1992 and Najibullah himself was executed. Najibullah was an ethnic Pashtun, and he was defeated by a coalition of non-Pashtun "warlords", primarily supported by Tajiks and Uzbeks. The warlords who overthrew Najibullah had little Pashtun support and Afghanistan essentially had no central government. Afghanistan thereupon entered into a state of civil war, not surprising given the country's vast ethnic diversity. Political power devolved upon the local warlords who drew allegiance based on local ethnic and tribal groupings. Without Cold War rivalries to motivate it to do anything, the US took no action to stabilize Afghanistan or to rebuild its shattered economy. Although Afghanistan degenerated into a state of bloody civil war and the rest of the world paid little attention, it is not correct to say that it was unconnected to the outside world. Afghanistan's connections, however, passed through two of globalization's darkest passages: drug trafficking and violent religious extremism.<br /><br />While the cultivation of opium poppies has a long history in Afghanistan, the business took off during the Soviet invasion. The Mujahideen turned to opium production as a means of financing their resistance to the Soviets. Professor Alfred McCoy contends in his book <em>The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity In The Global Drug Traffic</em> (2003) that the CIA and the ISI helped to promote drug trafficking in Afghanistan in order to finance the Mujahideen. While that claim remains controversial, there is no question that the CIA and the ISI have a long history of ties to one of Afghanistan's most notorious druglords, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar was one of the principal players in the overthrow of the Najibullah government.<br /><br />Drug trafficking in Afghanistan continued to expand following the departure of the Soviets, and today, Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium, as cultivation has declined in other parts of the world such as Southeast Asia and Turkey. There are several reasons why the trade has flourished in Afghanistan. The cultivation of opium poppies is a very labor-intensive process. It requires a very large number of poppies to produce a small quantity of opium. The process of extracting opium paste from poppies and drying it so that it can be converted into opium, and ultimately morphine and heroin, is laborious and time-consuming. Accordingly, the business of growing opium poppies tends to be attractive only in a subsistence economy where alternatives do not exist. Moreover, because the profitable cultivation of opium poppies requires the maintenance of vast fields of poppies, the crop is subject to ready eradication by law enforcement authorities. Thus, the opium trade thrives when two conditions are present - a subsistence economy and the absence of a strong government - and post-Soviet Afghanistan certainly had both of these characteristics. The flourishing opium trade in turn gave further fuel for the Afghan civil wars, not only by providing funding for the competing warlords but also by creating a shared incentive not to permit the establishment of a central government.<br /><br />Religious extremism in Afghanistan was also in many ways a biproduct of the Soviet invasion. Although Afghanistan has long been a Muslim country and all ethnic groups tend to be conservative Muslims (about 90% Sunni), Afghanistan did not have a history of politicized Islamism prior to the Soviet invasion. The CIA and the ISI saw the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism as a way of stoking anti-communist sentiment. Saudi Arabia helped to finance madrasahs (religious schools) throughout Afghanistan, promoting the fundamentalist Wahhabist sect of Islam. As noted, Islamic fundamentalists led by Bin Laden and his followers had descended upon Afghanistan to aid the Mujahideen in fighting the Soviets.<br /><br />By the mid 1990s, an extremist Islamist group led by Mullah Mohammed Omar began to assume a dominant position among the Pashtun tribes fighting in the post-Soviet Afghan civil wars. The group was a direct outgrowth of the madrasah movement, and its name, "Taliban", is the Pashto word for "students". By 1995, the Taliban had seized control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and it established the closest thing to a central government that Afghanistan had seen since the departure of the Soviets. The ascendancy of the Taliban among the Pashtun, however, did not put an end to the civil wars. On the contrary, the primacy of the Taliban incentivized the non-Pashtun opposition to coalesce and form the "Northern Alliance", made up of various competing warlords supported by groups of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara.<br /><br />For reasons of ideology and practicality, Mullah Omar cultivated a close relationship with Bin Laden, who returned to Afghanistan after being expelled from Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Bin Laden became an implacable foe of the Saudi royal family following the first Gulf War - Bin Laden felt that he should be the one to oust the secular Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, not the American infidels - and he dedicated himself to a program of overthrowing the Saudi royal family and driving Americans and all non-Muslims not only out of the holy lands of the Middle East, but out of the entire Muslim world that made up the historical Caliphate. Bin Laden, who had now organized a loose global network of violent Islamist extremists known as "al Qaeda" (which means something like "the network" or "the database") headquartered in Afghanistan, directed a series of attacks against the Saudis and various western interests, culminating in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Mullah Omar refused to cooperate with American requests to apprehend Bin Laden.<br /><br />In late 2001, the US launched an attack, primarily aerial, against the Taliban. With American air support, it was relatively easy for the ground forces of the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban out of Kabul. In early 2002, Hamid Karzai, a veteran of the Soviet war who had acted as a CIA contact in funding the Mujahideen and one of the few prominent ethnic Pashtun who had supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, was installed as the new President of Afghanistan. By this time, the Bush Administration had bigger fish to fry, and it was already planning its invasion of Iraq. The Bush Administration committed relatively few ground troops to Afghanistan, and it was content to let the Northern Alliance carry out "mopping up" operations against the Taliban. A relatively small force of NATO "peacekeepers" was brought in to keep the peace. The Bush Administration also paid little attention to the state of the economy of Afghanistan, and the opium trade continued, and even expanded, as the economic backbone of the country (when it was in power, the Taliban had actually taken some steps to reduce opium production).<br /><br />The Taliban, however, was not "mopped up" and there was no peace to keep. It is important to remember that the Taliban is not simply an Islamist extremist movement; more importantly, it is a Pashtun movement. The leadership of the Taliban, along with much of the leadership of al Qaeda (probably including Bin Laden), simply left "Afghanistan" and crossed the Durand Line and moved into the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, primarily in South Waziristan, part of Pakistan's FATA. As noted previously, Mortimer Durand's imaginary line had never meant very much to the Pashtun. Now ensconced in Pakistan with the leadership of al Qaeda, Mullah Omar and his followers proceeded to organize a new "branch" of the Taliban among the Pashtun living in Pakistan, where, as noted, most of the Pashtun (<em>i.e.</em> "Afghans") actually live.<br /><br /><strong>Map of Pakistan Showing Provinces</strong> <br /><a href="http://www.asiawaves.net/pakistan-map.htm">http://www.asiawaves.net/pakistan-map.htm</a> <br /><br />The Taliban had long enjoyed a cozy relationship with the Pakistani government, particularly the ISI. Indeed, elements of the ISI looked with favor not only on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but also on the growing influence of the Taliban in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan. The Pakistani military is trapped in a mindset that views India as its sole enemy in the world, and many in the military and the ISI view a radicalized Pashtun population as shock-troops in what the Pakistani military sees as an inevitable war with India over Kashmir. Thus, although the US has ladled vast sums of money and military aid into Pakistan in the years since 9/11, little of it has gone towards fighting the Taliban. While much of the money has simply disappeared due to corruption, much of it has been diverted into military projects designed to strengthen Pakistan's position in a conflict with India. The last thing the Pakistani military has wanted to do is use the money to fight a radicalized Pashtun population, Pakistan's most enthusiastic supporters for a religious war with India.<br /><br />By 2008, the Taliban had gained extensive influence throughout Pakistan's Pashtun regions in FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province, even moving into heavily-populated areas such as the Swat Valley and getting perilously close to Pakistan's capital city of Islamabad. In addition, a combination of factors enabled the Taliban to carry on a highly successful insurgency in Afghanistan. The booming opium trade provided the Taliban with a ready source of funding, and the ineffectiveness and corruption of the Karzai government fed a growing body of support for the Taliban among the Pashtun. American forces were inadequate to confront the Taliban, and most of the non-American and non-British NATO forces were peacekeepers ill-equipped to engage in deadly military confrontations. Moreover, the Taliban's success in Pakistan provided it with an easy avenue of escape when faced with opposition by American forces or Afghan forces loyal to the Karzai government - mostly non-Pashtun remnants of the Northern Alliance, poorly suited to fight in the Pashtun territory in which the Taliban thrives - by simply crossing over the Durand Line into sanctuaries in Waziristan. US and Karzai government forces could not attack the Taliban in Pakistan, and as noted, the Pakistani military had little interest in doing so on its own. The Taliban's growing influence in Pakistan strengthened the position of violent Islamist extremists throughout Pakistan, and not just among the Pashtun, as demonstrated by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and even more dramatically by the massacre perpetrated by Pakistani extremists in Mumbai in November 2008.<br /><br />President Obama ran on a platform of supporting a more aggressive pursuit of the war in Afghanistan and shifting US troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. In March 2009, that is precisely what President Obama did. President Obama discharged General David McKiernan as commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan and replaced him with General Stanley McChrystal, a proponent of counterinsurgency strategies who had worked closely with General David Petraeus in Iraq.<br /><br />Since March, the situation has continued to deteriorate in Afghanistan. The bungled and almost certainly fraudulent election of August 2009 raises serious doubts about the legitimacy and efficacy of the Karzai government. In many ways, Karzai has always been the American-supported token Pashtun in what is really a non-Pashtun Northern Alliance government; accordingly, Karzai's lack of electoral support is not surprising. The Taliban has continued to press its military advantage and support among many Pashtun tribes, leading General McChrystal to recommend a further increase in US troop levels, absent which a Taliban military victory in the near future appears likely, at least according to General McChrystal.<br /><br />The prospect of further US military escalation in Afghanistan has given rise to a domestic political backlash, particularly among Democratic Party liberals. Senator Feingold has called for a timetable for the withdrawal of all US troops from Afghanistan. The more moderate Senator Levin, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has come out in opposition to any further increase in the level of US troops. There are rumors that Vice President Biden has counseled President Obama to reject General McChrystal's recommendation for additional troops, and instead begin a withdrawal of US ground troops and a strategic shift towards a more limited objective of using airpower to target al Qaeda outposts. President Obama has stated that he is considering all options, making it clear that he is not going to be rushed into making any decisions about his future course of action in Afghanistan.<br /><br />Objections to continued US involvement in Afghanistan have been even stronger in the liberal media. <em>NY Times </em>columnist Bob Herbert has written strongly and repeatedly in favor of a speedy withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/opinion/22herbert.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/opinion/22herbert.html</a> Liberal blogs have been virtually unanimous in opposing US involvement. Andrew Sullivan, whose current ideology is somewhat unclear - he is an openly gay, Catholic, self-proclaimed conservative who aggressively supported the Iraq War but turned against it and endorsed Obama - has veered beween strongly favoring withdrawal, <a href="http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/09/conservatism-and-afghanistan.html">http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/09/conservatism-and-afghanistan.html</a> to arguing in favor of "muddling through" for the time being. <a href="http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/10/the-afpak-dilemma-the-case-for-muddling-through.html">http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/10/the-afpak-dilemma-the-case-for-muddling-through.html</a><br /><br />A common theme that runs through virtually everything that is said or written in favor of a prompt withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, is that it is a "quagmire" and "another Vietnam." However, there are few relevant similarities between the conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam. Vietnam was primarily a "proxy war", played out against the backdrop of the Cold War in which the combatants were serving as stand-ins for the rival great powers. There is no such situation in the world today. On the contrary, all of today's great powers share identical interests with the US in Afghanistan: eliminating instability in Central Asia and preventing all of the externalities that flow from a failed state, such as terrorism, refugees, drug trafficking, and potentially even ethnic cleansing and genocide. It should also be emphasized that the Vietnam War can only be understood in terms of its role in the death throes of European colonialism. The adversary in Vietnam - the movement led by Ho Chi Minh - was a national liberation movement that successfully defeated one colonial power, France (and to a large extent, another would-be colonizer, Japan), and viewed the US merely as another colonial power seeking to take control of the country away from the Vietnamese. This perception of the US role in Vietnam was not without basis, and more than anything else, it was the US failure to understand that the Vietnamese viewed us as colonialists that doomed our involvement. Again, nothing comparable to that is involved in Afghanistan.<br /><br />This brings up a second theme often asserted by proponents of US withdrawal, namely, the refrain that Afghanistan is the "graveyard of empires", as demonstrated by the failures of England and Russia. However, it is worth remembering that the objectives of the British and the Russians in Afghanistan were unabashedly colonial - they wanted to conquer it and make it part of their empires. If that were the US objective in Afghanistan, I would certainly agree that we would fail and properly so. However, even the most confirmed devotee of Noam Chomsky would have a hard time making the case that the US is trying to colonize Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has no oil or virtually any other natural resources of any great value (although there may well be significant untapped mineral resources in Afghanistan). Indeed, that is one of Afghanistan's major problems, and the reason why it is having trouble building an economy based on anything other than opium. It seems clear to me that the US has no ulterior colonial ambitions in Afghanistan, and that our objectives in pursuing this conflict are exactly what we say they are: preventing Afghanistan and the neighboring Pashtun areas of Pakistan from serving as a safe haven for al Qaeda, as was the case on 9/11.<br /><br />Although the military situation has deteriorated in Afghanistan, there has been some encouraging news from Pakistan. There are signs that the Pakistani military has finally begun to shift its priorities away from preparation for a war with India, and to pursue violent extremists such as the Taliban in FATA with real vigor. These efforts by the Pakistanis have been aided immensely by US missile strikes, as demonstrated by the killing on August 5 of the leader of Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, an odious fellow with close ties to Mullah Omar and Bin Laden. As the Pakistani military has gradually become more serious about pursuing violent extremists such as the Taliban, there has also been a noticeable improvement in India/Pakistan relations, albeit still a long way from anything that might constitute a breakthrough. <a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI30Df01.html">http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI30Df01.html</a> There can be little doubt that all of this would change in the event of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the Pakistani military would undoubtedly again cozy up to the Taliban.<br /><br />Instead of looking to Vietnam for historical analogies, I would suggest that a far more apt analogy is the conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s. Like Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia was a "fake state" that was created not by the people living there, but by outsiders seeking to reconcile old imperial interests in the wake of World War I. Like Afghanistan, Yugoslavia had deteriorated into a state of civil war and there was essentially no central government. And most importantly, like Afghanistan, the warring ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia had compatriots in neighboring states, and the ongoing Yugoslav civil war threatened to spread conflict throughout the region.<br /><br />While the situation in the former Yugoslavia today is far from perfect, it is pretty good. Most people on both the left and the right would agree that the American military intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s was a success. I opposed military intervention at the time, but I readily admit now that I was wrong, and hopefully, I learned something from my mistake. (Actually, I didn't so much oppose American involvement in the Balkans, as I believed that the US should do more to act in concert with Russia rather than Western Europe; a pretty good idea in fact, just a few years ahead of its time). <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/23/opinion/l-us-and-europe-have-different-balkan-aims-297493.html">http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/23/opinion/l-us-and-europe-have-different-balkan-aims-297493.html</a> What we as a country should have learned from the experience in the Balkans are some of the parameters as to how and when US military force can be used effectively in dealing with Twenty-First Century conflicts. US military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was a necessary but not sufficient condition for a resolution of the conflict. US military action in the Balkans succeeded not simply because of the military strategy we followed, but because we were successful in making the conflict a matter of regional importance. Virtually all of the countries of Europe cooperated with the US in resolving the conflict, and most importantly, the cooperation provided by European countries was not limited to military assistance. In addition to providing peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslav republics, European governments, and perhaps even more importantly European businesses, actively worked to build an economic infrastructure that would enable the former Yugoslavia to become integrated into the European community. That is essentially the "success story" that has been taking place in the Balkans in recent years (the current economic crisis has presented a bit of a speed bump in that process).<br /><br />These lessons are directly applicable to Afghanistan. The key to success in Afghanistan is to stop viewing the conflict as simply an "American problem", and to begin addressing it as an enormous problem for the entire region of South-Central Asia. The countries that are most directly affected by the conflict in Afghanistan are those in the region: India (and of course Pakistan), China, Russia, and Iran. The impact on India and Pakistan of a US withdrawal and a Taliban victory has already been pointed out. Afghan drug trafficking has a huge impact on the countries of the region. Much of the Afghan heroin flows into Russia, which is now believed to have the world's largest population of heroin addicts. <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-heroin25-2009sep25,0,2349140.story">http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-heroin25-2009sep25,0,2349140.story</a> A great deal of Afghan heroin also flows into Iran, which has also long had a major problem with heroin addiction, leading the Iranian government to begin assisting the US in trying to eradicate Afghan drug networks. <a href="http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/05/un-hails-iran-for-curbing-afghan-heroin.html#atuid-4ac4fcec30cbf3a1">http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/05/un-hails-iran-for-curbing-afghan-heroin.html#atuid-4ac4fcec30cbf3a1</a><br /><br />The ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan also play a crucial role in destabilizing the region. The consequence of a US withdrawal will not simply be a Taliban victory, it will likely be a resumption of the Afghan civil war that had been ongoing since the end of the Soviet invasion. Again, it bears emphasis that the Taliban is essentially a Pashtun movement, and the Pashtun are only 40% of the population. The ethnic groups that make up the other 60% of Afghanistan would undoubtedly oppose the Taliban, as they did by forming the Northern Alliance. These ethnic groups have country-folk in the neighboring former Soviet republics and in Iran, and it is likely that the conflict would spread to these countries. The governments of the former Soviet republics are already of dubious stability, and they could readily be challenged by violent Islamist movements. Ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan could even embroil China, as the Muslim Uyghurs of the Chinese province of Xinjiang (which also borders on a small piece of Afghanistan) are ethnically and culturally related to some of the Turkic ethnic groups of Afghanistan, and growing militancy among Uyghur separatists is already a matter of considerable concern to the Chinese government.<br /><br />Whenever any suggestion is made that the US should look to other countries to take a more active role in Afghanistan, the suggestion almost invariably refers to America's "allies" in NATO. However, it is unrealistic to think that most European countries will be willing to make any more significant military commitment to Afghanistan other than by supplying peacekeeping troops, and that is of limited utility until there is a peace to keep. A far more fruitful source of allies is in the immediate region, namely, China, India, and even Iran and Russia. Notably, General McChrystal has recently pointed out that Iran is actually playing a very positive role in using its influence in Afghanistan to assist the US. <a href="http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/10/iran-in-afghanistan.html">http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/10/iran-in-afghanistan.html</a> In all of the hubub about Iran's nuclear program, the media seems to have missed General McChrystal's statement that Iran may be one of our most valuable allies in Afghanistan. There is no reason why China and India cannot also be encouraged to take a more active role in assisting the US in the conflict. And while the prospect of another Russian incursion into Afghanistan probably sounds pretty unattractive to everyone - to the Russians most of all - Russia can nevertheless provide other forms of assistance, primarily through their relationships with the former Soviet republics. Moreover, as in the case of the conflict in the Balkans, assistance by the regional powers can include economic aid as well as military assistance. In particular, Chinese and Indian businesses have recently shown themselves to be quite adept at developing natural resources in some of the most remote countries of Africa. There is no reason why these skills can't be applied to the development of Afghanistan's significant untapped mineral wealth. This can be the key to building an economic infrastructure in Afghanistan that is essential to any prospect for peace.<br /><br />I am not a military expert, and I do not have an opinion as to the correctness of General McChrystal's recommendation as to the need for increased US troop levels. What I do know, however, is that aggressive American diplomacy to get the other powers in the region more involved is just as important as military strategy to achieve success in Afghanistan. As in the Balkans, US military involvement is necessary but not sufficient to resolve the Afghanistan conflict. Fortunately, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton made a wise choice for their point-person in the region. Richard Holbrooke is not only perhaps America's most experienced diplomat, he is the person who displayed considerable diplomatic skills in dealing with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. We need him to apply a similar approach here.<br /><br />It is likely that the country of Afghanistan in its current form will cease to exist over the next few years. There are many possible scenarios as to what may happen. Like the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan could simply break up into several separate countries based on the ethnic divisions in the country. It is also possible that the different ethnic groups could not simply seek to break away, but could also seek to unite with their country-folk in neighboring countries (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc.). This could be particularly problematic as it pertains to Pakistan, which itself is, in many respects, a "fake state". The Afghan Pashtun could seek to join with the Pashtun in FATA, or the Afghan Baloch could seek to unite with secessionists in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. Instability in Balochistan is one of those sleeper issues that could suddenly burst onto everyone's radar screen in the next few years. Balochistan is geographically the largest province of Pakistan, but it is very sparsely populated. It is a mountainous region that has lots of nooks and crannies that provide ideal hiding places for terrorists, and it is believed that Mullah Omar has now moved to Balochistan since Pakistan has stepped up its anti-Taliban activities in FATA. The Persian-related Baloch have few ties of language and culture to the other peoples of Pakistan, although there is a substantial Pashtun minority in Balochistan. The Baloch often resent the "Indians" (<em>i.e</em>., Punjabis and Sindhis) who dominate the Pakistani government, and there is an active secessionist movement. While radical Islamism has never held much sway in Balochistan, and its secessionist movements have largely been secular and nationalistic in character, that could all change with the growing influence of the Taliban, and al Qaeda, in the province.<br /><br />[An aside: A number of years ago, I saw a bumper sticker on a New York City taxi reading, "India Out of Baluchistan!" I had no idea what this meant, as I had no clue where Baluchistan was. After looking it up in an atlas, I was still at a loss because it did not seem as though India was <em>in</em> Balochistan, and hence cannot get "out", since Balochistan does not border on India and it is on the far southwestern part of Pakistan, bordering Iran. Ultimately, I figured out that there are two possible interpretations of the bumper sticker. "India" is the term that Balochis use to refer to the dominant parts of Pakistan, namely Punjab and Sindh, so the cab driver could have been a Balochi separatist. On the other hand, Pakistan has often accused India of fomenting secessionism in Balochistan, so the cab driver could have been a Pakistani protesting against Indian meddling in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. I love the kinds of education you get just by living in New York.]<br /><br />On the other hand, it is conceivable that notwithstanding its ethnic diversity and the various secessionist forces at work, Afghanistan could continue to exist as a single sovereign state, albeit in a highly decentralized federated form. Managing these changes in a way that minimizes bloodshed and instability throughout the region will pose significant military and diplomatic challenges for the US. Richard Holbrooke may well be the only person in the world with relevant experience in handling such problems.<br /><br />Many Americans will continue to question why the US should be expending lives and treasure in Afghanistan. It is difficult for most Americans to see how the conflict in Afghanistan has an immediate impact on America's security. Opponents of continued US military action argue that we can better defend ourselves against al Qaeda by strengthening homeland security. Andrew Bacevich, a sharp critic of US military involvement in the world who is particularly skeptical of COIN strategies, proposes prompt withdrawal from Afghanistan and a shift to a "containment" strategy for dealing with Islamist radicals. <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092502011_2.html?sid=ST2009092503588">http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092502011_2.html?sid=ST2009092503588</a> But in today's world of globalization, national security cannot be achieved simply by closing our borders. Global interconnectedness has many, many positive aspects, but it also gives rise to global dangers. The opium produced in Afghanistan's poppy fields flows directly into the shooting galleries of America's inner cities. A group of religious fanatics given sanctuary by the government of Afghanistan can plot to cause the deaths of thousands in New York and Washington. [And, as I observe above, even passions about conflicts in a place as far away as Balochistan can find their way onto the bumpers of New York City taxis.] The unfortunate reality is that opposition to all wars is not a viable policy in today's world. As Barack Obama accurately stated in articulating his opposition to the Iraq War back in 2002, we cannot oppose all wars, only dumb wars. Afghanistan is not a dumb war. We have to build better alliances with the great powers in the region, and it would be dumb for the US to fight this war alone, but approached correctly as an exercise in multilateralism, American military involvement can be an indispensable component to bringing about a favorable resolution in Afghanistan.<br /><br />Addressing the conflict in Afghanistan will not only pose a test to President Obama's diplomatic skills, it will require the application of the full range of his formidable political skills. President Obama must present the case for American military involvement to the American public rationally but forcefully. President Obama is up against two strains in American attitudes about foreign policy that pose significant obstacles to a sound policy in Afghanistan. These strains are unilateralism and isolationism. As I have argued before, these strains are in many ways two sides of the same coin. <a href="http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009/07/reclaiming-liberal-patriotism.html">http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2009/07/reclaiming-liberal-patriotism.html</a> Americans have a tendency to believe that we should always act alone in international affairs (the cowboy mindset), and if we can't do whatever we want to do by ourselves, we should not try to do it at all. President Obama must persuade the American people that this attitude is simply not a viable one in Afghanistan, or indeed, virtually anywhere else in today's world. We cannot walk away, but we cannot do it alone. And we must learn to think about the world in a new way. The Twenty-First Century is not a Euro-American world. To thrive in this world, Americans must learn to think about acting in concert with people who may seem different from us - not just the Indians, but the Chinese, the Russians and even the Iranians.<br /><br />Afghanistan is probably just the beginning. The scenario now playing itself out in the Afghanistan conflict is likely to be repeated many times in the decades ahead, primarily in Africa, which is chock full of "fake states" left by European colonialists. America will not be able to avoid becoming involved in these conflicts; nor should we, at least, not if we care about stopping things like famine and genocide. Acceptance of multilateralism, and a willingness to look beyond our historical alliances in Europe for new partners, will be the key to our success.<br /><br />Finally, a note on sources. I highly recommend the work of Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid. He has an excellent piece in the current edition of <em>The New York Review of Books</em> updating the situation in Afghanistan. <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23113">http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23113</a> Anyone interested in digging deeper to get an understanding of the region should read Rashid's outstanding trilogy: <em>Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia</em> (2000), <em>Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia</em> (2002), and <em>Descent Into Chaos</em> (2008).<br /><br />As always, I also recommend the writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett, whose writings on Afghanistan, as on just about every other global issue, are among the best things out there. <a href="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/10/gelb_on_the_need_to_socialize.html">http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/10/gelb_on_the_need_to_socialize.html</a>#Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-10787571267207345042009-08-26T19:16:00.000-07:002009-08-26T19:25:54.607-07:00Reclaiming Liberal Patriotism IIWithout a past we are lost. Without a future we are doomed.<br /><br />I found myself close to tears most of this morning. It surprises me. I have never been particularly taken by "the Kennedy mystique." I campaigned for Gene McCarthy in '68. Things got a bit heated during the primaries, and some of us didn't care for RFK that much. Still, I remember being unable to sleep on the horrible night of the California primary.<br /> <br />I felt some of the same things this morning.<br /><br />I think of my personal recollections of Ted Kennedy. I remember seeing him at an airport once. It was around the time of the Bork fight, and I shook his hand to congratulate him on the good work he was doing. He looked so energetic, so confident.<br /><br />I remember going to an Obama rally in New Jersey just before Super Tuesday. My daughter, who had never expressed much interest in politics before but was drawn to Obama, was the one who got me to go along. I ran into some people I had known from Northern New Jersey from the McGovern campaign. Ted Kennedy was there. He looked a lot smaller and more frail compared to the way he looked when I saw him at the airport twenty years earlier. But he still seemed to have the same confidence and energy. His speech was beautiful. So was Obama's. So was Cory Booker's. The past, the present, the future.<br /><br />All my life, I've loved the study of history, almost to the point of obsession. I think about it a lot, American history in particular. There's a lot not to like about American history. I'm not particularly a fan of two guys who are Democratic Party icons, Jackson and Jefferson. I think they were hypocrites. Somehow, though, those hypocrites managed to let some very subversive words sneak into the fabric of our country:<br /><br />"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men [sic] are created equal ..."<br /><br />Much as the forces of reaction have tried to wipe them out over the years, those words are still there. They have inspired greatness throughout our country's history. Greatness on the part of figures in the establishment, like Lincoln and FDR. Greatness on the part of figures outside of the establishment like Frederick Douglass, Ella Baker, and Harvey Milk. Greatness on the part of a few outsiders who worked their way into the establishment, like Louis Brandeis and Thurgood Marshall. It's what I think of as liberal patriotism.<br /><br />It's been hard for liberals to be patriotic during my lifetime. We've gone through the Cold War, Vietnam, the Kennedy assassinations, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, Watergate, Iran-Contra, the Clarence Thomas hearings, the Clinton impeachment, the election of 2000, the Bush-Cheney reign. Torture as national policy - and Cheney brags about it.<br /><br />Is there any room for liberal patriotism? That's why I got teary this morning. Because, throughout all of those years there have been the Kennedys. Perhaps, at times, they have been hypocrites, as other Democratic Party icons have been. Robert Kennedy worked for Joe McCarthy. John Kennedy did not say no to the Bay of Pigs.<br /><br />But over the years they have also been the voices of liberal patriotism. They have been a bridge between what has been great in our past and what can be great in our future. JFK challenged us, literally, to reach for the moon, and we saw Neil Armstrong take his small step. RFK told us that when dreaming of things that never were, we should say "Why not?", and we saw the civil rights revolution become the law of the land. Teddy Kennedy told us, several times, that the dream would live on, and we saw America again became a beacon of hope for millions of immigrants.<br /><br />Teddy Kennedy also told us that healthcare for all Americans is an unalienable right. How fitting, how striking it is that his life was brought to an end at this moment in our history. I'm starting to tear up again.<br /><br />I have sensed some darkness in the liberal soul over the past few weeks. There has been defeatism. Liberals seem to be getting "wee-weed up" (I just love that phrase). There is a lot a cynicism; we expect Obama to be a sell-out, a disappointment. Lord knows we have plenty of reasons to be cynical. We hear that passing healthcare reform is just impossible. And the more we hear that, the broader the wolfish grin on the faces of the forces of reaction becomes.<br /><br />Is it really that hard? Is it such a big thing to say that every American has a fundamental right to a guarantee of decent healthcare? I will not accept for an instant the suggestion that we cannot afford it. Even through economic crisis we are still the wealthiest country in the world, indeed, in the history of the world. I do not begrudge great wealth to people who have worked hard to earn it. But those who have truly earned their wealth are those who understand that they must bear great responsibility to those less fortunate. I think Teddy Kennedy understood that, perhaps better than anyone.<br /><br />The simple answer lies in that subversive phrase woven into the fabric of our country, for all of us are truly created equal. No one of us has a greater right to lead a healthy life than any other.<br /><br />I salute Senator Kennedy for all of his service to our country. Let us honor his life by reclaiming liberal patriotism.<br /><br />I cannot wait for the day when President Obama signs the Edward M. Kennedy Healthcare Reform Act of 2009 into law.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-83221093012577907752009-07-03T12:46:00.000-07:002009-07-04T05:59:56.997-07:00Reclaiming Liberal PatriotismOn November 4, 2008, I fell in love. I fell in love with the United States of America.<br /><br />As I may have mentioned on other posts, I am part of the baby-boom generation, born in the early 1950s. I hid under my desk in elementary school during the Cuban Missile Crisis while my teacher casually mentioned that an H-bomb dropped on the Empire State Building would melt steel in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">Hackensack</span> (our school was a lot closer to the Empire State Building than it was to <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">Hackensack</span>). I went to college in the early 1970s and learned about what had happened to people like <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">Mossadeq</span>, Juan Bosch and Allende. I watched the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">assassinations</span>, marched in antiwar rallies (Vietnam and later Iraq), lived through Watergate, Iran-Contra, the Clarence Thomas hearings, the Clinton impeachment, the 2000 election and you-know-who's Presidency that came after that. It often occurred to me that Noam Chomsky seemed to be making some good points about the evil America had perpetrated in the world.<br /><br />Then came November 4, 2008. I spent the day <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">volunteering</span> as a Democratic legal observer at a polling place in a blue-collar district near Scranton, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">Pennsylvania</span>. There wasn't much to observe. Everything went very smoothly, very peacefully. I would say that 90+% of the voters appeared to be white, working-class people.<br /><br />That night I came home with my family, and was moved to tears by the results of the election. I happened to go online to see what the results had been in the district where I had been working as a poll watcher. Obama got more than two-thirds of the vote.<br /><br />That was the United States of America I fell in love with. It was the same United States of America that had been there all my life, but I don't think I fully appreciated it before. Did America change or did I? Probably a little bit of both.<br /><br />I have been reading a great deal about FDR's Presidency lately. My wife, son and I always make it a point to attend the annual Reading Festival at the FDR Library in Hyde Park, NY (our daughter joined us this year, my sister-in-law and her husband joined us last year). I recommend it highly.<br /><br />In particular, I have become fascinated by FDR's foreign policy and his vision for America's role in the postwar world. A couple of years ago, one of the speakers in Hyde Park was Elizabeth <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">Borgwardt</span>, whose outstanding book, <em>A New Deal For The World</em>, was a real eye-opener. This year there were some excellent <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7">presentations</span> on FDR's foreign policy by David <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8">Woolner</span>, co-author of <em>FDR's World</em>, and by Christopher <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9">O'Sullivan</span>, author of a new biography of Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State during World War II and an influential architect of many of FDR's policies during the war.<br /><br />FDR's vision of America's role in the world was best expressed in his incredibly moving "Four Freedoms" speech, namely, the belief that America must dedicate itself to the promotion and protection of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Most importantly, FDR emphasized that these freedoms are the birthright of every person in the world, not just Americans. The concept was, and is, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10">revolutionary</span>. One person who was inspired by FDR's speech was an aspiring young South African lawyer named Nelson Mandela.<br /><br />FDR's vision of the postwar world was more than just pie-in-the sky platitudes. FDR's thinking <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11">specifically</span> differed from Wilsonian idealism in that it attempted to find grounding not just in theoretical structures and diplomatic organizations, but in the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12">practicalities</span> of real life. In particular, FDR understood that economic liberalism - a New Deal for the world - was essential to the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_13">implementation</span> of his ideas. In a way, FDR's concept of America's role in the postwar world could be summed up as Wilson plus Keynes. FDR's vision stood on three pillars: free trade, anti-colonialism, and <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_14">multilateralism</span>.<br /><br />There was also a fourth pillar underlying FDR's program having to do with the domestic politics of the US. FDR was committed to bipartisan consensus as the basis for achieving popular support for his program. It was not just FDR's war cabinet that was decidedly bipartisan. FDR recruited prominent Republicans such as Arthur <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_15">Vandenberg</span> to help implement his program for the postwar world. In other words, FDR's vision was not distinctly Democratic or Republican - it was American.<br /><br />As I have studied FDR's vision of America's role in the world, it occurred to me that it reminds me a lot of the America I fell in love with on November 4, 2008. How could I have missed it for most of my life?<br /><br />The Cold War did a great deal to undermine FDR's dream of a new world order predicated on the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_16">implementation</span> of the Four Freedoms. The Cold War in turn had an enormous, and very negative, impact on US domestic politics. What had been the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_17">isolationism</span> that had destroyed Wilson's dreams for a system of world peace after World War I, morphed into the McCarthyism and fanatical anti-communism that destroyed any hope for either <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_18">bipartisanship</span> in domestic politics or <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_19">multilateral</span> cooperation in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_20">international</span> affairs. Indeed, David <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_21">Woolner</span> commented in his recent talk that the American ideological strain that had fought Wilson was never truly <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_22">isolationist</span>, but is more accurately described as <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_23">unilateralist</span>. What Wilson's opponents preyed upon in order to shoot down the League of Nations treaty was not so much an American desire to be isolated from the rest of the world, but a desire to preserve America's freedom to act <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_24">unilaterally</span>, based upon a suspicion of other countries and an <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_25">unwillingness</span> to commit the US to act in a cooperative fashion with the rest of the world.<br /><br /><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_26">Unilateralism</span> was what made America's behavior so <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_27">objectionable</span> in the post-World War II era. When America becomes <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_28">unilateralist</span>, it can become very ugly. That is the America I protested against for its unilateral acts of aggression in Vietnam and Iraq.<br /><br />Just as the Cold War opened the floodgates to American <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_29">unilateralism</span> under the guise of anti-communism, so too did it divert the US from FDR's vision of America as a bastion of anti-colonialism. Vietnam was the clearest <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_30">manifestation</span> of this. The US committed itself to the restoration of French rule in Indochina, even though the French had sided with the Japanese during World War II and Ho Chi <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_31">Minh</span> had carried on a guerrilla war against both the Japanese and the French. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_32">Woolner's</span> book suggests that although the record is not clear on the point, FDR, had he lived, might well have pushed for a stronger anti-French position in post-war Indochina. No matter - Ho Chi <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_33">Minh</span> was a communist and in the mindset of the Cold War, we had to defeat him. Anti-colonialism got put on the back burner. When the Vietnamese defeated the French, the US just stepped into their shoes. The Vietnamese saw no difference; the Americans had become the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_34">colonialists</span>. And while many Americans deluded themselves into thinking that we were fighting for freedom and democracy in Vietnam, it was the Vietnamese who had it right. We were really just fighting to prolong colonialism.<br /><br />It was not just right-wing ideologies that were twisted by the Cold War; the ideologies of the Left also underwent a <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_35">transformation</span>, and in many ways, it was not a healthy one. Vietnam became a trigger for the belief that America could play no positive role in the world. All American military action, regardless of the purpose, came to be viewed as synonymous with aggression. The Left became champions of a new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_36">isolationism</span>. We can hear this attitude today in the opposition by some on the Left not only against the war in Iraq, but against the war in Afghanistan as well. These attitudes on the Left carried over to economic policy, as a crude populism drifted towards economic nationalism. Free trade - the cornerstone of FDR's liberal economic world order - emerged as the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_37">bete</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_38">noire</span> of the Left. The Left became the opponent of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_39">globalization</span>, and global economic development itself came to be viewed by many on the Left as nothing more than an excuse for <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_40">profiteering</span> by American <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_41">corporations</span>. The Right castigated the Left as the "blame America first crowd." I hate to say it, but the attack was not without basis.<br /><br />The dream of bipartisan consensus collapsed. We became two Americas, one Red and one Blue. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_42">Partisanship</span> became a blood sport. New media - talk radio, cable news, blogs - gave rise to a partisan atmosphere in which the notion of common ground became unthinkable.<br /><br />That is, until November 4, 2008, and it became thinkable again. Those white folks I was keeping an eye on at the polling place in Scranton had voted <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_43">overwhelmingly</span> to elect a President named Barack Hussein Obama, whose mother was a white agnostic and whose father was a Muslim from Kenya. So too had a majority of the voters in Florida, and Virginia, and Indiana, and North Carolina - North Carolina for goodness sake! So too did every member of my family. Suddenly it became possible to believe in President <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_44">Obama's</span> vision of a country that was more than just a collection of warring Red States and Blue States, but instead, the <em>United</em> States of America.<br /><br />President Obama has enormous substantive challenges ahead of him. We are in the deepest recession since the 1930s. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_45">Unemployment</span> just went way up. Serious health care reform is no longer optional. We are in two wars. Al <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_46">Qaeda</span> is still out there.<br /><br />But I believe that President <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_47">Obama's</span> greatest challenge transcends any substantive issue. He must rediscover FDR's vision for America and its role in the world and make it a reality. And we have to help him. We need to reclaim liberal patriotism.<br /><br />It's not going to be easy. President Obama is coming under attack from both the Right and the Left. The attacks from the Right are to be expected, but the level of their viciousness almost defies belief. The attacks from some on the Left are almost as bad. Extreme <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_48">partisanship</span> has not only become a bad habit, it has become an industry. Many pundits of the Left and the Right do not want to see Americans work together, they do not want to admit of the possibility of common ground. Doing so would put them out of a job.<br /><br />But there are bigger forces at work today than the insidious blather of partisan pundits. The peoples of the world stand on the brink of a new era, and it can be an era of peace, prosperity and freedom. There is no Cold War. In fact, there is no war at all among the major powers of the world and it is almost impossible to conceive of any danger of such a war arising in the foreseeable future. Economic development is on the march in China, India and Brazil. We can seriously talk about ending extreme poverty in the world. Technology has made <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_49">interconnectedness</span> and the free flow of ideas an unstoppable force. We have seen the rise of the spirit of liberty even in a country as rigid and <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_50">authoritarian</span> as Iran.<br /><br />And <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_51">notwithstanding</span> everything America has done wrong in the past 50 years, much of the world still sees America as its beacon of hope. They see the America that I saw on November 4, 2008. They hear the words that inspired Mandela.<br /><br />On this Fourth of July, I would like to salute my sister-in-law, a successful ob-<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_52">gyn</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_53">practitioner</span>. She has gone to do volunteer work in a hospital in rural Kenya. She is one of the greatest patriots I know.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-18815018486942348392009-04-24T10:20:00.000-07:002009-05-11T07:39:22.279-07:00A Brief History of SocialismI heard a report the other day that there are some lunatic elements of the Republican National Committee – they can no longer be called the “lunatic fringe” because they are not on the fringe of the Republican Party -- who are insisting that the Democratic Party now be referred to as the "Democrat Socialist Party." <a href="http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/23/steele-urged-to-label-obama-a-socialist/">http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/23/steele-urged-to-label-obama-a-socialist/</a> Right-wing talk radio routinely describes President Obama as a “socialist”, or worse. Clearly, "socialist" is the epithet of choice of the Republican Party.<br /><br />However, talk about "socialism" seems to be all the rage these days on both sides of the political spectrum. Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed "socialist", recently argued in an op-ed piece in the <em>Boston Globe</em> that socialism is really a good thing, pointing to his favorable impressions of Finland, which Senator Sanders described as a "socialist country." <a href="http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/04/22/and_socialism/">http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/04/22/and_socialism/</a> Similarly, the liberal-leaning <em>Daily Show</em> recently did a satirical piece in which one of the comic reporters traveled to Sweden, another alleged "socialist country", in order to reveal the "nightmare" of socialism, including "horrific" things such as universal health care, free college tuition, and guaranteed 30-day paid vacations (as well as ubiquitous well-endowed blonde women).<br /><br />Obviously, a lot of this is not to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, socialism is very much in the news, and the point that is most striking to me is that most people on both the right and the left seem to be absolutely clueless as to what socialism is. So, pedant that I am, I have decided to take it upon myself to set forth a little history of socialism, hopefully, with the objective of making it clear just how nonsensical this Republican name-calling about “socialism” really is.<br /><br />Socialism is an economic system in which what Karl Marx called the "means of production" -- i.e., factories, farms, offices, all of the things that are needed to make an economy work -- are not owned privately but are instead owned by the State (or some other type of collective). True socialism is by and large an economic system that died with the Twentieth Century. Except for the geriatric Fidel Castro, the lunatic Kim Jong Il, and the demagogic Hugo Chavez, there is no one in the world today who continues to espouse socialism. The highly-capitalistic country of Sweden is most definitely not a socialist country. Nor is Finland, contrary to what Bernie Sanders thinks.<br /><br />In order to understand what socialism really is, and how it came to be so thoroughly discredited, I offer this brief journey into the past.<br /><br />Socialism first appeared in the early Nineteenth Century in experimental communities such as the commune established by British industrialist Robert Owen in New Harmony, Indiana. Early socialism was driven by ethical and moralistic objections to private property, a belief frequently derived from various forms of evangelical Christianity. The guiding principle of early socialism was the abolition of private property and the equal sharing of all goods and services among all members of the community. This form of socialism was also closely connected with philosophical anarchism, as expressed in the writings of the French anarchist philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon theorized that private property was a form of legalized theft carried out by the State. Thus, Proudhon postulated that if the State were eliminated, private property would also necessarily be eliminated and socialism would be established by default.<br /><br />Socialist theory underwent a radical transformation in 1848 when two young radical German philosophers, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, published <em>The Communist Manifesto</em>. Marx and Engels derided earlier versions of socialism as "utopian socialism", and instead advanced a theory of what they called "scientific socialism." Marx and Engels posited the claim that all of history could be understood in terms of "class struggles." They viewed the growth of capitalism as, in many respects, a positive historical development in that it fostered technological innovation and economic growth. More importantly, however, they argued that capitalism dramatically simplified the class struggle, by dividing society into only two classes: the bourgeoisie that owned the means of production, and the proletariat that toiled in order to generate profits for the bourgeoisie. What was needed to establish socialism and eliminate the inequities of capitalism (which were undoubtedly quite real in the mid Nineteenth Century) was for the proletariat to rise up in a revolution and seize control of the means of production. For Marx and Engels, unlike Proudhon and other anarchist socialists, the State in itself was not the villain. Marx and Engels contended that the State was merely the political arm of the ruling class, through which the ruling class exercised its control over everyone else. Thus, Marx and Engels argued that an organized revolutionary proletariat could seize control of the State, and then use the State to take over ownership of the means of production and bring about a socialist society.<br /><br />Marx and Engels were driven out of Germany as a result of the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848 and they fled to England where, ironically and perhaps hypocritically, Engels' wealthy family owned numerous factories. Marx, the intellectual powerhouse of the duo, supported by the largesse of the Engels family, thereupon embarked upon a comprehensive academic study of capitalism carried out during long hours in the British Museum, ultimately producing his magnum opus, <em>Capital.</em> Drawing on the works of English economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill, and supported by a detailed study of the financial records of English factories, Marx concluded that capitalism had an inherent tendency toward shrinking overall levels of profit (something originally suggested by Ricardo), leading to monopolization. More importantly for Marx, this meant that capitalist society would become increasingly polarized between a shrinking but wealthier bourgeoisie, who owned the means of production, and a growing and more impoverished proletariat, who labored to generate profits for the bourgeoisie. Marx concluded that this meant that a revolution by the proletariat was not just desirable, but historically inevitable, and that once the proletariat seized control of the State, it would be able to create a socialist society in which the State, as the political arm of the proletariat, would now own the means of production.<br /><br />Although not consistent on the point, Marx tended to believe that it was most likely that this socialist revolution would first come about in the most highly-developed capitalist country, England, where the evolution of capitalism was most advanced and where the proletariat was best organized. Thus, while in England, Marx involved himself with the International Workingman's Association, known as the "First International", seeking to ingratiate himself with English trade unionists. Marx found the experience frustrating, as the English trade unionists were generally more interested in organizing for the purposes of improving their wages and working conditions than staging a political revolution in order to seize control of the means of production. On the other hand, Marx found himself even more frustrated with the advocates of violent revolution in the International, who continued to adhere to the romanticism of anarchistic "utopian socialism" and who rejected what they perceived to be the authoritarianism of Marx's "scientific socialism". Marx's great adversary was the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin; Bakunin and his followers, particularly a violent fellow named Nechayev, were the models for the nihilistic radicals depicted in Dostoyevsky’s novel <em>The Possessed</em>. Internecine disputes among these various factions ultimately brought about the end of the First International. Marx died without seeing either the end of capitalism or a socialist revolution.<br /><br />Later socialist theorists continued to be attracted to the logical rigor of Marx's scientific socialism. However, by the end of the Nineteenth Century it was becoming obvious that Marx's prediction of the inevitable collapse of capitalism and its replacement by socialism was not coming to fruition. On the contrary, the capitalist economies in England, France, and Germany, as well as new, rapidly developing capitalist economies in the United States and Japan, while given to periodic economic ups and downs, generally appeared quite healthy.<br /><br />At the turn of the century, the British historian/economist J.A. Hobson wrote a book entitled <em>Imperialism</em>, and although Hobson himself was not particularly committed to socialism, Hobson's book would radically alter socialist theory for most of the Twentieth Century. Hobson theorized that the advanced capitalist economies of Europe did not experience shrinking levels of profit because as advanced capitalist economies effectively became internally sated with capital, the phenomenon that Marx believed would cause the demise of capitalism, financiers were nevertheless able to invest their capital outside of their own countries, thereby creating new markets and access to new supplies of resources and labor that enabled them to generate ever-increasing levels of profits. Hobson viewed this phenomenon as the "economic taproot" of imperialism, the process by which the European powers, as well as non-European powers Japan and the United States, had effectively gained control of the entire world by the end of the Nineteenth Century.<br /><br />For many European socialists, such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the other English Fabian Socialists, and Eduard Bernstein and other leaders of the German Social Democratic Party, Hobson's theory meant that Marx's prediction that socialism would come about as a result of a violent revolution following the inevitable collapse of capitalism, had become outmoded. Instead, they argued, rising profits in the advanced capitalist countries meant that labor unions could now successfully bargain for higher wages and improved living conditions for the working class. Labor unions, in turn, could finance political parties, such as the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party, that could attain political power through democratic processes and establish socialism gradually and peacefully. The name “Fabian Society” was derived from the Roman general Fabius Maximus, known as “Cunctator” or “Delayer”, because of his strategy of gradually delaying the advances of the Carthaginians. The Fabian Society advocated a similar gradualist approach to the overthrow of capitalism. H.G. Wells, a follower of the Fabian Socialists, wrote a science fiction novel entitled <em>Things To Come</em> about a future utopian society in which the economy would be organized "scientifically" according to socialist principles, superseding the "barbaric" capitalist system.<br /><br />Hobson's theory, however, caused socialists in other parts of the world to reach other conclusions. A Russian radical lawyer/activist/intellectual, Vladimir Ulyanov, known as "Lenin", wrote his own book entitled <em>Imperialsm</em>, subtitled "The Highest Stage of Capitalism." Lenin essentially copied Hobson's analysis of the economic bases of imperialism. However, Lenin argued that far from invalidating Marx's prediction of violent proletarian revolution, the phenomenon of imperialism simply meant that the class struggle had now become globalized. The bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist countries now exploited the proletariat of the less-advanced countries, such as Russia (Mao Zedong would later expand Lenin’s analysis to include pre-capitalist workers, such as rural Chinese peasants). Thus, Lenin rejected the notion of the possibility of democratic socialism and indeed, argued that groups such as the British Fabians and the German Social Democrats showed that workers in the advanced capitalist countries had been co-opted by the bourgeoisie and were now enemies of the true proletarians in exploited countries like Russia. Lenin argued that these exploited workers in the poorest parts of the world would rebel and fulfill Marx’s prediction of a socialist revolution.<br /><br />Thus, the beginning of the Twentieth Century saw the great fissure between the democratic socialists and the authoritarian socialists (who generally became known as "communists"). Nevertheless, both of these groups continued to adhere to the basic goal of bringing about socialism, namely, the creation of a non-capitalist economic system in which the State would own the means of production.<br /><br />A non-socialist analysis of advanced capitalist economies was put forward in the 1920's by the English economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes was most assuredly not a socialist. Keynes detested Marx, whom he considered to be a windbag whose economic theories had long been discredited. On a personal level, Keynes was an elitist and something of an anti-Semite, and, apropos of nothing, he was gay. Keynes argued that any inefficiencies in the functioning of capitalism were not due to any inherent tendency towards declining profits but rather were attributable to fluctuations in the economy's aggregate demand for goods and services, a problem that Keynes believed could be rectified by government fiscal policy, i.e., taxing and spending.<br /><br />Keynes' ideas got their first practical application in the United States during the Great Depression, which was in fact brought about as a result of a massive shortfall in global demand, just as Keynes had predicted. Although FDR did not care for Keynes and found his writings incomprehensible, the New Deal was essentially the implementation of Keynesian theory, as the New Deal spent large amounts of government funds on infrastructure (the WPA and similar programs), social welfare programs (Social Security), and with the American entry into World War II, the creation of a massive military establishment. FDR was initially driven to establish these programs by two persons who were social workers and not economists by trade, Frances Perkins and Harry Hopkins, but the New Dealer who was most responsible for designing the postwar economic order at the Bretton Woods conference was a confirmed Keynesian, Harry Dexter White (Keynes himself was the British representative at Bretton Woods).<br /><br />Thus, at the end of World War II, the United States stood as the dominant power in the world and while it had an enormous activist government, the US was most definitely a capitalist and not a socialist country. The American government did not own the means of production, which remained in private hands, but instead the government used its wealth to continue to pay for social welfare programs (Social Security and later Medicare), to fund and expand infrastructure development (the interstate highway system), and again, to maintain a massive, and growing, military establishment (Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex"). Noam Chomsky and others have derided the American economic system as "military Keynesianism", but this is only partially correct. Large-scale government spending on "entitlements" (Social Security and Medicare) is also an indispenable component of the system.<br /><br />Things were somewhat different, however, in much of the rest of the world. Authoritarian socialism had taken control in Russia and China. As European colonial empires disbanded, newly-independent countries dabbled in various forms of socialism. Notwithstanding the best efforts of the American military to stop them, Ho Chi Minh and his followers brought authoritarian socialism to the former colonies of French Indochina. Nehru, an admirer of the ideals of the Fabian Socialists, sought to establish democratic socialism in India. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, had also joined the Fabian Society while studying to become a barrister in England. More authoritarian variants of socialism came about in Africa and the Middle East.<br /><br />Meanwhile in Western Europe, democratic socialist parties achieved electoral success. The Swedish Social Democratic Party first gained power in 1917, and it has dominated Swedish politics ever since. The British Labour Party led by Clement Atlee came to power in 1945. Similar democratic socialist parties came to power at various times throughout Western Europe.<br /><br />The agenda of the European democratic socialists was two-fold. First, they sought to establish comprehensive government-funded social welfare programs, well beyond the scope of the New Deal. This included government-funded programs such as free universal health care and free higher education. Second, the democratic socialists sought to implement a gradual program of nationalization of various industries. Thus, in varying degrees, the advancement of true socialism – i.e., government ownership of the means of production – remained a goal of many of the European democratic socialists.<br /><br />The global economy underwent a radical transformation in the 1970s as many pillars of the Bretton Woods system collapsed. The economies of the United States and Western Europe went through prolonged periods of stagnation. Inflation soared to record levels. Precisely why this all happened is a subject beyond the scope of this posting, and probably well beyond the expertise of this blogger. Robert Samuelson has recently written a book entitled <em>The Great Inflation</em> analyzing both the causes and effects of the rocky economic events of the 1970s.<br /><br />While it is undoubtedly a gross oversimplification of the facts, it is my view that the root causes of the economic dislocations of the 1970s can be traced to the ongoing progress of economic globalization. The processes that Hobson had written about at the beginning of the Twentieth Century were still very much at work. Although the system of European-dominated colonialism and imperialism that had prompted Hobson to write his book had largely ended after World War II, economic globalization continued apace. Indeed, it is my view that colonialism and imperialism are merely manifestations of what Marx would call the political “superstructure”, but the “substructure” is economic globalization itself, namely, the movement of capital from the advanced capitalist countries to various other parts of the world. By the 1970s, this movement of capital, which had been going on since the mid Nineteenth Century (and actually a lot earlier than that) was bearing fruit, as many less developed countries in the so-called “Third World” were ready to make the leap into the modern capitalist system.<br /><br />Globalization proved to be lethal to socialism. In less developed countries, the prospect of rapid capitalist development, in sharp contrast to the stagnant condition of most socialist economies, caused governments throughout the Third World to abandon their socialist experiments. Virtually overnight, China changed from a society in which Mao had imposed socialism in its most rigid, doctrinaire form into a society that pursued unregulated free market capitalism to a degree unknown virtually anywhere else in the world, including the United States. Vietnam, having successfully defeated the military of the United States in its misguided crusade to prevent Third World “dominoes” from falling to communism, promptly abandoned socialism and followed the Chinese model of pursuing free-market capitalism with a vengeance. India jettisoned Nehru’s dream of a democratic socialist society and also embarked on an aggressive transition to capitalism. Most dramatically, the Soviet Union – Lenin’s prototype for the fulfillment of Marx’s vision of a future socialist society – collapsed and adopted “shock therapy” as a means of making a speedy transition to capitalism. I have always felt that perhaps the most insightful observation about the fall of communism was a quip by the “Saturday Night Live” comedian A. Whitney Brown: “Who would have thought that communism would be a failure for the simple reason that there’s no money in it.”<br /><br />Although the issue is not free from controversy, it is my view that capitalist globalization has been highly beneficial to these countries. While income disparities have grown enormously, overall standards of living have improved even more dramatically. China will soon have the second largest economy in the world. India’s dominance of the IT industry is legendary. Millions of Chinese and Indians, as well as Vietnamese, Brazilians, Malaysians, Koreans, etc., are now enjoying middle-class lifestyles approximating those that Americans, Europeans, and Japanese have long taken for granted.<br /><br />Interestingly, it could be argued that while socialism may be an inefficient system for promoting economic growth, it is valuable in creating the preconditions for such development. Socialist societies generally do a good job of providing certain public services that are not delivered very effectively through the free market, such as public health care and education. Communist China, while having an economy that was, to put it bluntly, in the toilet, nevertheless provided health care to large numbers of citizens more effectively that did most non-socialist Third World countries. A relatively healthy populace is essential for economic development, since chronically-ill workers are not efficient workers, so the Chinese system of public health care, a legacy of socialism, ironically proved to be highly beneficial to the development of Chinese capitalism. Similarly, socialist India had developed a very impressive system of public education, particularly at the level of higher education; again, this system of education far surpassed those that existed in non-socialist countries. The Indian educational system was critical to the fabulous success India achieved in the IT field. The lesson of this, as I discuss in more detail below, is that economic development cannot be achieved through the free market alone, and inevitably requires the involvement of an activist, well-funded public sector.<br /><br />At any rate, the rapid progress of globalization in the 1980s proved to be equally toxic to democratic socialism as it had been practiced in Western Europe. State-owned industries proved to be clunky and inefficient, and were incapable of competing with rapidly-growing private firms in China, South Korea, India, and Brazil. A crash program of privatization swept throughout Europe. Today, state-owned industries have almost entirely disappeared – including in the countries of Scandinavia, which many people continue to label, mistakenly, as “socialist.” Nokia, one of the world’s largest manufacturers of cell phones, is a privately-owned Finnish company. Sweden is the home of numerous privately-owned, successful companies. Actually, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the most experienced and in many ways the most canny of the European “socialist” political parties, was never very enamored of state ownership of major industries, and the Swedish economy has always been dominated by private “capitalist” firms. Notably, Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries have also sharply reduced corporate tax rates in recent years, seeking to promote <em>private</em> savings and investment. Take that, Senator Sanders!<br /><br />While privatization and the dismantling of state-owned enterprises proceeded apace throughout Europe in the 1980s, a more virulent form of conservatism came to power in the United Kingdom and the United States under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. While Thatcher pursued privatization eagerly – since State ownership of industries had never happened in the U.S., there wasn’t much for Reagan to privatize – Thatcher and Reagan went further and argued that all forms of government involvement in the economy should be abolished, including governmental regulation of businesses such as the financial industry and government operation of social welfare programs.<br /><br />Thatcher and Reagan were largely unsuccessful in carrying out this agenda, but they caused a great deal of damage in their attempt to do so. They implemented a broad program of deregulation, some of it justified but most of it not. As we have seen in the past few months, the consequences of deregulation have been a financial meltdown and the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. The lesson that has been taught in the past year with brutal effectiveness, is that the answer to regulations that are misguided or outmoded is not the elimination of regulations altogether; it is the implementation of better regulations.<br /><br />The attempt by Reagan and Thatcher to eliminate government social programs was also a noteworthy failure, but again, much damage was done in their attempt to carry out their goal of eliminating all government involvement in the economy. Reagan implemented a series of sweeping tax cuts for the wealthiest members of American society. The idea was that this would “starve” the government so that, to use the metaphor of manic tax-cutting enthusiast Grover Norquist, government would become so small that you could drown it in a bathtub. It didn’t work out that way. While taxes got cut, government spending did not. Reagan and his acolytes learned the unsurprising lesson that cutting unpopular taxes is easy, but cutting popular government programs is hard. As a result of Reagan’s program, the U.S. government deficit exploded. The trend was briefly reversed under Clinton but returned with a vengeance under Bush II. Republicans cut taxes even more excessively than they had under Reagan. Not only did the Republicans fail to reduce government spending, but they actually increased it substantially, through programs such as new Medicare prescription drug benefits and through pursuit of two costly wars (as well as expanded military spending on unnecessary new weapons systems such as “star wars”).<br /><br />As a result of this new “conservative” agenda, the U.S. became little more than a consumer nation, financed on foreign credit. In the short-run, this situation caused globalization to proceed even faster, leading to breathtaking levels of economic growth in China and the other new capitalist economies. America bought massive quantities of Chinese goods, paying for them, in large part, with money borrowed from China. This system was obviously unsustainable and not surprisingly, it crashed last fall.<br /><br />Meanwhile, in the former democratic socialist countries of Europe, government funded social programs survived privatization and the demise of socialism, just as they did in the U.S. However, while the U.S. chose the path of cutting taxes and funding the government on credit, European countries paid for their social programs – which were far more generous than those in the U.S. – through taxation. However, the form of taxation that supports these programs is often overlooked and misunderstood. The right-wing meme is that the countries of Western Europe finance extensive government social programs through “Robin Hood economics”, i.e., by heavily taxing the rich and redistributing the money through government programs. That is not really the case. While many countries in Europe do have higher marginal income tax rates than the U.S., it also bears emphasis that European countries (as well as Canada) raise a much smaller percentage of their overall tax revenues through income taxes than the U.S. does. Rather, these countries raise a very large proportion of their tax revenues through consumption-based taxes, primarily the VAT. What these countries effectively do is to limit private consumption through the VAT, and redirect the money into public sector investments through government programs. As noted above, many of these countries, including the supposedly “socialist” Scandinavian countries, have also used these consumption taxes to make it possible to reduce corporate taxes, thereby promoting private sector as well as public sector investment.<br /><br />As the United States and the rest of the world attempt to dig out of the rubble of last year’s financial crash, there is general worldwide consensus on a few points. A significant boost in government spending is necessary to bolster global demand in order to stave off deflation and avert the danger of depression. Increased spending on public sector infrastructure is essential in countries where it has been ignored in recent years, primarily, the United States and China. One legacy of the Republican orgy of tax cuts for the rich has been inattention to adequate spending on public sector infrastructure, a lapse that must be corrected. And most importantly, another failure of Republican anti-government policies must be corrected: updated, intelligent regulation of the financial system is a must.<br /><br />One thing, however, that is not even on anyone’s radar screen is the revival of “socialism”, namely, the creation of an economic system based on government ownership of the means of production. Again, except for some isolated nuts in North Korea and Venezuela, every country in the world is now in agreement that the economy functions best through privately-owned enterprises. The only other place where socialism exists today is in the fevered imagination of the leadership of the Republican Party. In the sane parts of the world, socialism is history.<br /><br />One final thought: The most important global development for the next decade will be the transition away from the inherently unstable economic system in which the United States has acted as the world’s consumer. Here, Senator Sanders is right, though perhaps not for the reasons he has argued – we can learn a lot from the countries of Scandinavia. We need a consumption-based tax in the U.S. and a concentration on developing a system that promotes both private and public investment in order to achieve long-term economic growth.<br /><br />As I have promised in the past, <a href="http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2008/11/dont-blame-me-i-voted-for-henry-clay.html">http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2008/11/dont-blame-me-i-voted-for-henry-clay.html</a>, that is the subject for a future blog.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-64163904567991077722009-01-15T13:14:00.000-08:002009-01-16T10:56:59.780-08:00Be Seeing YouI read the obituary of Patrick <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">McGoohan</span> this morning. It brought back memories of how extraordinary it was for a misfit teenager to live through the year 1968. It was the year when many of my life's passions took hold: politics, science fiction, philosophy, the films of Stanley Kubrick, general <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">geekiness</span>.<br /><br />I always remember the day early in that year when I saw my mother's ashen face when she learned that her best friend's only son had been killed in Vietnam. I signed up to volunteer in the McCarthy campaign the next day. Then followed a few months of hope, only to have it crushed by the assassinations; riots throughout America's cities revealing the scope of the poverty and hopelessness that lay beneath the American Dream and shoving it in the faces of us middle class white kids who had been taught about some other America; the scenes of Soviet tanks rolling into Prague; the conventions, George Wallace making racism acceptable, the election of Richard Nixon - the gathering realization that American Democracy was a hoax and that America was not necessarily a force for good in the world.<br /><br />That summer, CBS ran a bizarre British television series called <em>The Prisoner</em> as a summer replacement. The timing could not have been more appropriate.<br /><br />If you have never seen <em>The Prisoner</em>, I won't try to tell you what it is about. In fact, most viewers, including me, have a hard time figuring out what it was about. Get it on DVD.<br /><br /><br /><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">McGoohan</span> created and starred in the show. The great Leo <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">McKern</span> was also in it. It was about individuality and freedom, social control and social responsibility. It addresses revolution. Is rebellion simply an act that asserts individual freedom, or does the rebel have a responsibility to the community?<br /><br /><br /><em>The Prisoner</em> may seem dated in a psychedelic, late '60s sort of way. Some of the episodes are way over the top. But so much of <em>The Prisoner</em> could not be more timely. The show is almost like a catalogue of the Bush Administration's "greatest hits": extraordinary rendition, torture, uncontrolled surveillance, rigged elections, imprisonment as the solution to all social ills, criminality and deceit in the highest levels of government. At the end of the day, however, there is hope. Freedom and individuality cannot be wiped out, and the human spirit can triumph. The power to resist oppression lies within each of us.<br /><br />Thinking about hope inevitably makes me think about what will happen next week. The horrors of 1968, or of the past eight years, have not been wiped out, and will not be wiped out when Obama takes the oath. But I can really see the possibility of something better. President Obama can be a success by tearing down prison walls. Guantanamo is a good start, but it is only a start. Maybe in a few years we can stop thinking of America as the country that has the highest rate of imprisonment in the world.<br /><br /><br />Thank you Patrick <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">McGoohan</span> for having opened up the mind of this geek, and I suspect, many, many others. Be seeing you.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-43047213407891289642009-01-07T14:53:00.000-08:002009-01-07T14:55:50.377-08:00Continued Thoughts On The Writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett<div><strong>Introduction</strong><br /><br /><br />The following is the conclusion of the essay I wrote in 2007 on the writings of Thomas Barnett. In Part I, I laid out some of Barnett's basic ideas, comparing them to my own ideas about "neo-Marxism" or "bourgeois Marxism." I then began to delve into some of my disagreements with Barnett, using American military actions in the Balkans and Iraq as case studies in the use of American military force in the post Cold War era. I acknowledged that Barnett's ideas worked extremely well in the Balkans, but appeared to break down in the case of Iraq. In Part II, I explore the reasons for the failure of Barnett's ideas in Iraq in more detail, and highlight the distinction between colonialism and globalization, which, I believe, is central to the distinction between the ideas of the neo-conservatives who dominated the Bush Administration, and who were responsible for the direction of the Iraq War, and the thinking of proponents of globalization such as Barnett (as well as myself).<br /><br />The distinction between colonialism and globalization also dovetails nicely with my thoughts about the <em>Counterinsurgency Field Manual</em>. When counterinsurgency doctrine is applied in the service of globalization, it can be a boon to humankind; but it is equally applicable in service of neo-colonialism, in which case it becomes a malignancy. The best solution to the problem is the one I highlight in the conclusion of this essay, namely, to reject U.S. unilateralism in Twenty-First Century warfare. This is the key to ensuring that in the future American military actions are engaged in the endeavor of promoting globalization, as opposed to neo-colonialism.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Globalization and Colonialism In The Post Cold War Era (Conclusion)</strong><br /><br /><br /> Barnett’s support for the Iraq War is not based on any of the purported justifications advanced by the Bush Administration. Rather, Barnett supported the Iraq War as an example of the sort of "shrink the Gap" type of conflict he wants the U.S. to pursue in the post-Cold War era. Barnett viewed Saddam Hussein’s government as a good example of a malignant Gap regime that was harmful to the Iraqi people and dangerous to Iraq’s neighbors, both of which were unquestionably true. Barnett’s view was that with the removal of this dysfunctional regime, Iraq would have an opportunity to re-build itself and get on the road to Core membership, speeding the penetration of globalization into the entire Middle East. In all, Barnett viewed the American invasion of Iraq as an event that would set off a "big bang" that would radically alter Middle Eastern politics, with the end result of enabling the entire region someday to join the Core.<br />Barnett would have to agree that to date, things have not worked out very well in Iraq. Iraq today is more "Gap-like" than it was before the U.S. invaded. The Iraqi economy is not functioning, even at the extremely depressed levels at which it was functioning before the war. The country is torn by civil war. Reliable estimates put the Iraqi death toll at in excess of a half-million fatalities, both as a result of the American invasion and the ensuing civil war. Iraq has become a hotbed of terrorist activity. Religious fundamentalists hold far more influence in Iraq than they did before the war. The status of women in Iraqi society – as noted, something Barnett rightly identifies as a major indicator of a society’s compatibility with the culture of the Twenty-First Century globalized economy – has declined since the war.<br />Barnett sees the failure of the Iraq War as fundamentally a failure of strategy. Specifically, Barnett faults the strategy pursued by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, which could be described as a strategy that was all Leviathan and no SysAdmin. The American Leviathan force did its job by quickly defeating the Iraqi army and deposing Saddam Hussein. However, there was no large SysAdmin force ready to occupy Iraq and rapidly undertake the task of re-building Iraqi society (that "nation-building" stuff that candidate Bush disliked so much back in 2000). As a result, Iraq descended into chaos in the days immediately following the invasion, the attempts to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure were ill-conceived and poorly executed, and the evolution of an Iraqi insurrection and ultimately a full-blown civil war flowed inexorably from the lack of any SysAdmin force and the flawed overall occupation strategy pursued by the United States.<br />While there can hardly be any dispute that the U.S. conduct of the occupation of Iraq was poorly planned – and it appears to have been hardly planned at all – I do not agree that the failure in Iraq was solely attributable to a failure of execution. Even if the U.S. had pursued a different strategy in its occupation of Iraq, I seriously doubt that the result would have been much different. Indeed, there is really no point in debating the question of whether the outcome in Iraq could have been different if a true SysAdmin force had been brought into play, because the reality is that it simply was not possible for such a force to have been deployed in Iraq. Barnett concedes that the U.S. alone does not have sufficient forces to field a SysAdmin force of the magnitude that would have been required to do an effective job in Iraq. Thus, in order for the Iraq War to have been successful, the U.S. necessarily would have had to put together a much more substantial international coalition than the rather pathetic "coalition of the willing" that actually participated in the Iraq War. Barnett argues that the U.S. should have been accompanied into Iraq by large numbers of Indian, Russian, and Chinese troops, which would have supplied the numbers for a massive SysAdmin force that could have made the Iraqi occupation a success and could have staved off insurrection and civil war. Barnett argues that it was the failure of the unimaginative Bush Administration foreign policy team – Barnett has particularly strong criticism for Secretaries of State Powell and Rice – that was responsible for the inability to put together a significant international coalition for prosecuting the Iraq War, which again, resulted in the failure to field a large SysAdmin force capable of carrying out the occupation in a way that would have brought about the re-structuring of Iraqi society, laying the groundwork for Iraq’s eventual entry into the Core. Barnett says that such a program was done successfully in the Balkans, and if executed properly, there is no reason why the same strategy could not have succeeded in Iraq.<br />Again, I do not agree with Barnett that the failure in Iraq can be written off as simply a failure of strategy, or an unfortunate consequence of incompetence in the leadership of the State Department. I believe that in order to understand the failure of the Bush Administration to achieve anything remotely resembling Barnett’s "blueprint" in Iraq, one has to look at the real reasons why the Bush Administration fought the war, which in turn explain why the Bush Administration fought the war unilaterally, and therefore failed to field an effective SysAdmin force. Just as I do not believe that the Bush Administration invaded Iraq because of a fear that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or otherwise constituted a threat to the U.S., I do not believe that the Bush Administration invaded Iraq because it had the slightest interest in pursuing some version of Barnett’s "shrink the Gap" strategy. Rather, as I stated above, I believed at the outset of the Iraq War and continue to believe today, that the Bush Administration’s interest was in using military force to protect the dominant role of American oil companies in the region.<br />One way of looking at this is to ask the question why most other nations of the Core did not join the "coalition of the willing" in the invasion of Iraq? If I am correct about the true motivations behind the war, then the answer is obvious: most nations did not participate in the Iraq War simply because they had no interest to be advanced by participating. Most nations of the world were not fooled by Bush’s stories of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or Iraqi ties to terrorists. Most nations simply saw no reason to participate in a war that had no greater justification than the objective of advancing American (and to a lesser extent British) oil interests. This point is seen very clearly in the strong opposition to the war coming from France and Russia, as the oil businesses of those nations had enjoyed favorable positions vis-a-vis Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime and unlike the Bush Administration and its allies in the American petroleum industry, the governments of those countries saw nothing to be gained by regime change.<br />In sum, I would define the Iraq War as fundamentally a "war of colonialism", namely, a war pursued by a stronger nation against a weaker nation in order to protect the stronger nation’s control of a natural resource located within the weaker nation. In contrast to wars of colonialism, I would define Barnett’s paradigm of post-Cold War warfare as "wars of globalization." The wars in the Balkans may be the only example we have to date of a war of globalization, but even using this small sample, we can describe some of the fundamental characteristics of a war of globalization. (I think that the war in Afghanistan may also have had many of the characteristics of a true war of globalization, but unfortunately, Afghanistan has become something of an after-thought following the Bush Administration’s initiation of the Iraq War). In terms of objectives, such wars have the goal of removing a regime that is acting as an impediment to the development of trade and investment with respect to the targeted country. This objective will also shape the manner in which wars of globalization are fought. Since such wars do not have the goal of serving the narrow national interests of any one country, but rather, are intended to advance the interests of the global capitalist economic system as a whole, such wars will almost inevitably be characterized by multilateralism and a high degree of international cooperation. Of course, that is exactly what we saw work so successfully in the Balkans, and it is exactly what has been missing in Iraq. In addition, since the goal of a war of globalization is the establishment within the targeted state of a stable economic system open to trade and investment, the process of "nation-building" will also be an inevitable and essential part of such a war; thus, Barnett’s SysAdmin force is an indispensable component of any successful war of globalization. Again, this is precisely what we have seen carried out successfully in the Balkans, but notably not in Iraq.<br />These characteristics of a war of globalization can be contrasted with a war of colonialism. Since a war of colonialism has the objective of enhancing the narrow interests of the attacking country by enabling agents of the attacking country to exploit the natural resources of the targeted country, it is almost inevitable that such a war will be unilateral, not multilateral; this characteristic applies to the Iraq War. And, since a war of colonialism has the objective of exploiting the resources of the targeted country and is not concerned with otherwise opening the targeted country to trade and investment, the nation-building aspect of a war of colonialism is likely to be perfunctory at best, with the occupation of the attacked country being concerned solely with narrow objectives of maintaining a minimal degree of order in the targeted country and not with the re-building of the targeted country into a state capable of participating in the globalized economy. Obviously, these characteristics also apply to the Iraq War.<br />This latter point is, I believe, crucial to understanding why Barnett’s program breaks down in the case of the Iraq War. The failure of the U.S. (and the pathetic and virtually non-existent "coalition of the willing") to insert a meaningful SysAdmin force into Iraq was not just the product of short-sighted or flawed strategic thinking on the part of Rumsfeld and the other decision-makers in the Bush Administration. Rather, there was no SysAdmin force in Iraq because the Bush Administration saw no need for such a force, given the true objectives of the Iraq War. The real goal of the Iraq War was not the re-building of Iraqi society and the integration of Iraq into the globalized economy. The goals of the Iraq War were simply the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime and the insertion of a substantial American military presence in the Middle East in order to promote and protect the interests of the American oil companies and their partners in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. No meaningful SysAdmin force was needed in order to achieve these goals.<br />This is not to say that the powers-that-be in the Bush Administration are completely satisfied with the way that the Iraq War has turned out; however, I do not believe that they are entirely dissatisfied either. Slightly more than 3,000 Americans have died in a war that has now lasted almost four years. Viewing things from a cold-blooded perspective, that is an extraordinarily low fatality rate by any historical criteria. To be sure, the consequences of the war have been catastrophic for the Iraqis – deaths likely in excess of 500,000, destruction of much of the national infrastructure, rampant chaos and civil war, etc. If this had truly been a war of globalization in which the goal was the transformation of Iraqi society in order to enable it to be integrated into the globalized economy, these facts would unquestionably brand the war as an unmitigated disaster. However, accepting the conclusion that the Iraq War was a war of colonialism and not a war of globalization, these facts are of relatively little significance to the Bush Administration’s architects of the war. The U.S. now has a firmly-established military presence in the Middle East, the regimes of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are safe and secure, and the American oil companies are in an excellent position to take the lead in developing more extensive oil production in Iraq.<br />This leads me to a somewhat broader criticism of Barnett. Barnett occasionally is not sufficiently careful to draw the distinction between colonialism and globalization. As noted, I believe that this is the fundamental reason why Barnett was wrong about the Iraq War – he viewed it as a war of globalization whereas in reality it was a war of colonialism. At this point, it might be helpful for me to digress a bit and offer a clearer definition of these terms, as I am using them.<br />"Colonialism" is an economic system in which an industrialized capitalist country develops a relationship with a non-industrialized, largely pre-capitalist country that exploits the natural resources or agricultural products of the colonized country for the benefit of the capitalist organizations of the colonizing country. In a colonialist system, the agents of the colonizing power obtain access to the natural resources and agricultural products of the colonized state on terms that are highly favorable to the agents of the colonizing power. In addition, the colonized state becomes dependent upon the industrial products of the colonizing power, and the colonizing power is therefore able to force the colonized state to obtain those industrial products on terms that are highly favorable to the agents of the colonizing power. In the past, colonialism was generally promulgated by means of the exercise of military coercion on the part of the colonizing state against the inferior military forces of the colonized state. The combination of colonialism with military coercion is imperialism, which dominated the world up until the Second World War.<br />However, it is important to emphasize that colonialism can exist without imperialism, i.e., without military coercion and without actual political control of the colonized country by the colonizing state. An excellent historical example of colonialism without imperialism can be seen in the case of the American South. Even though the American Revolution terminated political and military control over the United States by Britain (or any other European country), a colonialist economic relationship continued to exist between Britain and the South long after the U.S. became politically "independent" of Britain. (To some extent, a colonialist relationship between the South and the industrialized North also developed after the Civil War, although that relationship also had much to do with the exercise of military coercion by the North, e.g., Sherman’s march, etc.). British textile manufacturers obtained cheap, slave-produced Southern cotton, while the South became highly dependent upon British industrial products, which British manufacturers were able to sell to the South on highly favorable terms – a textbook colonialist relationship.<br />There is a temptation to view the colonialist economic relationship too simplistically as one in which the colonizing power is the "exploiter" and the colonized country is the "victim." While that may be true in a broad sense, narrow interest groups within the colonized country can benefit greatly from the relationship. In fact, colonialism can be extremely lucrative for an elite group within the colonized country that happens to control the natural resource or agricultural product that is sought to be exploited by the agents of the colonizing power. Again using the ante bellum South as an example, Southern plantation owners became fabulously wealthy through the colonialist relationship that they enjoyed with British textile manufacturers. To be sure, the system was highly damaging to masses of the people of the South as a whole; the exploitation of black slaves was a self-evident evil, and the bulk of white Southerners also suffered under the system. Southerners were forced to pay exorbitant prices for British industrial products, and most Southerners could not afford to buy and maintain slaves and therefore could not compete with the plantation owners in the production of agricultural products. Again though, for the slave holders who controlled the Southern political system, colonialism was a pot of gold and they were willing to start one of the bloodiest civil wars in the history of the world in an attempt to keep the system intact.<br />The relationship between colonialism and globalization is complex. Colonialism is frequently the pre-cursor to globalization. Barnett points out, echoing the views of numerous economists who have written about globalization, that globalization requires the free-flow of various factors of production, such as resources, labor, goods, information, and capital. While colonialism has its origins in an economic relationship in which the colonizing power simply seeks to exploit the natural resources of the colonized country, the relationship often leads to the development of these other flows that ultimately enables the former colony to join Barnett’s Core, i.e., participating membership in the globalized capitalist economy. J.A. Hobson, writing at the end of the 19th Century, noted that the driving economic force behind British imperialism was no longer the sector of the British economy that had benefitted from the exploitation of natural resources and agricultural products obtained from the colonies, but rather, the British financial community, which was looking for profitable investment opportunities throughout the world. Thus, while the British Raj may have started out as a classic colonial relationship in which British businesses sought to exploit Indian natural resources and agricultural products, India ultimately also became an important investment opportunity for British financiers. In addition to the movement of capital, British colonization of India also gave rise to flows of other factors of production (people, goods, language, knowledge) that would in recent years be critical to India’s ability to join the globalized capitalist economy.<br />Notwithstanding this relationship between colonialism and globalization, it is important to emphasize that the two are not the same; in fact, they are really mutually exclusive. A nation cannot become a participating member of the globalized economic system while it is in a colonial relationship. The reasons for this are readily apparent. The economy of the colony is based entirely upon the sale of natural resources and agricultural products; it produces no goods or services to be traded in the global economy. Most importantly, it is in the interest of both the colonizing power and the elite in the colonized country to keep things that way. The colonizing power does not want the colony to develop a more diverse economy, because that would cause the colony to become less dependent upon the colonizing power as a source of industrial goods; in addition, if the colony had economic alternatives to selling off its natural resources, it would be in a stronger bargaining position in dealing with the colonizing state. The elite within the colony, which typically profits greatly from the colonial relationship, also does not want things to change; if the economy of the colony diversifies, the potential exists for the development of other power centers and with them other elites within the colony capable of challenging the position of the traditional elite.<br />Thus, a nation cannot enter the Core unless it has broken free of colonialism. Writing back in the 1970s, Chomsky, in noting that Japan was then the only highly-developed capitalist society not controlled by people of European ancestry, pointed out that it was not a coincidence that Japan was also the only non-European nation that had not been colonized by Europeans. Indeed, the example of Japan is instructive in understanding the relationship between colonialism and the ability of a nation to enter Barnett’s Core. It is quite common for nations seeking to develop a modern economy to erect barriers to keep out potential colonizers, so that a nation can develop to the point where it is able to participate in the global economy on an equal footing, and thereby avoid being subjected to colonization. Japan is the most clear-cut historical example of a nation that pursued such an isolationist strategy openly and deliberately, with highly successful results. To some extent, the Communist regimes of Russia and China effectively performed similar historical functions in keeping out would-be colonizers, even if those regimes did not do so with the conscious purpose of enabling Russia and China someday to have functioning capitalist economies; I would argue that for the past 20-odd years, the Mullahs have also been performing this function in Iran, consciously or otherwise. The strategy of non-alignment followed Nehru in years following Indian independence is another example.<br />Consideration of U.S. history is also relevant. While mythology would have it that the U.S. has always been the bastion of free enterprise and free trade, historical reality is quite different. In fact, there are many similarities in the path to Core status pursued by the U.S. and the Japan; for most of U.S. history, at least up until the New Deal, America followed a policy of rigid political and economic isolation, not totally unlike that pursued by Japan. High tariffs were the key to American historical economic development; it is hardly surprising that the tariff was almost invariably the flash-point of ante bellum conflict between the colonized South, which was already in the colonial grasp of the U.K. and whose leaders wanted to keep it that way, and the pre-industrialized North, which was seeking to protect its developing capitalist economy from falling prey to European colonizers. Of course, I should note that just because I am pointing out the role of high tariffs in promoting historical economic development in the U.S., that does not mean that I am a devotee of latter-day protectionists such as Pat Buchanan or Lou Dobbs. I recognize that free trade among Core nations is a good thing and that a policy of protectionism by a Core nation can be disastrous, as Smoot-Hawley aptly demonstrated; however, U.S. history illustrates the point that for a pre-capitalist society seeking to protect itself from colonialism so that it can develop an economy capable of full participation in the global economy, protectionism can be beneficial and, indeed, essential.<br />In the contemporary world, the last major colonialist relationship that continues to exist is the relationship between the nations whose economies are primarily based on the sale of oil, mostly but not exclusively located in the Middle East, and the nations of the Core, especially the U.S. Not surprisingly, the nations whose economies largely rely upon the sale of oil are all located in the Gap; it is not a coincidence that South America’s biggest oil producer, Venezuela, has not made strides towards Core membership comparable to those made by Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, none of which is a significant oil producer. It is also not a coincidence that Venezuelan voters have been receptive to the anti-colonialist demagoguery of Hugo Chavez, and have not supported pro-free market politicians of the sort who have been so successful in the New Core states of South America.<br />The paradigmatic oil-based colonialist relationship in the world today is that between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. At first blush, this seems counter-intuitive, because we in the U.S. have all been conditioned to believe that the Saudis and the other "oil sheikhs" have us "over a barrel" and are able to exercise inordinate control over the U.S. because we are so "dependent" upon their oil. However, cutting through such caricatures promoted by the U.S. media, the relationship is unquestionably one of classic colonialism. The Western oil companies, principally American, have access to Saudi oil on terms that are quite favorable. The Saudi elite – which is a classic parasitic colonialist class (like Southern slave holders) that does nothing other than claim ownership of the ground under which the oil is located – profits handsomely from the relationship. The Saudi elite does not, however, use those profits to invest in economic diversification within its own country. Notwithstanding the countless trillions of dollars that Western oil companies have paid to the Saudi royal family over the years, Saudi Arabia remains a country with absolutely no industry and virtually no economy that is based on anything other than oil; incredibly, it also remains a country in which poverty and all of the other attributes of Gap membership such as poor education, poor healthcare, barbaric justice, and inhuman treatment of women, remain widespread. That is the way the House of Saud wants to keep it, because economic diversification could lead to the empowerment of other elites who might undermine their hold on their country. That is also the way the oil companies want to keep things, because a Saudi Arabia that had an economy based on something other than oil would have a stronger bargaining position. So instead of investing in economic development in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi elite instead invests its money either in the Core (principally in the U.S.), expensive U.S.-produced weapons systems, or in consumable items such as luxury automobiles, yachts, private jets, maintaining a level of conspicuous consumption Thorstein Veblen could not even have imagined. The American oil companies and their allies in Washington want to make sure that these wastrels remain in power; the saga of Mohamad Mossadegh in Iran is not a promising harbinger of what can happen to the leader of an oil-producing state that expresses an interest in using his nation’s oil wealth to promote internal economic development.<br />As wealthy as the members of the Saudi elite may be, however, they are really no different from the Southern slave holders – beneficiaries of a colonialist relationship that principally serves to benefit the agents of a stronger nation. Who is it that is really "over the barrel" in this relationship? Consider this scenario. Suppose some Dr. No/James Bond villain-type came along and made all of the oil in the world radioactive and unusable. The economy of the Core would be highly disrupted, but we would eventually pull through it by going on a crash program of conservation, building nuclear power plants, wind turbines, and solar panels, and dusting off those blueprints for electric cars. The economy of Saudi Arabia, however, would be wiped out without any possibility of repair; the country would literally be in the stone age. In short, it is the Saudis who are dependent upon the Core to buy their oil. For those of us in the Core, relatively cheap Saudi oil is a convenience that yields obscene profits for the oil companies and that enables Americans to drive around in SUVs, but if we had to do without it, we could make do. Ultimately, however, the Saudis do not have that choice because they have nothing to sell to the rest of the world but their oil.<br />The anti-globalizing effects of colonialism are not limited to the harmful way in which it stunts the development of the economy of the colony. Society within the colonizing state is also affected in a way that tends to work against the progress of globalization. Some of these effects are addressed in Kevin Phillips’ recent excellent work, <em>American Theocracy</em>. Phillips identifies four characteristics that almost invariably develop within countries after they embark upon a program of colonialism: (1) a tendency towards jingoism and fanatical fundamentalist religion; (2) militarization of society and a growing influence of the military in the economic and political life of society, leading to the development of monopolistic enterprises that profit from the military and effectively operate as "joint ventures" between the government and private interests; (3) increasing dependence upon whatever natural resource is the object of the colonial relationship; and (4) growing importance of the financial, as opposed to the industrial, sector of the economy, accompanied by increasing levels of national debt. Phillips identifies these characteristics in past colonial empires (Spain, the Netherlands, and Britain), and he emphasizes the prominence of these characteristics in the contemporary U.S., particularly during the current Bush Administration.<br />Phillips does not extensively discuss the relationship between these characteristics and globalization. Indeed, while I have criticized Barnett for a tendency to be insufficiently sensitive to the distinctions between colonialism and globalization, Phillips seems to ignore globalization altogether. Phillips does not have an evolutionary view of history in the Marxian (or neo-Marxian) mode; he tends to view history as cyclical, with the U.S. simply being the latest in the long line of colonial empires that inevitably fall prey to the foibles that will ultimately bring them down. Phillips does not see this process leading to the ultimate end of colonialism and its displacement by globalization; he seems to view history as a cycle in which some new colonial empire will arise, only to be brought down and replaced, and so on, ad infinitum. To this extent, I strongly disagree with Phillips. Nevertheless, I believe that his analysis of the impact of colonialism on the society of the colonizing state is right on the money, and his application of that analysis to the U.S. under the Bush Administration is entirely accurate.<br />What I think is important for Barnett’s analysis is the fact that all of these developments within U.S. society that Phillips identifies as taking place during the current Bush Administration are ultimately antithetical to the interests of globalization. Barnett identifies the principal threat to globalization in the Gap. I would submit that an equally significant danger exists within the Core, namely, the ideologues driving the policies of the Bush Administration, who are manifestations of the characteristics Phillips identifies. They are often referred to as "neo-conservatives", but I believe that a more accurate label would be "neo-colonialists." These ideologues do not share Barnett’s vision of a "future worth creating", in which the nations of the Core will work together cooperatively to "shrink the Gap." The neo-colonialists are interested in pursuing a vision of a future based on American military hegemony. They do not talk about globalization as a cooperative process, in which the U.S. and Europe will ultimately be as much or more altered to resemble the rest of the world, as the rest of the world will be altered to resemble the U.S. and Europe. They talk of the U.S. as the "lone superpower", a "dangerous nation" and an "indispensable nation", freely and openly using its military superiority to enable the U.S. to gain control over the world’s dwindling oil resources and at the same time suppressing the rise of any potential competitor. They are prone to see the current world situation in apocalyptic terms, with the U.S. "alone" "standing tall" as the only power willing to protect Western Civilization from the dark, non-Christian forces that are threatening the essential values of the West. They are interested in international cooperation only on terms dictated by the U.S.; the rest of the world is welcomed as followers, but not as collaborators in the processes of globalization. They are not interested in mutual defense pacts with China, a key ingredient of Barnett’s strategy for building a workable joint military force capable of shrinking the Gap and spreading globalization. They are interested only in pursuing strategies designed to ensure that China does not become a "threat" to the military supremacy of the U.S.<br />In sum, the current American neo-colonialists act pretty the same way that colonialists have always acted – unilateralists with no objective more noble than the achievement of hegemony. And so long as these neo-colonialists have the power in Washington to implement their visions, globalization will be hindered.<br />It is interesting to note that some of Barnett’s critics have often compared him to pre-World War I historians and political philosophers, such as Norman Angell, who had suggested at the beginning of the Twentieth Century that the state of European civilization had reached a point in which warfare was so destructive and so illogical that wars between European states had become obsolete; today, descriptions of such visions are almost always accompanied by wise-cracks about "famous last words." Barnett does not reject the comparison to past visionaries of global peace such as Angell, but he points out that nuclear weapons change the equation significantly. Perhaps, but the battlefields of the Somme, the Marne, Verdun, etc. give one pause in considering the extent to which the pursuit of global hegemony by the leaders of supposedly "civilized" nations can yield horrific results that no sane person would ever contemplate. What is most important to recall is that what destroyed the optimistic vision of universal peace that was suggested at the beginning of the Twentieth Century was colonialism and the drive by certain European powers, principally Germany, to achieve global hegemony. The dangers to the achievement of a peaceful globalized economy posed by the hegemonists in Washington today are just as great.<br />So, in moving towards a conclusion, this neo-Marxist will ask the question famously posed by the most notorious of the old Marxists: What is to be done? Again, I would turn to the teachings of my neo-Marxist mentor, Lee Benson, for the answer. The key element of the neo-Marxist approach is the recognition that Marx’s fixation with the class struggle as the engine of all social change was fundamentally wrong, at least as applied to capitalism. That conclusion applies to both ends of the economic spectrum, both the bottom and the top. Just as Marx’s idea of "class consciousness" fails when applied to the proletariat in modern capitalist society, so too does it fail when applied to the upper echelons of society, namely, the leaders of U.S. business and government. Not all of America’s business and political leaders are neo-conservatives or, as I would suggest they should be called, neo-colonialists. While traditional leftists are inclined to see the disastrous policies of the Bush Administration as being attributable to the service of a "corporate agenda" allegedly being perpetrated by the capitalist class in order to subjugate the workers of the world, I believe such claims to be unsubstantiated rubbish, outdated rhetoric having very little relationship to the reality of the Twenty-First Century global economy.<br />In fact, the neo-conservative/neo-colonialist group that dominates decision making in the Bush Administration represents a relatively narrow segment of the American capitalist class; the neo-conservatives are those associated with the oil industry, those whose ideology or regional backgrounds incline them towards jingoism, nativism, or religious fanaticism, and a spectrum of the Jewish community (and a very narrow one at that) tied, either by finance or by ideology or perhaps both, to hard-liners within the Israeli government. I do not believe that this group represents anything close to a majority of the American business elite. In fact, I would wager that opposition to the Iraq War among the top income earners in the U.S. is at roughly the same levels as one would find within other economic strata of society. Changing the course of current American foreign policy will not require a class revolution. All that needs to be done is to replace the decision makers whose vision is based in colonialism and the fantasy of achieving U.S. military hegemony, with decision makers who understand that fulfilling the promise of globalization requires cooperation and multilateralism. Robert Rubin is among the wealthiest and most powerful capitalists in the world, but in my mind, that hardly disqualifies him from being recognized as a great visionary. When future historians write of our times, they will see Rubin, and many other business leaders, as among America’s most enlightened decision makers who helped make globalization work.<br />At the end of the day, history is on the side of globalization, not colonialism. Even with respect to oil-based colonialism, we can see the handwriting on the wall. Not only is oil becoming scarce, but we do in fact have something going on that is akin to the "Dr. No" scenario I posited above in which oil becomes unusable. That scenario is working itself out through the phenomenon of global warming. International cooperation will be unavoidable if we are to move towards alternatives to fossil fuels, particularly in the nations of the New Core, where energy consumption is going to increase astronomically in the upcoming years. The demands of capitalist globalization dictate that the economies of these New Core states not be permitted to regress to a pre-capitalist state; if that is to be accomplished while recognizing the impact of global warming, multinational cooperation is essential and quests for hegemony must be abandoned.<br />While the necessity for addressing global warming will inevitably promote multinational cooperation, the resulting process of change is also fraught with danger. As the world moves away from an oil-driven economy, there will inevitably be significant disruption in the oil-producing countries of the world, especially in the Middle East. On the one hand, such disruption can be an occasion for much positive change, as the world moves away from this last bastion of colonialism, and the countries of the Middle East will unavoidably begin to build diverse capitalist economies not dependent upon the sale of oil, bringing them into membership in Barnett’s Core. On the other hand, such disruption will also inevitably play into the hands of groups such as al Qaeda who resent and distrust the changes wrought by globalization In the long run, globalization will lead to peace and prosperity, but in the transitional phases leading there, the dangers of terrorism will continue to be very real.<br />Such disruption in the Middle East will also inevitably increase the immigration of Muslims into Europe and the U.S. This process will have a far greater impact upon the lily-white nations of Europe than it will upon the U.S., which has vast historical experience in dealing with immigrants, even those whose skin is of a different hue or whose religion differs from that of the majority. I see a very high likelihood of increasing nativism and intolerance in the politics of Europe, straining the belief system of Europe’s current dominant left-leaning secularist culture. I don’t see this process as leading to anything apocalyptic in the long-run, but it will certainly bring about a very unpleasant transitional phase during which Europeans will finally have to come to grips with the fact that the world is not their own private oyster.<br />In short, we must recognize that globalization has its enemies, and they present a danger to the rest of the world. But such dangerous actors are not limited to the members of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. I submit that they are also to be found in Washington, DC and elsewhere in the West, which is the principal point I have labored to make in this essay. Neo-conservatives committed to fantasies of American military hegemony and American neo-colonialist control over the world’s dwindling supplies of oil, and Euro-centrists trying to whip up hostilities by promoting visions of an apocalyptic "clash of civilizations", all pose just as great a danger to globalization as the most committed, fanatical Islamic (or other religious) terrorist.<br />Barnett has produced an impressive body of work. He has helped establish a framework of analysis that can guide us through the perils of the current transitional era as humanity moves forward to a world of true economic globalization. Decision makers throughout the world should read Barnett’s writings. But a word of caution to Barnett: not everyone in Washington shares your vision of a future worth creating. And a word of caution to those neo-conservatives who believe that they have an ally in Barnett: Barnett’s vision of a future worth creating is not one that is consistent with a vision of American military hegemony.<br />Globalization is about international cooperation, connectivity, and relative equality among participants. China, Southeast Asia, India, the European Union, Brazil, a future African union anchored in South Africa, and a Middle East not tied down to oil – all will shape the future world of globalization just as much as the United States will. And rightly so. But that may not be the world the neo-conservatives want to create. Failure to recognize the dangers to globalization that are posed by colonialism and the hegemonic schemes of neo-conservatives will lead us into more disasters such as the Iraq War, and will only move us away from the future that Barnett, as well as this bourgeois Marxist, look forward to creating.</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-38566326692621300542009-01-07T14:39:00.000-08:002009-01-07T14:50:58.767-08:00Some Thoughts On The Writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett<strong>Introduction</strong><br /><br />As I said in my first post on this blog, my interest in the writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett is one of the subjects that I intend to explore in my postings. Barnett is about to release a new book, <em>Great Powers: America and The World After Bush,</em> which should hit bookstores in February 2009. I am looking forward to reading his latest book, and I thought that this might be a good opportunity to post in more detail some of my ideas about Barnett's work.<br /><br />The following is an essay I wrote in 2007. I have edited it a bit to remove stuff that might seem embarrassingly wrong, but for the most part, it still reflects much of my thinking about Barnett's writings. I haven't tried to update the essay to include anything about the current economic crisis. While some pundits believe that this crisis signals the demise of global capitalism, that is certainly not my view. Taking the long view, Barnett's vision of the ramifications of globalization remain sound, and if anything, the current economic crisis makes it even more important to put recent events into perspective and to look at the broader sweep of the history of capitalist evolution.<br /><br />I suspect that Barnett would take strong objection to much of my analysis of the Iraq War, pointing out that conditions in Iraq have improved markedly since I originally wrote this essay. Even if one accepts the conclusion that conditions have improved in Iraq and that this improvement is not likely to deteriorate, there is still a big question as to whether this outcome would justify the horrendous costs of the war. In my view, the jury is still out as far as the ultimate outcome in Iraq is concerned, and I am highly skeptical that any long-term improvement of conditions in Iraq will take place unless the U.S. embarks on major diplomatic initiatives, particularly by engaging Iran. Fortunately, that may well be the direction in which the Obama Administration intends to steer American foreign policy. At the end of the day, the Iraq War could only be a success if it is truly internationalized, so that it is clearly a war of globalization, and not a war of American neo-colonialism, which is the basic point of my essay.<br /><br />Another motivation for my posting of this essay at this time is the fact that I am currently reading the <em>Counterinsurgency Field Manual</em> of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, published by the University of Chicago Press in 2007. The <em>Field Manual </em>is a remarkable and impressive piece of work. However, I find that my qualms about the <em>Field Manual </em>parallel some of my uncertainties about Barnett's writings, at least his writings so far. Specifically, these concerns can be summed up by the <em>Manual's </em>definition of an "insurgency":<br /><br /><br /><blockquote>"an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted<br />government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."<br /></blockquote><br />The key question therefore is, what is a "constituted government" and who has the authority to make that decision? Apply these definitions, for example, to the Vietnam War - were America's opponents in Vietnam really "insurgents"? After all, "South Vietnam" was nothing more than a "fake state", created and maintained by the military might of the United States. Moreover, South Vietnam existed only because the United States subverted the conduct of elections that had previously been agreed upon following the defeat of the French, since the elections inevitably would have resulted in widespread manifestation of popular support for a unified Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Weren't the United States and its South Vietnamese allies really the "insurgents", and not the supporters of Ho Chi Minh who overwhelmingly reflected the popular will of the Vietnamese people? These problems arise even more glaringly in the case of the Iraq War. The U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew a "constituted" government, albeit a brutal and corrupt government. Why should the Iraqi forces who resisted the American invaders be deemed "insurgents" under the <em>Manual's</em> definition?<br /><br />By raising these questions, I do not mean to suggest that I support an isolationist foreign policy in which America must invariably refrain from invading other countries and displacing established governments. On the contrary, I believe that globalization may well mandate such actions by the U.S. on numerous occasions in the years ahead. However, what is needed is a new global political and legal architecture to provide guidance as to when such interventions may legitimately be conducted. Most importantly, American unilateralism in the conduct of future military adventures must be firmly rejected.<br /><br />My impression is that these are some of the questions Barnett will be addressing in his new book, particularly as applicable to his critique of the Bush Administration's foreign policy. Anyway, the following is what I thought about some of these things back in 2007.<br /><br /><strong>Globalization and Colonialism In The Post Cold War Era (Part I)</strong><br /><br />I have become very interested in the writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett. Barnett is a defense theorist who writes about the future of the American military in the post-Cold War world of economic globalization. Until recently, he worked as a Professor at the Naval War College, and he now operates a consulting business called Enterra Solutions. He is the author of two books, <em>The</em> <em>Pentagon’s New Map</em> and <em>Blueprint For Action</em>, and writes a newspaper column that originates in the <em>Knoxville Sentinel</em>. He also maintains a website, <a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/">http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/</a> , on which he posts a blog discussing various matters ranging from his personal comings and goings to his views on numerous current issues.<br />At the outset, I should say that my views on Barnett’s writings are generally quite positive. This is somewhat surprising, even to me, because Barnett is an unlikely soulmate for someone of my ideological persuasions. I consider myself a person of the Left, whose views on international issues have in the past often found compatibility with the writings of Noam Chomsky. By contrast, Barnett is someone who is often described as a "neo-conservative" whose writings are often grouped together with those of Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Friedman. While I believe that the designation of Barnett as a neo-conservative is in error (and I understand that Barnett thinks so too), the fact remains that Barnett was an original supporter of the Iraq War; I, on the other hand, proudly point to the fact that I marched in at least three protest marches against the Iraq War, dragging my son along with me. So, how can I possibly find anything positive to say about Barnett?<br />It might help to say something about how I first became exposed to Barnett’s ideas. One evening, I was nicely ensconced in the living room sofa, as I usually am, wielding the remote control to explore the evening’s televised fare. I happened to land on CSpan, as I often do, and started watching a lecture being delivered to what appeared to be a room full of Generals and Admirals by a man with a rather bizarre manner of speaking. At the time, I do not believe I even knew the name of the speaker, although he frequently made reference to something that he called "the Pentagon’s new map"; I subsequently googled this reference and learned that this was the name of a book written by Barnett. Barnett’s lecture was amusing and it featured a sophisticated PowerPoint presentation complete with sound effects, notably including strategic placement of the "dunh dunh" familiar to viewers of the "Law and Order" television series.<br />My initial reaction to Barnett was that he was just a glib neo-con with a clever PowerPoint show. However, the more I listened, the more I realized that Barnett was saying many things that echoed my own views on international affairs. What particularly struck me was the fact that the focus of Barnett’s analysis was relentlessly economic; here was someone who truly grasped the centrality of global capitalism in shaping world events. This type of analysis is almost never heard these days, particularly in the U.S., and hardly ever coming from any source other than the far left. Unlike left-wing analysts, however, Barnett expressed a view of the nature and effects of Twenty-First Century global capitalism that was far more balanced and mature. Again, Barnett set forth much of the same analysis that has been rolling around in my own head for several years.<br />My own analysis is something that I call "neo-Marxism", or as I sometimes like to call it, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, "bourgeois Marxism", in order to distinguish it from much of the claptrap that comes out of the left these days. This theory is not original with me; it is primarily derived from the teachings of my college mentor, Professor Lee Benson of the University of Pennsylvania. My thinking has also been heavily influenced by the writings of economist Joseph Schumpeter. I hope to be able to write a good deal more about neo-Marxism in the near future, but the following is a thumbnail sketch of the idea.<br />Neo-Marxism starts off with the premise that Marx was the most important social scientist who has ever lived, primarily because he established a scientific approach to the study of history. However, Marx should be treated just that way – as a scientist – and his writings should be subjected to experimentation, analysis, criticism, and verification, and should not be treated as holy writ. Thus, a scientific historian could claim the label of "neo-Marxist" much the same way that a modern biologist might be referred to as a "neo-Darwinian" or a physicist could claim to be a "neo-Newtonian."<br />Using that scientific approach, neo-Marxism posits the thesis that Marx, and the underrated Engels, were correct that the "mode of production" is the driving force in all human history; Marx’s development of this method for studying all human societies is his most important contribution to the scientific study of history. Marx’s mode of production consists of both the "means of production", i.e., the technology through which any human community produces the necessities of life, and the "relations of production", i.e., the legal, cultural, and religious framework that defines the relationships among the members of the community (somewhat analogous to what Barnett calls "rule sets"). Modes of production – both in terms of the means of production and the relations of production – are not static; conflicting elements exist within any mode of production, and the resolution of these conflicts leads to change, and this process of change is what we call "history." These historical processes led to the evolution of the capitalist mode of production in Europe at roughly the time of the Renaissance, replacing the feudal mode of production. Most of Marx’s writings, particularly his magnum opus, <em>Capital</em>, are devoted to an analysis of how the capitalist mode of production works, as well as offering prescriptions as to how to replace it and what it should be replaced with..<br />Benson’s concept of neo-Marxism asserts that where Marx and Engels went wrong in promulgating a scientific theory of history, was in their analysis of "class struggles", and specifically, the impact of the evolution of capitalism upon class conflict. Marx and Engel theorized that conflicts between members of economic classes are what bring about changes in the mode of production. Marx and Engels further theorized that the evolution of capitalism would inevitably cause society to become polarized between two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the conflicts between these classes would inevitably lead to revolution. The resolution of this class conflict would bring about the end of the capitalist mode of production and usher in the beginning of the socialist mode of production, in which society would be rid of economic classes and all members of society would be free to realize their full potential by enjoying the fruits of their labors.<br />While Marx’s theory of class conflict may or may not work as applied to pre-capitalist modes of production, in which members of different economic classes have differing legal and political status, Benson concluded that the theory breaks down completely when applied to capitalism, in which legal distinctions based upon membership in differing economic classes are almost entirely eliminated. Benson reached this conclusion through his studies of American political and social history, exemplified by his ground-breaking work, <em>The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York As A Test Case</em>. Benson applied a meticulous social science methodology to the analysis of voting patterns in New York State during the so-called "Jacksonian Era", roughly 1820-1850. Benson concluded that "Jacksonian Democracy", i.e., the notion that the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson represented the "little guy" against wealthy capitalists, was a myth; to simplify things, Benson found that wealthy voters were as likely to be Democrats as Whigs, and lower-class voters were as likely to be Whigs as Democrats. Benson found that party affiliations correlated most closely with factors such as ethno-religious identification, regionalism, and ideology, as opposed to economic class.<br />In later writings such as <em>Toward The Scientific Study of History</em>, Benson attempted to extend his findings about American political history to a broader application, namely, to an understanding of the nature of group conflict and cohesion in capitalist society, and the implications of his findings about American history for traditional Marxist theory. Benson suggested that what was happening in America was really a microcosm of capitalism in general. The elimination of all legal distinctions based on economic class – something that was pursued very aggressively by virtually all U.S. political parties during the so-called "Jacksonian Era" – was endemic to capitalism; Marx himself had emphasized this point in identifying the pertinent factors that necessarily had to be accomplished in order to enable the bourgeoisie to supplant the landed gentry that had dominated society in feudal times. Moreover, America in the early 19th Century was characterized by extraordinary physical and social mobility, combined with unprecedented levels of mass immigration, resulting in the mixing of diverse ethnic and religious groups within a single country. As discussed below, such mobility is also something that is inherent in the evolution of capitalism. These forces seemed logically to produce the sorts of non-class based group conflict and cohesion that Benson had detected in American history through his studies of voting patterns. These same forces, however, derived directly from the nature of the capitalist mode of production. Thus, Benson suggested that while empirical evidence contradicted Marx’s theory that capitalism engendered group conflict and cohesion based upon economic class, empirical evidence nevertheless supported Marx’s more general theory that it is the mode of production that is the central factor in shaping social and political phenomena such as group conflict and cohesion, and ultimately, the processes of human history.<br />This, then, is the central tenet of neo-Marxism. In a nutshell, Marx’s theory of class conflict as applied to capitalism is ultimately contradicted by Marx’s own theory that it is the mode of production that determines historical change. Capitalism is the most dynamic of all historical modes of production, as Marx correctly concluded, but as a consequence, capitalism cannot be analyzed in a static condition, as Marx attempted to do. Political economists up to Ricardo, who was the principal influence upon Marx’s analysis of capitalism, could not analyze economics in any way other than as a closed system operating within a single political unit, such as a single country. However, that is not how the capitalist mode of production works in the real world; capitalism is inexorably driven to expand and it will not be confined to a single community or even a single nation-state. As a result, capitalism leads directly to foreign investment, which in its initial phases was manifested in the global system of imperialism and colonialism (my definitions of these terms are discussed in more detail below), and which ultimately leads to globalization, namely, the globalized capitalist economic system that has been taking shape since World War II, and which has developed exponentially since the end of the Cold War (and which is the central focus of Barnett’s writings).<br />At the beginning of the Twentieth Century both democratic socialists (J.A. Hobson and the Webbs) and authoritarian socialists (Lenin) recognized the connection between capitalism and imperialism. What these socialist theoreticians failed to recognize, however, was the relationship between capitalist globalization and class consciousness and class conflict. As capitalism "goes global", group conflicts tend more often to be based upon ethno-cultural, religious, national, and regional differences between members of different communities, since globalized capitalism inevitably increases the interactions among different communities, and as a result, group conflicts are less likely to be based upon conflicts between members of economic classes within a single community. Thus, contrary to what Marx and his followers thought, the evolution of the capitalist mode of production actually leads to decreasing levels of class consciousness and class conflict. As a result, the class-based revolution that Marx believed would bring about the end of capitalism and usher in the era of the socialist mode of production has not in fact occurred; the reality that it will never occur is becoming more obvious every day.<br />Because Twentieth Century socialists did not appreciate the full significance of the relationship between capitalism and globalization, and the decreasing significance of class conflict due to the evolution of global capitalism, the experiments that Twentieth Century socialists pursued in imposing some version of "socialism" upon capitalist societies, either in a democratic form (Fabianism) or in an authoritarian form (Leninism), were doomed to failure. Capitalism will continue to grow and prosper until the process of globalization is complete – namely, when the entire world is linked in a functioning capitalist economy in which all of the world’s peoples are able to participate on a relatively equal footing. Only when global capitalism has then run its course will humanity be ready for an evolution into the next mode of production. I have no idea what the post-capitalist mode of production will look like (actually, I do have some theories on the subject but I’m not going to get into that now), but I am reasonably confident that it will not have much resemblance to Twentieth Century versions of "socialism". Nevertheless, I do believe that the post-capitalist mode of production – since it will be truly global and truly universal – will more closely embody the values that Marx and other socialists have always purported to espouse, namely, universal opportunity for individual creativity and general freedom from organized violence, than do either Twentieth Century socialism or Twentieth Century capitalism. Professor Benson used to posit that the "good society" would be one in which people are "kind and creative"; I think that capitalist globalization is a process that is moving us all in that direction.<br />Now back to Barnett. Barnett’s central thesis is that in the post-Cold War era, the nations of the world can be divided into two groups: the "Core" and the "Gap." The Core, or what Barnett calls the "functioning core of globalization", refers to those nations that are linked to and participants in the global capitalist economic system. The Core, in turn, is divided into two sub-groups, the "Old Core" and the "New Core." The Old Core refers to the nations that have relatively mature capitalist systems that have been in place for many years (or even many centuries): Western and Southern Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The New Core consists of the nations that have more recently joined the global capitalist economy, generally having done so in the post-Cold War era: China, India, Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe (except the former Yugoslavia, but including Slovenia), South Korea, South Africa, and the growing free market economies of South America, namely Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay.<br />The rest of the world falls into Barnett’s "Gap" or "non-integrating gap" – the nations that do not yet have functioning capitalist economies linked to and capable of participating in the global economy. Barnett does identify a few "seam states", i.e., nations that border the Core but do not yet have fully functional capitalist economies (Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Singapore) or that have developed capitalist economies but are prevented from full participation in globalization because of entanglement in local conflicts (Israel, Cyprus, Croatia). For the most part, however, Barnett’s Core/Gap dichotomy is fairly Manichean – a nation is either one or the other.<br />Some commentators on Barnett’s writings say that the Core and the Gap are the equivalent of the "haves" and the "have nots." This is a serious misunderstanding of what Barnett is talking about. Wealth alone is not determinative of membership in the Core. Several nations in the Core, such as China and India, continue to have high levels of poverty and are on a per capita basis far less wealthy than other nations, notably Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states, which Barnett nevertheless includes in the Gap. For Barnett, what determines Core membership is the extent to which a nation is connected to the global economy. I would add that a Core nation must not only be connected to the global economy, it must also be capable of participating in the global economy as a capitalist "player", even if not necessarily as a player of equal stature with the Old Core nations. (I think that Barnett sometimes fails to pay sufficient attention to this point, which relates to some of my disagreements with Barnett, as I will discuss in more detail below). Thus, China, India, and Brazil, notwithstanding their high poverty levels, all compete with the U.S. and Western Europe in the global economy. Saudi Arabia, despite its wealth, is merely a source of a valuable natural resource and is not a competitor in the global economy. Barnett’s recognition of this distinction is one of the most important, and insightful, aspects of his analysis.<br />Of course, Barnett would argue, correctly in my view, that membership in the Core does ultimately lead to substantial increases in national wealth and improvements in overall living standards. For all we may decry the existence of Chinese sweatshops – and I do not make light of them – there still can be little doubt that the economic benefits to the Chinese people that have come from participation in the global capitalist economy are enormous; Chinese economic growth over the past decade has been off the charts, and while the business cycle will inevitably bring about peaks and valleys in the performance of the Chinese economy, there can be little doubt that the overall upward trend will continue into the foreseeable future. Indeed, all of the New Core nations have in recent years benefitted from what may well be the most successful anti-poverty program in history, namely, the economic improvements attendant to participation in the global economy. Moreover, as President Lula da Silva of Brazil has demonstrated, an openness to globalization and free markets combined with enlightened social programs can result in truly extraordinary accomplishments in the eradication of poverty. I generally share the views of economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs that although globalization may have its "discontents", and attention needs to be paid to issues such as global warming and other environmental concerns, it is also a system that holds out the promise of the universal eradication of poverty and evolution towards a future in which all persons can lead lives free from want and free to make the most of their lives.<br />As a defense theoretician, Barnett is primarily concerned with the security ramifications of the Core/Gap world view – hence the name of Barnett’s first book, <em>The Pentagon’s New Map</em>. In Barnett’s view, once a nation joins the Core, i.e., once it becomes connected to and a participant in the global capitalist economy, it becomes extremely unlikely that such a nation will go to war with another member of the Core. The benefits derived from participation in the global economy are so great that no nation enjoying those benefits would be willing to put them at risk by making war against another nation that is also enjoying those benefits. Moreover, the nations of the Core all either have nuclear weapons or could readily obtain them if they chose to do so (Japan, Germany, Brazil), meaning that a full-scale war between Core nations would be devastating. Accordingly, a very simple cost/benefit analysis precludes any possibility of warfare between the nations of the Core.<br />Barnett argues that membership in the Core carries with it acceptance of the "rule sets" of the Core, and the most important of all of these rules is the rule that disputes between nations of the Core are not resolved through military force but are instead resolved by other means, such as diplomacy, trade agreements, and international law. Indeed, Barnett would say that one of the defining characteristics of a Core nation is its willingness to accept these "rule sets", which, not coincidentally, also happen to be the "rule sets" on which the global capitalist economy is based.<br />As Barnett says, the world of economic globalization is based on the authority of rules, not rulers.<br /><br />The fact that warfare among Core nations is precluded has important significance for Barnett’s views on U.S. military planning. There is no need to plan for a "big war" with a nation of roughly equal military strength and, as such, there is no need for many of the expensive weapons systems developed during the Cold War, such as nuclear submarines and what Barnett rightly castigates as the most unnecessary boondoggle of them all, the "Star Wars" anti-missile system.<br />Barnett argues, however, that it is a grave mistake to think that the U.S. can get out of the military business altogether just because Core vs. Core warfare is no longer a danger. This point was driven home by the events of September 11, 2001, which Barnett describes as a "system perturbation", i.e., a dramatic event that caused all participants in the global system to re-evaluate the nature of the system. The U.S. continues to have a need to be engaged militarily with the rest of the world, but those engagements now must focus upon the Gap, not the Core. Barnett points out that he originally hit upon his concept of "the Pentagon’s new map" by charting the locations of all major U.S. military engagements since World War II. The location of those conflicts is almost entirely coterminous with the Core/Gap distinction that is at the heart of Barnett’s analysis.<br />Since the nations of the Gap are not connected to and, as I continually emphasize, are not participants in the global capitalist economy, the nations of the Gap do not accept the "rule sets" of the globalized economy, which are also the rule sets that define the relationships among the nations of the Core. So, the corollary to the conclusion that warfare among Core nations is no longer a possibility is the conclusion that warfare among Gap nations or between Gap nations and Core nations is very much a possibility. The watchwords that Barnett uses are "disconnectedness defines danger"; in other words, so long as a nation remains disconnected from the global economy, it is a source of danger not only to its neighbors, but ultimately, to the entire world.<br />Indeed, Barnett argues that the processes of globalization make such conflicts inescapable; it is here that Barnett’s analysis intersects very directly with much of the neo-Marxist analysis. Globalization leads to more interactions among different national, ethnic, and religious groups, and in that process, certain groups will inevitably feel their status to be threatened by the processes of globalization. For example, one of the most significant consequences of globalization is the empowerment of women, as women are inevitably drawn into the workplace in the globalized economy. However, maintaining gender roles is one of the key aspects of virtually every traditional religious group. Thus, one can readily see how globalization inevitably engenders antagonism within such traditionalist groups, increasing the danger that such groups will come into conflict with other groups that are promoting globalization. Radical Islamic fundamentalists present a paradigmatic example of such a group that feels that its value system, and therefore its status in society, is threatened by globalization, and the manifestation of such religious fundamentalists in a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda is a demonstration of the danger that they can pose to the rest of the world, including the U.S. and the other nations of the Core.<br />Because most of these traditionalist groups that are threatened by globalization are to be found in the Gap, Barnett argues that this is therefore the location in which U.S. military activities will inevitably be focused in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Barnett argues that the U.S., as the leading nation of the Core, should take a proactive role in attempting to "shrink the gap" by using its military force to bring about change in the nations of the Gap, with the ultimate goal of enabling the nations of the Gap to become connected to the global economy. In other words, the U.S. should use its military strength not only for defensive purposes to fight terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, but also to attack and ultimately replace dysfunctional governments within the Gap that are an impediment to globalization and that thereby give direct or indirect support to terrorist organizations.<br />In order to carry out these Gap-oriented conflicts, Barnett suggests a re-configuration of the U.S. military. First, he proposes a "Leviathan" force. This is, in most respects, the military that the U.S. already has. It is a lean and mean fighting machine, capable of striking quickly and decisively. It consists of stealth bombers, smart bombs, attack helicopters, and mobile, mechanized land forces capable of covering great distances with extraordinary speed and breathtaking lethality. It was the U.S. Leviathan force that was very much on display in the two Gulf wars. The Leviathan force would be used to accomplish regime change by rapidly and decisively defeating the armies of harmful Gap governments that are threatening the progress of globalization.<br />The second component of Barnett’s new military is something he calls the "SysAdmin" force. The U.S. military has only begun to build a "SysAdmin" force, in large part in response to the sobering experiences of the disastrous Iraq War. (As discussed more below, although Barnett has supported the Iraq War, he acknowledges that the Bush Administration’s conduct of the war has been grossly mismanaged). The SysAdmin force would be larger and more labor-intensive than the Leviathan force. The SysAdmin force would be responsible for carrying out the various functions that Presidential candidate George W. Bush derided as "nation-building" during the 2000 campaign; Barnett labels these functions "military operations other than war." Following a regime change brought about by the Leviathan force, the SysAdmin force would be responsible for maintaining law and order and implementing civilian functions such as providing electricity, water, sanitation, food distribution, etc., in order to enable an occupied state to recuperate and install a new regime hospitable to the forces of globalization. In difficult cases, the SysAdmin force would also be called upon to carry out counter-insurgency fighting, although, if the SysAdmin force does its job well enough, it should be able to get a nation into a functioning condition on a fairly speedy basis so that insurgencies will not arise.<br />Barnett does not see the SysAdmin force as being comprised exclusively or even predominantly of U.S. military personnel. Indeed, Barnett acknowledges that the U.S. military alone is not large enough to field both a Leviathan force and a meaningful SysAdmin force. Accordingly, Barnett recognizes that it is highly unlikely that the U.S. can carry out successful military operations in the Gap unilaterally, because it does not have sufficient troops to field an effective SysAdmin force, and such additional forces will therefore have to be drawn from other sources. The armies of the European Union are already eminently suited to performing SysAdmin functions. However, a key component of Barnett’s strategy is that the U.S. must think beyond its traditional alliances (NATO and Japan), and build new alliances based on the common interest in promoting globalization that unites all of the members of the Core. Thus, Barnett also sees the armies of the "New Core" nations, principally India, China, and Brazil, as excellent sources of personnel for the SysAdmin force. Barnett is skeptical that the U.N. is institutionally capable of directing such operations, since the U.N. as currently structured lacks the equivalent of an "executive branch" of government. Instead, Barnett proposes the creation of an expanded version of the current G-8 – expanded to something like the "G-20" to include the nations of the New Core – that will provide the political and diplomatic leadership for the coordination of future Gap-oriented military operations. Barnett’s second book, <em>Blueprint For Action</em>, is just that, a description of an ambitious program of action whereby the U.S. can act in conjunction with the other nations of the Core – and Barnett places particular emphasis on the potential benefits to be derived from U.S. alliances with the nations of the New Core, especially China – to pursue military ventures that will bring about political change within the Gap. For example, Barnett sees the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea as a prime example of an oppressive, dysfunctional government that is impeding North Korea’s integration into the Core and that should be targeted for regime change. Using the Leviathan force to eliminate such malignant regimes in the nations of the Gap, and the SysAdmin force to rebuild these nations following the elimination of these regimes, Barnett sets forth a program to "shrink the Gap" by re-building these nations in a way that will permit them to be "plugged into" the globalized economy. Barnett would not have the U.S. do all of this unilaterally. Again taking the case of North Korea, Barnett emphasizes the common interest of the various Core states in the region – China, Japan, and South Korea – in working together with the U.S. to eliminate the disruptive North Korean regime, much as the U.S. worked together with the nations of Western Europe to bring about regime change in the former Yugoslavia (the example of the intervention in the Balkans is discussed in more detail below as a case study of how Barnett’s program might work).<br />Barnett describes the end result of the pursuit of this strategy of "shrinking the Gap" as the achievement of "a future worth creating." At the end of the day, Barnett’s vision of the post-Cold War world is extraordinarily positive and optimistic. Barnett sees the forces of globalization as not only fundamentally benign, but as practically unstoppable. Barnett also believes that one way or the other, the nations of the Core will arrive at security arrangements that will make the shrinking of the Gap a reality, with the attendant elimination of most global poverty and with it, most significant military conflict.<br />Some of Barnett’s detractors take issue with his extreme optimism, accusing him of having Pollyanna-ish tendencies. I do not think that this criticism is warranted. Because Barnett’s analysis is so firmly grounded in economics, I believe that his views cannot be described as anything other than realistic. For Barnett, the drive to shrink the Gap does not just come from altruism, it comes principally from the profit motive. The nations of the Core will be driven to shrink the Gap not just because it is moral and right to do so, but because it is good for business. As a neo-Marxist, I heartily concur in that analysis. The march to economic globalism comes from the unstoppable force of the universal desire of all persons to improve the material conditions of their lives. I share Barnett’s optimism that this road will lead a world of unprecedented peace and prosperity – a future worth creating.<br />There are numerous parallels between neo-Marxism and Barnett’s ideas:<br />• Both view the capitalist mode of production as the driving force shaping political events.<br />• Both reject the idea that capitalist evolution leads to class consciousness and class-based revolution.<br />• Both conclude that the globalization of capitalism leads to conflicts based on factors such as ethno-religious identification, rather than membership in economic classes.<br />• Both share a predominantly optimistic historical outlook, viewing capitalist globalization as fundamentally a positive force leading to improvement in the quality of life for the world’s peoples, and a general reduction of organized violence.<br />So, if Barnett is so smart, and if I agree with him so much, then why does Barnett do something so stupid as supporting the Iraq War, a war that I consider to be not just the ultimate in stupidity but a war that is so malignant as to be truly worthy of prosecution as an international war crime? I have wrestled with that problem at length, and have tried to analyze exactly where my views diverge from those of Barnett. In that analytical process, it has occurred to me that the aspect of Barnett’s writings with which I have the most visceral difficulty is in his prescription for future American military actions. When I first thought of this, it reminded me a bit of Marge Simpson’s comment that she really likes Woody Allen movies except for that annoying little guy with glasses who always appears in them. After all, Barnett is first and foremost a military theorist. Saying that you like everything about Barnett except for his military theories does seem quite a lot like Marge’s views on Woody Allen’s movies.<br />Nevertheless, the more I teased out the ramifications of this idea, the more it seemed to me that I was getting close to the root of our disagreement. The problem that I was having with Barnett’s ideas was that I had difficulty seeing exactly how his proposed U.S. military adventures in the Gap would play out in the real world, and more particularly, what would prevent those adventures from becoming excuses for American imperialism. Recall that I said at the outset of this essay that I am someone who has often found much common ground with the writings of Noam Chomsky, and I do have a strong visceral suspicion of proposals to have the U.S. throw its military weight around the world.<br />The problem that I have with Barnett’s prescription for future U.S. military actions is enhanced when one considers the issue from the perspective of the people in the nation that is subject to one of Barnett’s proposed attacks. In such a military action, the U.S. strikes a relatively weak and impoverished nation that is not a direct military threat to the U.S. with the full power of the Leviathan force, inevitably causing great loss of life and damage to property. Yet, the U.S. would have the nation under attack believe that it is being subjected to attack not because the U.S. has any ulterior motives, or has anything directly to gain from the attack, but simply because the U.S. wants to relieve the attacked nation of a bad government and thereby enable the nation to join the globalized economy. How likely is it that the attacked nation will accept such an altruistic explanation as the truth? More importantly, how likely is it that such an altruistic explanation would <em>be</em> the truth?<br />Yet, I am not a pacifist and unlike Chomsky, I do not believe that the U.S. is always wrong or that the use of American military force is never appropriate. Part of me very definitely believes that Barnett is on to something.<br />I think that the best way of sharpening the analysis and breaking this intellectual log-jam is to look at empirical examples of the use of American military force in the post-Cold War period, and analyze the questions of whether the use of military force has proven beneficial, and if so, why, and if not, why not. In order to do this analysis, I have considered two of the most significant uses of American military force in the post-Cold War era: (1) the military intervention in the former Yugoslavia; and (2) the war in Iraq. I opposed both of these military ventures; Barnett supported both of them. I would submit that I was wrong about Yugoslavia and right about Iraq, and that Barnett was right about Yugoslavia and wrong about Iraq. (We both have a .500 batting average, which isn’t so bad). Let’s take a closer look at these two case studies in the use of American military force, and try to understand exactly where Barnett and I went wrong; in doing so, I believe that I can identify with more precision my likes and dislikes about Barnett’s writings, and in the process, suggest some refinements to Barnett’s proposals that might ultimately make them more effective in achieving the goals that I do share with Barnett.<br />Let’s first consider the war in the former Yugoslavia. I opposed American military intervention in the Balkans for two reasons. First, I did not believe that the U.S. had any national interests that were affected by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and that it therefore did not make sense for the U.S. to expend lives and treasure in a military intervention in the region. Second, I did not accept the official justification for the war, namely, that the war was being fought for humanitarian reasons in order to put an end to violent "ethnic cleansing" involving Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanian Kosovars; I was very skeptical of the notion that the U.S. (or any other nation for that matter) would be willing to fight a war for purely humanitarian reasons. Rather, I believed that the war was being driven by the economic interests of the nations of the European Union, especially Germany, that had extensive economic investments in the Balkans, especially in Slovenia and Croatia, and that the nations of Western Europe wanted to use American military force to stabilize the region in order to protect those investments and open up the entirety of the region to further investments. What was the legitimacy of my concerns?<br />As to my first concern – the lack of any direct American interest in the Balkans – I now believe that my concerns were short-sighted because I took too narrow a view of what constitutes the "national interest" of the U.S. I now agree whole-heartedly with Barnett that in the Twenty-First Century, it is unavoidable that the U.S. must be concerned with the global ramifications of what may appear to be regional or even local conflicts. I also agree with Barnett that this point was driven home by the events of September 11, 2001, which dramatically demonstrated the connections between U.S. security and conflicts springing up in far away places. Imagine if the conflicts in the Balkans had not been addressed and were ongoing to this day – the Muslim populations of Kosovo and Bosnia would provide fertile recruiting grounds for fundamentalist organizations such as al Qaeda, and if those areas had remained in the chaotic state that reigned prior to American intervention, they would have been prime launch pads for terrorist attacks against Europe and the U.S.<br />Turning to my second concern, I still believe that I was fundamentally correct that economic interests and not humanitarian considerations drove the nations of the European Union to implore the U.S. to intervene militarily. However, my response to that point now would be, so what? The economic interest that the European Union was pursuing in the former Yugoslavia concerned trade and investment; the nations of the European Union were not seeking to exploit any natural resources in the region because there are virtually none of any importance. Promoting free trade and investment is, after all, what Barnett’s "shrink the Gap" strategy is all about, so the fact that the European Union enlisted U.S. military assistance in effecting regime change in the former Yugoslavia in order to make the region safe for trade and investment, simply makes the U.S. military intervention in the Balkans all the more justifiable.<br />In hindsight, it is clear that the American military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was well worthwhile and highly successful. Indeed, the entire operation is virtually a showcase that Barnett can hold up as an example of what is supposed to happen in such a military venture (and he does so in <em>Blueprint For Action</em>). The American Leviathan force quickly put an end to aggressive actions by the Serbs in both Bosnia and Kosovo, and toppled the dangerous Milosevic regime. Thereafter, a large NATO-based SysAdmin force occupied the region and rapidly brought stability. Since the intervention, violence in the region has dropped dramatically, virtually to the point of disappearance. It is likely that several of the nations of the former Yugoslavia will be admitted to the European Union in the next few years; Slovenia is already in, Croatia and Macedonia have applied for membership, and probably the rest of the former Yugoslavia will join within a decade. Just recently, elections were held in Serbia and while the Serbian Nationalists continue to be the largest single party, their percentage of the overall vote was under 30%, with the overwhelming majority of public support going to parties highly sympathetic to the idea of European integration. Barring unforeseen circumstances, it will soon be appropriate to move all of the former Yugoslavia out of the Gap and into the Core – one small step towards the realization of Barnett’s future worth creating.<br />Now let’s consider the Iraq War. I opposed the Iraq War because I did not believe that any of the Bush Administration’s proffered justifications for the war – the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction, the alleged connections between the Iraqi government and al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and the alleged desire of the Bush Administration to "democratize" the region – was true. Rather, I believed that the true reason why the Bush Administration wanted to pursue the war was to establish a substantial American military presence in the Middle East for the purpose of protecting the interests of American and British oil companies. Such interests are located not only in Iraq itself – itself a major source of high-quality crude oil highly coveted by many U.S. oil companies – but even more importantly, in neighboring Saudi Arabia. U.S. oil companies share a highly lucrative relationship with the corrupt and dictatorial Saudi royal family (I discuss the U.S./Saudi relationship and its relationship to the Iraq War in more detail below). In exchange for giving open oil spigots to American companies, the corrupt House of Saud seeks, and obtains, both personal enrichment and the military protection of the U.S. However, because of religious sensitivities, the Saudi royals prefer not to have American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia itself. Thus, a large American army in neighboring Iraq suits the security needs of the Saudis very well. These oil-related considerations, I believe, are the true motivations underlying the Iraq War, and nothing has happened in the almost four years since the Bush Administration started the Iraq War that would change my analysis.<br /><strong></strong><br /><br /><strong>[END PART I]<br /><br /></strong><strong></strong>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-5605642116117809372008-11-02T18:02:00.000-08:002008-11-03T15:51:06.587-08:00Don't Blame Me, I Voted For Henry ClayOne of the most vociferous critics of the American fiscal policies that have brought about the current global financial crisis has been Peer Steinbrück, the German Finance Minister. In several widely-reported interviews, Steinbrück blamed the financial crisis on America’s highly-unregulated financial system, stating that the collapse of this system would result in the end of America’s status as the world’s financial superpower. <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8ab34ea-8b63-11dd-b634-0000779fd18c.html">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8ab34ea-8b63-11dd-b634-0000779fd18c.html</a> Steinbrück and other European finance ministers particularly recalled last year’s G-7 meeting, at which German Chancellor Angela Merkel urged the US and the UK to adopt more intensive regulation of hedge funds, emphasizing the need for America to move away from its bifurcated banking system that distinguishes between commercial banking and investment banking, and to move toward a more integrated regulatory framework similar to the one generally following in Continental Europe, and indeed, in most of the rest of the world. American representatives at that G-7 meeting generally scoffed at the proposal as a “typical example of Germans’ penchant for over-regulation”, stating that it was not “America’s way.” Steinbrück’s recent criticism of the American financial system had more than a bit of schadenfreude and a refrain of “I told you so.”<br /><br /><br />In the days following Steinbrück’s jeremiad against the American financial system, the Germans and many other continental Europeans have found themselves wearing a good deal of egg on their faces, as the financial crisis has spread throughout Europe – effectively wiping out the economy of one European nation, Iceland – and it has become clear that European financial institutions have been as guilty as their American counterparts in engaging in foolish speculative activities that have endangered the global financial system. Indeed, Steinbrück and other Europeans have spoken with considerable admiration for the aggressiveness with which US Treasury Secretary Paulson has confronted the crisis, successfully overcoming Congressional opposition on the Left and the Right in order to enact an impressive program authorizing broad government intervention in the financial markets.<br /><br />At heart, however, there is a good deal of truth in the German criticism of the American financial system. Banking in America, and the American legal and regulatory scheme governing the banking industry, is quite different from the rest of the world. In some respects, America’s unique banking system has been beneficial, helping to fuel the rapid economic growth that has been the hallmark of American history. However, the American banking system has also been very prone to financial “panics” – bursts of extreme financial instability – which have often been the harbinger of wider periods of economic recession and depression. In today’s world of capitalist globalization, it is very dangerous for America’s banking system to continue playing the role of the world's financial “maverick”, as its proclivity for financial instability can rapidly lead to worldwide economic crises.<br /><br />America often reminds me of Madagascar. Evolutionary biologists love to study Madagascar because it has numerous species of plants and animals that are found nowhere else in the world. However, because Madagascar is an island that broke off from the African mainland in relatively recent geological time, it is possible to find common ancestors that link species found in Madagascar to those found in the rest of Africa. For example, lemurs are unique to Madagascar. They are primates that share common ancestors with the monkeys, apes and humans that evolved in Africa. However, lemurs went off in their own evolutionary direction on the isolated island of Madagascar.<br /><br />Like Madagascar, America has evolved institutions that are often quite different from those in the rest of the world. America is one of the few countries in the world that is not metric; it is virtually the only country that does not have a VAT (a pet peeve of mine that I will write about some day). The American legal system has lots of rules that are unique – American civil juries have no analog in other countries and the American system of civil litigation, with its free-wheeling discovery, general lack of judicial supervision, and potential for generating enormous jury verdicts including punitive damages, is unlike any other legal system in the world. And, as the Germans have recently pointed out, the American banking system is different from the rest of the world.<br /><br />Again, the analogy to Madagascar strikes me as very apt. Many of these unique American institutions can be traced to antecedents in Europe, primarily England, such as the jury system or the English system of measurement. However, because of its physical and political isolation, these institutions took a different evolutionary course in America.<br /><br />To understand America’s unique banking system, we have to go back to the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. As readers of this blog may have noticed, I am quite prone to find the influence of “Jacksonian” ideology in many aspects of American life. The “Jacksonian Era” was the area of my concentration as an American History major in college, and, as I have often commented, I consider Walter Russell Mead’s essay, “The Jacksonian Tradition”, to be one of the most insightful pieces ever written about American ideology. The recent debate on the so-called “Wall Street bailout” had a very familiar ring to anyone who has studied the rhetoric of Jacksonian America. “Populists” on both the Right and the Left decried the greed and corruption of “Wall Street”, in contrast to the honesty and common decency of “Main Street.” These speeches could have been delivered almost verbatim in the 1820s, and they would have been completely comprehensible to the partisans of that era. So, in order to understand the world's current financial crisis, a journey into history is in order.<br /><br />Modern banking got its start in the Dutch Republic in the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries. There were a number of factors that caused Holland to become the first center of merchant capitalism. The Protestant Reformation broke down traditional Roman Catholic dogma that viewed all forms of money lending as sinful. Muslim and Jewish emigrants to the Netherlands fleeing the Spanish Inquisition brought with them an entrepreneurial culture and an understanding of the potential benefits of credit, that embodied the germs of a nascent financial system. The European discovery of the Americas and the beginnings of industrial capitalism promoted trade and sea travel, all of which was very expensive and could not take place without a system of credit. The Dutch golden age proved to the world that there was nothing inherently evil about credit and debt, and that an economy based on merchant capitalism, financed by credit, could generate hitherto unimagined levels of general wealth, and notably, a degree of wealth not restricted to the aristocracy but increasingly available to a new phenomenon in human history: a growing mass middle class.<br /><br />By the end of the Seventeenth Century, Britain replaced Holland as the dominant merchant capitalist power in the world. The British, however, learned an important lesson from the Dutch about managing an economy based on credit. While credit can be an extremely powerful force in promoting general prosperity, it can also be a very dangerous force if not managed wisely. A credit-based economy can be highly unstable, a characteristic that often spills over into the social and political spheres; Kevin Phillips’s work <em>American Theocracy</em> describes the tendency of societies that are excessively reliant upon credit to experience highly disruptive and often contradictory social phenomena, such as moral decadence and religious fanaticism.<br /><br />In an effort to manage a credit-based economy more wisely than the Dutch had done, Britain developed a system of central banking. The Bank of England oversaw the activities of all lesser banks. The British modification of the Dutch financial system proved to be fabulously successful, as British trade came to dominate the world. The British were able to convert their mastery of the world’s financial system into political and military dominance, as the British victory in the Seven Years’ War confirmed Britain’s status as the dominant global power, a position it would hold for almost two-hundred years.<br /><br />One of the most ardent admirers of the British system of central banking was America’s first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton. At Hamilton’s urging, President Washington supported the establishment of the First Bank of the United States, an institution modeled directly on the Bank of England. The Bank of the United States would serve as the repository of all revenues of the Federal government. This control over Federal revenues would give the Bank a position of dominance in the American financial system that would enable it to exercise direct control over the credit policies of all subordinate banks. Hamilton's system was very popular in the Northeast, especially New York and New England, where merchants and infant industrialists benefited from the fact the Bank gave credibility to the new American Dollar and established stability in credit markets. The agrarian South was less interested in credit, and Hamilton's Bank conflicted with the Jeffersonian ideology that favored "small government" and a society of "yeoman farmers", and distrusted trade and finance.<br /><br />In 1811, Jefferson's successor, President James Madison, allowed the charter of the Bank of the United States to lapse. Madison, however, soon learned an important lesson in the importance of having a sound financial system. In 1812, Madison succumbed to pressure from the "war hawks" and picked a fight with England, the world's financial superpower. While the over-confident Americans were embarrassed during the early stages of the war - including the British capture of Washington, DC and the burning of the White House - the young American Republic did manage to eke out a draw. The financial consequences of the war, however, were devastating. Madison's Treasury Secretary, the Swiss-born Albert Gallatin, persuaded Madison to revive the Hamiltonian system of central banking and the Second Bank of the US was established in 1816.<br /><br />Nicholas Biddle, the President of the Second Bank, was, by most accounts, a pretty obnoxious and corrupt individual. Biddle unabashedly used the economic power of the Bank to advance political ends. The two politicians who would later become the founders of the Whig Party, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay, were virtually hired hands of the Bank. Webster served as the Bank's principal lawyer, arguing on behalf of the Bank in the landmark Supreme Court case of <em>McCulloch v. Maryland</em>. Clay served as the Bank's principal agent in Washington, making liberal use of the Bank's economic power to provide benefits to politicians who worked with Clay to advance Biddle's fortunes. Nevertheless, in spite of his corrupt propensities, Biddle was an effective banker and the Second Bank succeeded in bringing about a prolonged period of prosperity and economic stability during the 1820s.<br /><br />Andrew Jackson was elected President in 1828, and populist rhetoric directed against the Bank became a maninstay of his political agenda. The Bank was attacked as "aristocratic", and Biddle's abuse of the Bank's economic power as a means of extending his political influence made him a worthy target of much of this criticism. Jackson's attack on the Bank also carried an ethnic dimension. Jackson drew strong support among Scots-Irish immigrants, who had come to the US in large numbers in the years following the Revolution, and the Bank was targeted as an "English" type of institution, and Biddle and his supporters were pilloried as Anglophiles.<br /><br />Jackson easily defeated the pro-Bank candidate Clay in the election of 1832. Getting rid of the Bank was the top priority of Jackson's second term. Not content to wait for the Bank's charter to lapse, Jackson set about to achieve his goal of the immediate destruction of the Bank. Jackson directed the Secretary of the Treasury to withdraw all Federal funds from the Bank and transfer the funds to various state-chartered banks that were run by Jackson's political supporters. Several Treasury Secretaries resigned rather than follow Jackson's order, which was of doubtful legality. Ultimately, Jackson designated his Attorney General and longtime political crony, Roger Taney, as the Secretary of the Treasury, and Taney carried out Jackson's directions. Soon thereafter, Jackson would reward the toady Taney by appointing him to succeed John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, where Taney would achieve notoriety and would again have an opportunity to change the course of American history, and not for the better, by writing the majority decision in the infamous Dred Scott case.<br /><br />Stripped of its status as the sole repository of Federal revenues, the Second Bank withered away as an institution of importance in the American economy, and became irrelevant by the time its charter lapsed. The imperious Biddle endured a similar fate.<br /><br />It is noteworthy that Jackson's attitude towards banking and credit differed significantly from that of the Jeffersonians. Jackson had no particular antipathy towards banks and a credit-driven economy, quite the contrary. Jackson's principal objection to the Bank had been based on its political power and its support for Jackson's rivals. Jackson also objected to the fact that the Bank of the United States tended to impede the growth of numerous state-chartered banks; again, many of these banks were owned by Jackson's political supporters. With the abolition of the Second Bank, there was in fact an explosion in both the number and the size of state-chartered banks. Without any central bank to place any controls on the activities of the state-chartered banks, and with little regulation being imposed by the highly corrupt state governments that chartered these banks, speculation of all sorts ran rampant throughout the American economy. This resulted in the Panic of 1837, initiating a period of serious economic dislocation. By this time, however, Jackson had left the White House and it was his successor, Van Buren, who would pay the price for this economic collapse, being defeated in 1840 by Whig candidate William Henry Harrison, who co-opted the same pseudo populist rhetoric that was Jackson's stock in trade.<br /><br />Notwithstanding the unhappy experience of the Panic of 1837 and subsequent economic collapse, the American system of state-chartered, minimally-regulated banking instituted by Jackson remained largely unchanged for almost a century. The National Banking Act, enacted during the Civil War, established the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to provide some minimal level of Federal oversight, but for the most part, no major changes occurred in the system. The most important changes in the American banking system during the Nineteenth Century occurred not because of new legislation or governmental regulation, but rather, because of changes within American society and the American economy. Specifically, the uniquely American bifurcation between commercial and investment banking began to take shape.<br /><br />What we would ultimately call “commercial banking” came under the domination of J.P. Morgan. Morgan acted as the conduit for large amounts of foreign investment into the U.S., primarily from England. However, the minimally-regulated Jacksonian banking system made it possible for other tycoons to translate their wealth into financial clout. Oil magnates such as Mellon and Rockefeller transformed themselves into bankers. John D. Rockefeller bought up control of the Chase National Bank; brother William Rockefeller took over the First National City Bank, today’s Citibank.<br /><br />Meanwhile, American ethnic divisions gave birth to a separate, much riskier branch of the banking industry, originally known as “merchant banking” and now known as “investment banking”. German Jewish financiers such as August Belmont (née “Schönburg”), Joseph Seligman, Jacob Schiff, and Marcus Goldman gave birth to the great investment banking firms of Wall Street. These financiers were locked out the world of mainstream banking by Morgan and other WASPs, but they compensated for the impact of such discrimination by opening doors for investments into the American economy by European Jewish financiers such as the Rothschilds and the Warburgs. (Stephen Birmingham’s brilliant work <em>Our Crowd</em> is an outstanding history of the great German Jewish families of New York who played a major role in establishing the leading investment banking firms and inventing “Wall Street.”)<br /><br />This free-wheeling, unregulated system of commercial and investment banking fostered the smooth flow of capital into the American economy, leading to an era of economic growth in the U.S. virtually without precedent in human history. However, the system was prone to repeated financial “panics”, with increasingly destructive effects on the American economy. In order to mitigate the impact of these frequent disruptions to the American financial system, Morgan began to assume the role of a <em>de facto</em> central bank. During the Panic of 1907, Morgan did many of the same things Secretary Paulson proposed doing to deal with the current crisis. Morgan’s efforts proved to be extremely effective, mitigating significantly the economic impact of the 1907 financial crisis.<br /><br />Morgan’s death in 1913 made it clear that something had to be done to bring some order to the American banking system. As a result, Congress created the Federal Reserve system.<br /><br />While we often think of the Federal Reserve as the American central bank, it really isn’t one in the sense that central banks exist in most countries of the world, or in the sense of the Bank of the United States as it existed before Jackson did it in. The Federal Reserve has virtually no regulatory authority or capability with respect to the banking system as a whole. The Federal Reserve’s job is to regulate the size of the money supply, by setting the discount rate at which member banks borrow money and by buying or selling government bonds in order to either inject or withdraw funds from the banking system. What the member banks do with the money is, for the most part, not something that the Federal Reserve has any control over.<br /><br />The minimally-regulated American banking system again helped to spur massive economic growth during the 1920s, as the historic distinctions between commercial and investment banking virtually disappeared and the large amounts of funds available to commercial banks flowed into highly-risky new investment ventures. As a result, the stock market soared to new heights. Also as a result, when the inevitable fall came, as it did in 1929, it was more catastrophic for the economy as a whole than any of the prior panics that had frequently rocked the American financial system.<br /><br />One of the first pieces of legislation enacted during the New Deal was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The principal author of the law, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, was an extremely conservative legislator, and he had no desire to overturn the fundamentals of the American financial system. The law responded to the financial crisis not by creating a real central bank or by establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme over all aspects of the financial industry, but rather, by creating a wall of separation between commercial banking and investment banking. In other words, the Glass-Steagall Act codified into law the separation between commercial and investment banking that had long existed in the American financial system. Commercial banking would enjoy the benefit of insured deposits through the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but at the same time, commercial banks would be sharply restricted in the kinds of investments they could make. Specifically, commercial banks would be barred from making investments in equity.<br /><br />The wall of separation created by the Glass-Steagall Act left the highly profitable equity markets as the exclusive preserve of investment banking firms. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposed new disclosure requirements on equity markets, but in many ways, the business of investment banking continued to be highly unregulated and very risky. And for the firms that managed to succeed in the risky business of investment banking, the business was extraordinarily profitable.<br /><br />The end of World War II and the subsequent Bretton Woods agreements left the United States as the world’s economic superpower. American financial institutions – both commercial banks and investment banks – prospered. By the 1970s, however, the Bretton Woods regime had broken down and capitalist globalization was on the march. By the 1980s, European and Japanese financial institutions had become dominant and few American banks made it into the lists of the world’s largest financial institutions.<br /><br />The Glass-Steagall Act became a major target of lobbying by American commercial banks. The exclusion of American commercial banks from the highly profitable business of investment banking, an exclusion that did not apply to non-American financial institutions, was portrayed as a major drag on the competitiveness of American banks.<br /><br />An attempt to make an end-run around the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act was made during the 1980s through the creation of equity-like debt instruments colloquially known as “junk bonds.” This experiment resulted in the savings and loan debacle and a consequent bloodbath for federal insurance, accompanied by the financial crisis of the late 1980s and the recession of the early 1990s.<br /><br />Lobbying against Glass-Steagall by the commercial banks continued during the 1990s, and it began to get real traction when the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 finally repealed almost all of what was left of Glass-Steagall.<br /><br />What seems to have been forgotten when Gramm-Leach-Bliley was enacted was the fact that at its core, America continued to have the same minimally-regulated financial system that resulted from Jackson’s abolition of the Bank of the United States in 1833. Without Glass-Steagall to stop the spillover of the risky business of investment banking into commercial banking, there was little regulatory framework in place to ensure the stability of the American financial system. Not surprisingly, the financial activities of the past decade bear remarkable similarities to the pre-Glass-Steagall era of the 1920s. The commercial banks would move aggressively into investment banking. More importantly, new institutions that would be largely immune from the regulatory jurisdiction of the securities laws, hedge funds, and new financial instruments also largely outside of the jurisdiction of the securities laws, derivatives, came to play dominant roles in the financial industry. As a result, again, when the inevitable collapse came it caused a massive impact on the American economy. And because we now have a truly globalized economy, the effects of the collapse have been felt in every corner of the globe.<br /><br />Where do we go from here? It seems clear to me that the American tradition of a minimally-regulated financial industry cannot be sustained. On the other hand, there is some legitimacy to the criticism of over-regulation in many European countries such as Germany. The free flow of capital is more important than ever in the era of globalization. The nascent capitalist boom in countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, etc., must be sustained in the interest of global economic and political stability. Overreaction in regulating the financial industry could have very harmful effects in choking off economic growth in these emerging economies.<br /><br />My view is that this is a time for synthesis. I would, of course, like to see the establishment of a new Bretton Woods regime for the 21st Century. However, this should not lead to the creation of some new global central bank to impose an extensive regulatory scheme on all of the financial institutions of the world. Rather, I would foresee the new global regime as imposing certain minimal regulatory standards that the major nations of the world would impose on their financial institutions. The era of unregulated Jacksonian banking should end. However, it also seems that the world could learn something from the American experience under the Glass-Steagall act. Different levels of regulation may be appropriate for different types of financial activities. Risky forms of investment should not be discouraged by overreaction and over-regulation, but on the other hand, the inevitable losses resulting from such speculative investment activities should have limited ramifications, so as to avoid the kinds of massive, global financial collapses we have seen in 1929 and 2008.<br /><br />The real bottom line is that America can no longer be Madagascar. The rest of the world can learn a lot from the unique American evolutionary history. But neither America nor the rest of the world can afford to have America continue to be the global financial “maverick”, maintaining the Jacksonian model of an unregulated financial industry whose inevitable failures rock the foundations of the world’s economy. In other words, it’s time to re-do the election of 1832.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-76020927333016651042008-09-21T22:18:00.000-07:002008-10-19T09:42:44.379-07:00The Pernicious Myth of "Human Nature"<div align="left">The belief that “human nature” includes instinctual drives towards aggression and violence has caused much mischief. The belief has led to a sort of “boys will be boys” attitude towards violence. Such beliefs can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If one believes that human nature is inherently violent and aggressive, then one must also believe that violence and aggression are inescapable aspects of the human condition, and that any proposal that seeks to reduce or eliminate violence and aggression is doomed to failure. Therefore, it logically follows, it is pointless, even counterproductive, to seek to implement any such proposals. As a result, aggression and violence continue to be prevalent in our lives.</div><div align="left"><br />Two things have caused me to think about the great damage that has been caused by the belief that there is such a thing as “human nature”, and that this nature is inescapably violent. First, I have recently read Robert Kagan’s new book, <em>The Return of History and The End of Dreams</em> (it’s only a little over 100 pages long, so it’s really more like an essay than an actual book, but nevertheless, Kagan somehow got somebody to publish it as a stand-alone book). Second, I recently attended a fortieth anniversary special screening and panel discussion of Stanley Kubrick’s masterpiece, <em>2001 A Space Odyssey</em>, a work of art that I admired greatly when I first saw it as a radical-wannabe teenager during the peak of the counterculture in 1968, but which now fills me with great misgivings when viewed through the eyes of a middle-aged liberal.</div><br /><div align="left">Kagan’s book is an extremely important book. It is, in my opinion, a thoroughly loathsome book and I disagree with just about every word of it, including “and” and “the” to borrow a line from Mary McCarthy, and I often found myself throwing down the book in exasperation while reading it (I took it out from the local public library so as to avoid contributing to Mr. Kagan’s royalties, and I frequently had to remind myself not to do damage to public property). Nevertheless, it is a very important book. It is an important work because it is an excellent articulation of the current state of the political philosophy generally known as “neo-conservatism”. Kagan is one of the leading foreign policy advisers to Senator McCain and the book is basically a position paper for the foreign policy that would be pursued during a McCain Presidency. McCain’s call for the creation of a “League of Democracies” to carry out military adventures under the leadership of the United States in the years ahead comes directly from Kagan.</div><br /><div align="left">The book also has a lot to do with some of the “inside baseball” in the neo-conservative movement. The Kagan family is sort of the neo-con version of the Partridge Family. Robert Kagan was one of the prime movers behind the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), which remains the focal point for neo-conservative ideas. Patriarch Donald Kagan, a classics scholar at Yale, was one of the early godfathers of neo-conservative philosophy. Brother Frederick Kagan has also been affiliated with PNAC, and was a strident proponent of both the initiation of the Iraq War and of its continuation and escalation and prolongation (the so-called “surge”), with the ultimate goal of installing a permanent U.S. military force in Iraq – the “100-year” occupation espoused by Senator McCain.</div><br /><div align="left">Robert Kagan’s new book, in addition to being the blueprint for the foreign policy of a McCain Presidency, is also a rejoinder to the writings of another (now erstwhile) leading light of the neo-conservative movement, Francis Fukuyama. The title of Kagan’s book is actually a dig at the title of Fukuyama’s major work, <em>The End of History and The Last Man</em>. Fukuyama is regarded as something of an apostate by other neo-conservatives, as he has expressed the opinion in his latest book, <em>America at the Crossroads</em>, that the Iraq War was a mistake and Fukuyama has abandoned what had previously been a central tenet of his neo-conservative philosophy, namely, that the United States can and should engage in military conquest for the purpose of spreading “democracy.” Fukuyama has also given a tentative endorsement of Obama’s campaign.</div><br /><div align="left">Fukuyama’s celebrated “end of history” thesis was as follows. Fukuyama opined that the end of the Cold War signaled the end of socialism and left free-market capitalism as the world’s sole economic system. However, Fukuyama is a non-Marxist Hegelian who believes that economics isn’t everything, so he was not content to accept the benefits of a world united by globalization and the attendant economic benefits it could bring to the peoples of the world. For Fukuyama, America’s “victory” in the Cold War was not just a triumph for an economic system, it was a triumph for an ideal, namely, the ideal of “democracy.” Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold War ushered in the “end of history” because it meant that the entire world would now be united by a single common ideology, namely, American-style “democracy.” And, since the end of the Cold War left the United States as the world’s sole superpower, Fukuyama advocated the liberal use of American military force in order the accelerate the global spread of “democracy.”</div><br /><div align="left">As noted, Fukuyama now concedes the error of at least some of his ways, as the Iraq debacle has convinced him to abandon the core principles of neo-conservatism. Neo-cons such as Kagan (and McCain), however, are made of sterner stuff.</div><br /><div align="left">Kagan argues that the weakness in Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis lay in its failure to give sufficient recognition to the “instincts for aggression and violence” that are embedded in human nature. Fukuyama’s work had devoted great attention to the classical Greek concept of<em> thumos</em>, the passionate, irrational component of human nature that produces the ferocious sorts of conflicts among tribes, clans, and nations, which we have come to know as “war.” Fukuyama did not contend that <em>thumos</em> could be eliminated; rather, he argued that human instincts for competition would be channeled into peaceful pursuits as a result of the universal embrace of Euro-American style “democracy.” Kagan argues that Fukyama’s thesis is nothing more than wishful thinking, and Kagan announces, almost gleefully, that large-scale, nation vs. nation warfare is here to stay.</div><br /><div align="left">Kagan points to what he claims to be the lessons of the post-Cold War period in order to support his argument. Kagan asserts that even though global capitalism as an economic system has indeed swept virtually the entire world, this has not led to a trend towards global democracy. The rule of the Communist Party in China appears unshakable. After an initial and largely unsatisfactory flirtation with democracy during the Yeltsin era, Russia appears to have reverted to authoritarianism under the Putin regime. According to Kagan, there is no necessary connection between capitalism and democracy. Kagan believes that “authoritarian capitalism” has shown itself to be a perfectly viable political and economic system in China and Russia, and he believes that it is proving to be a very attractive model for many developing countries in Central Asia and Africa. In Kagan’s world, we can expect “authoritarian capitalist” regimes to be around for quite some time unless they are confronted, and defeated, militarily.</div><br /><div align="left">Kagan, like Fukuyama, sees conflict as rooted in ideology, not economics. Here is where the concept of<em> thumos</em> once again raises its ugly head. Kagan believes that the instincts for violence and aggression inherent in human nature make it inevitable that there will be violent conflicts between the rival ideologies of democracy and authoritarianism. Kagan concludes that we have not arrived at Fukuyama’s “end of history” – hence Kagan's assertion of the “return of history” – and we can look forward to a twenty-first century that will be as bloody as the last century. Actually, Kagan suggests that the twenty-first century will be more like the nineteenth century in that there are no longer competing economic systems following the end of the Cold War, just national ideologies struggling to achieve dominance. Nevertheless, in Kagan’s world we should rest assured that human nature will guarantee that these conflicts will be carried out through bloodshed and violence. In order to ensure that America achieves “victory” in this violent world, it should continue to maintain its massive military establishment, and most importantly, the United States must have a military establishment capable of fighting large-scale wars against other powerful nations <em>(i.e</em>., China and Russia), and not just a military attuned to engage in counterinsurgency fighting in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.</div><br /><div align="left">Finally, Kagan articulates the proposal that has become the centerpiece of McCain’s foreign policy agenda, namely, that the United States should become the leader of a “League of Democracies” that will carry out the fight against our “authoritarian” rivals around the world. This program includes steps such as the virtual scrapping of the United Nations, the expulsion of Russia from the G-8, and the threat of an American military response to protect the “democracy” in Taiwan against Chinese aggression.</div><br /><div align="left">Notably, the threat of Islamic extremism plays a somewhat secondary role in Kagan’s world. At first blush, this might seem inconsistent with what is generally assumed to be the preoccupations of the neo-cons. However, it is perfectly consistent with the PNAC worldview, which sought to achieve an international system based on American hegemony brought about by military might. While Kagan is by no means a fan of radical Islam, he views American military action in the Middle East as merely one part of his scheme of a larger global ideological conflict between “democracy” and “authoritarianism.” Kagan’s goals for American military action in the Middle East are, (1) to promote “democracy” where possible, thereby recruiting new members of the “League of Democracies” that will be the military partners of the United States, and (2) even more importantly, to gain control over vital resources (oil, of course) so as to deny those resources to our authoritarian enemies.</div><br /><div align="left">As I said earlier, I disagree with just about every word of Kagan’s book, so I have a bit of a hard time articulating these disagreements in a coherent way. I’ll give it a try.</div><br /><div align="left">One can challenge the particulars of Kagan's assumptions about the post-Cold War world. The paradigm of dividing the world into warring ideological camps denominated as "democracies" and "autocracies" is way off base. While states such as Russia and China are certainly far from being open societies along the lines of the liberal democratic ideal, they are unquestionably far freer than they were under their communist regimes. Russia now does conduct elections, and those elections cannot be dismissed as being wholly without substance. While China has made little movement in the direction of electoral democracy, the structure of the Communist Party itself has become far more flexible and amenable to change, and in some cases, it is even responsive to public opinion. The recent earthquake in Sichuan province offers a good example of this. Provincial party officials who were not sufficiently responsive in dealing with the crisis were subjected to intense popular criticism. <a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/06/the_sichuan_quake_system_pertu.html#comments">http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/06/the_sichuan_quake_system_pertu.html#comments</a> For the most part, the Chinese party leadership responded not by cracking down on demonstrations of popular anger, but rather, by removing incompetent or corrupt local officials. The contrast with the Bush Administration’s handling of incompetent officials who bungled the Federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina – Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff kept his job and still holds it – is noteworthy, and to any objective American, humbling.</div><br /><div align="left">It is also instructive to look at the other side of the democracy vs. autocracy divide in assessing how accurate Kagan’s analysis really is. The paragon of democracy in Kagan’s world, the United States, has unquestionably been drifting in a much more authoritarian direction during the eight years of the Bush/Cheney administration. The United States government under Bush and Cheney openly advocates programs involving torture and detention, and President Bush engaged in widespread illegal electronic surveillance. Security procedures such as random searches and omnipresent metal detectors have become accepted features of American life. The authoritarian drift in American society is not confined to anti-terrorist measures adopted in the wake of 9/11. Calls for the closing of American borders in order to cut off immigration draw great support among the far right, and even among followers of pseudo populists such as Lou Dobbs. The United States employs capital punishment on a scale unknown anywhere in the “democratic” world – even authoritarian Russia has abolished capital punishment. The United States now has the world’s largest prison population, both in absolute and per capita terms; again, the “autocracies” of China and Russia lag far behind the United States in the rate at which they imprison their own people.</div><br /><div align="left">One can also question Kagan’s assertion that autocracies present a greater danger of military aggression than do democracies. Kagan would point to the recent events in Georgia to bolster his contention that the Russian autocracy is a major threat to world peace which the United States must be prepared to resist. The facts of what happened in Georgia are far from clear, as Russian officials have strongly asserted that Georgia initiated the conflict by attacking Russian troops in South Ossetia, and allegedly committing atrocities against Ossetians. While the extent or even the existence of any atrocities committed by Georgian troops in South Ossetia remains unproven, there appears to be little dispute that the hostilities were initiated by Georgian troops that began heavy shelling of Russian troops in South Ossetia; Russian troops have been present in South Ossetia for the past fifteen years, effectively since the break-up of the Soviet Union, pursuant to a mutual agreement between the governments of Russia and Georgia. To be sure, it can be argued that Russian use of military force in Georgia was excessive, but one can only imagine how restrained the United States would be if Castro suddenly decided to start lobbing artillery shells into Guantanamo.</div><br /><div align="left">Any objective observer of recent international affairs would have to acknowledge that the most militarily adventurous nation has been the democratic United States, not the autocratic Russia or China. In the past twenty years, the United States has launched invasions of numerous sovereign nations: Panama, Iraq (twice), Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and most recently, Pakistan. Many of these invasions have had little to do with either the defense of the United States or a response to direct threats against the United States. Nor have many of these military actions by the United States received the approval of any international authority. The most egregious example, of course, is the American invasion and occupation of Iraq, which the United Nations explicitly refused to bless. The United States invaded Iraq anyway, effectively unilaterally, and has occupied Iraq for the past five years. As long as the Republican Party remains in power in Washington, there is no reason to believe that this occupation will end anytime in the foreseeable future. There have been no international calls to have the United States subjected to military or economic sanctions because of its patently illegal occupation of Iraq, comparable to the assertions that followed Russia’s relatively short-lived incursion into Georgia.</div><br /><div align="left">The military aggressiveness of the United States in recent years has not been limited to the launching of invasions of other countries. The United States has consistently pressed for the eastward expansion of NATO, including into the former Soviet Union in states bordering directly on Russia, such as the Ukraine and Georgia. It is not entirely clear what purpose NATO serves today following the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union. The United States has sought to make it seem as though NATO is merely an adjunct of the European Union, playing a role that is as much an economic one as a military one. Russian leaders Yeltsin and later Putin argued that if this is the case, then there is no reason why Russia itself could not become a member of NATO. The United States has staunchly opposed this suggestion. Russia has viewed American efforts to expand NATO right up to its doorstep with great suspicion, seeing it as an effort by the United States to expand its military power throughout Eastern Europe and place Russia in a military position where it is at the mercy of the United States. Russia’s suspicions about the ulterior motives of the United States draw support from the Bush Administration’s insistence upon installing American missile systems in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. To make matters worse, the Bush Administration has advanced the preposterous claim that the purpose of these missile systems is to protect Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe from a missile attack launched by Iran, supposedly having no connection at all to Russia. Not surprisingly, one of the first things that the Bush Administration did in response to Russia’s Georgian incursion was to announce the agreement with Poland to proceed with the construction of American missile sites; in other words, the United States promptly dropped the fig leaf that the missiles were supposedly directed against Iran rather than Russia. No wonder Russia views the United States as a duplicitous, aggressive power intent upon making itself the dominant military power in the world and reducing Russia to a vassal status.</div><br /><div align="left">Ultimately, there is not much to be gained by attempting to dissect the particulars of Kagan’s polemic. Kagan is primarily a propagandist, not an objective analyst of international affairs. As noted, Kagan was one of the founders and intellectual leading lights of PNAC. PNAC seeks to promote an agenda based on American military hegemony. The maintenance, and expansion, of a massive American military establishment is the essential component of the PNAC program. The PNAC thesis is that the United States is the world’s sole superpower following the end of the Cold War, and that the United States should freely use its military supremacy to establish a dominant position in the world, before other powers such as Russia and China can come into their own as potential rivals. The goal is to establish a <em>Pax Americana</em>, a new Roman Empire that will last for the balance of the twenty-first century and beyond.</div><br /><div align="left">This then is the true subtext of <em>The Return of History</em>. While Kagan may be purporting to sound the alarm about potential dangers posed by states such as Russia and China, his real agenda is to justify the continuing expansion of American military power throughout the world. And, given the assumptions underlying Kagan’s view of human history – that bloody military conflicts and struggles for national hegemony are an inevitable part of human relations and will continue as such for the foreseeable future unless the United States gets busy establishing a <em>Pax Americana</em> – the program Kagan is promoting is perfectly understandable, even laudable. After all, if you assume that great power military conflict,<em> i.e</em>., warfare between powerful nation states, is an inescapable aspect of the human condition, it makes sense that you would want your nation to come out on top. It all comes back to this concept that human nature is inherently violent and aggressive – the <em>thumos</em> of the ancient Greeks on which both Kagan and Fukuyama place so much importance – that determines the aggressive militaristic agenda that Kagan, and the rest of the neo-cons, want the United States to pursue.</div><br /><div align="left">In the title of this post, I characterize the concept of an inherently violent and aggressive “human nature” as a “myth”. But is it? Centuries of bloodshed and warfare would argue that I am a blind fool in making such an assertion. This then brings me to the second component of the inspiration for my post, my recent re-viewing of Kubrick’s <em>2001</em>.</div><br /><div align="left">I have always believed that the most striking segment of <em>2001</em> is not the protracted scenes of balletic space travel or the psychedelic light show at the end of the film, but rather, the introductory segment entitled “The Dawn of Man.” This part of the film deals explicitly with the relationships among violence, aggression, tribalism, warfare and civilization. Kubrick’s concept of an inherently bloodthirsty human nature as articulated very clearly in the opening section of <em>2001</em>, permeates all of his films, most notably <em>Clockwork Orange</em>, <em>Dr. Strangelove</em>, and<em> The</em> <em>Shining</em>.</div><br /><div align="left">For those readers who, unlike me, have not committed every frame of <em>2001</em> to memory, I will recap the “plot” of the opening segment of the film. The film focuses on a group of early hominids, probably Australophithecenes or a similar species, living on the African plains in terror of predators, eking out a meager subsistence by competing with tapirs and other mammals for edible roots and sparse vegetation, and struggling with rival hominids for control of scarce water resources. One day, the hominids are visited by intelligent extraterrestrials in the form of a mysterious black monolith, accompanied by the eerie music of Gyorgi Ligeti, and the encounter triggers the beginning of logical thought in the hominids. While gazing at a pile of tapir bones, it occurs to one of the hominids, to the strains of <em>Also Sprach Zarathustra</em>, that the femur could be used as a weapon to bash in the skulls of living tapirs. The thought is transformed into action and the hominids are promptly feasting on raw tapir meat. They soon use the bone-clubs to attack and kill rival hominids in order to gain control of a contested waterhole. The victorious hominid throws his club into the air in triumph, and the film abruptly cuts to outer space in the year 2001, where Americans are competing with Soviets for control of the moon. The message of all this is quite clear: there is a direct linkage between aggression and civilization. Violence is inherent in human nature.</div><br /><div align="left">When <em>2001 </em>was made in 1968, many of the most important anthropological discoveries that have given us information about the evolution of early hominids had not yet been made. Lucy, the nearly intact fossilized remains of a female Australopithecus, was not discovered until 1974. The discoveries that have been made about early hominids make it clear that the version of events put forth in<em> 2001</em>, aside from the obvious fact that there is no evidence that singing extraterrestrial monoliths played any role in human evolution, is almost entirely incorrect.</div><br /><div align="left">Some of the errors in <em>2001</em> were clear to me in my recent re-viewing as a matter of commonsense, and I was astounded that I had not noticed them before. My daughter, a first-year medical student who took me to the screening as a birthday present, immediately pointed out the absurdity of any animal suddenly changing from herbivorous prey to carnivorous predator, as its digestive system could not possibly tolerate such a radical change in diet. Obviously, the human capacity to consume animal protein is something that evolved over a long period of time. Indeed, anthropological discoveries indicate that early hominids had a long history of consuming animal protein, but they did so because they were scavengers, not because they were hunters. The act of killing animals in order to consume their flesh was actually a fairly late development in human evolution. By the time that occurred, hominids had been eating animal protein for centuries, usually in the form of bone marrow obtained from the skeletons of animals that had been killed by other predators. And by the time that humans began the practice of hunting living animals for food, humans were well advanced in the making of tools and were already well on the road to the development of what we would ultimately call civilization.</div><br /><div align="left">The question of tool-making also brings up another obvious fallacy in the scenario presented in <em>2001</em>. Tapirs, like many mammals, are covered with pretty tough hides. Even if an Australopithecus could figure out how to club a tapir to death with a femur, the hominid would still have the problem of cutting open the carcass of the dead tapir in order to consume its flesh. Hominids do not have sharp fangs or claws. In order to dissect an animal to be able to eat it, a hominid would have to have some form of cutting tool. Plainly, intelligent tool-making behavior among hominids preceded hunting. In fact, anthropological discoveries have shown that probably the earliest tools created by hominids were sharpened stones to be used as cutting tools. These primitive “knives” were too small to be used as effective weapons to kill prey; unquestionably, they were used to cut open the carcasses of already dead animals that were killed by other predators and appropriated by hominid scavengers.</div><br /><div align="left">One aspect of human pre-history that <em>2001</em> probably got right was the focus on competition for water as being a central aspect of hominid existence. However, even this fact sheds a somewhat different light on human evolution. Early hominids required water not just because they were thirsty, but because water played a unique role in human evolution. Again, the study of fossils such as Lucy indicates that from a very early time, hominids had developed two of the characteristics that we often think of as uniquely human: bipedalism and relative hairlessness. These characteristics almost certainly relate to the fact that hominids have a uniquely efficient cooling system. Bipedalism helps to make the human cooling system work more efficiently, since it exposes a larger surface area of the skin to the air than would be the case for an animal walking on four legs, thereby leading to more rapid evaporation of perspiration and more effective cooling. As a consequence, however, hominids have to consume much greater amounts of water than do other animals.</div><br /><div align="left">This highly efficient cooling system provided early hominids with an important advantage – they could cover great distances in the hot African climate. Again, this is critical to understanding what anthropology has taught us about the existence of early hominids. Early hominids were highly nomadic creatures, existing not as hunters, but as scavengers. Hominids found a neat little evolutionary niche that enabled them (us) to survive notwithstanding their lack of strength and speed or innate weapons such as fangs and claws. They could roam about large distances in the African heat, finding animal protein to eat in the remains of carcasses left behind by predators and in the bits of marrow dug out of animal bones. This relatively high protein diet in turn made possible other evolutionary improvements, such as a gradual increase in height and weight, and most importantly, larger brain size.</div><br /><div align="left">Let’s now do a Kubrickian quick cut and jump back to the world of 2008, where Robert Kagan and the neo-conservatives are prattling on about “the return of history” and the inevitability of inter-state warfare. But is there really such a thing as an inherently violent “human nature” that makes warfare an inescapable component of the human condition? I would submit that the evidence would not support such a conclusion. What we can learn from anthropology is that to the extent that there is such a thing as “human nature” – and in my view, the very concept is of highly questionable utility – that nature is not one of violence and aggression, but rather, one of opportunism and improvisation. To be sure, humans have the capacity to be aggressive and violent, but it is a capacity that tends to be used when it is expedient to do so. All in all, I would submit that the capacity for violence is well down the list of distinctive human characteristics. The scrawny, slow-footed, clawless and fangless creatures that ultimately evolved into <em>homo sapiens</em> survived and even flourished not because they were so violent and aggressive, but because they were clever scavengers who could steal a carcass from a predator, who could figure out ways to get the maximum amount of nourishment out of a dead animal, and who could explore great distances in order to find more carcasses and the precious water they needed to keep their unique cooling systems working.</div><br /><div align="left">What does this tell us about <em>thumos</em>, the ancient Greek concept of an inherent human propensity for aggression, that is so important to Fukuyama and Kagan, and many other philosophers as well? I think that <em>thumos</em> is another ancient Greek myth, having no more reality than Pegasus or Medusa. As noted, the patriarch of the Kagan clan, Donald Kagan, is a classics scholar, and there is a tendency among classicists to think that just because the ancient Greeks believed something and attached a portentous Greek word to the belief, it must be true. Galileo disproved Aristotle’s claims about the speed with which objects of different weights fall to the ground, thereby paving the way for Newton and the beginning of modern science. I have no problem with a similar declaration of independence from the tyrannies of ancient Greek philosophies in the realm of social science, which, among other things, have saddled us with some baseless mythology about human nature.</div><br /><div align="left">What does all of this have to do with contemporary international relations, the subject of Kagan’s recent little book? It seems to me that if you believe that there is such a thing as human nature that is exemplified by Kubrick’s early hominids, whose first sentient thoughts concerned killing, first other animals and soon other members of its own species, ultimately building an entire civilization based on aggression and bloodshed, then you will be inclined to accept Kagan’s view of international affairs, in which large-scale inter-state warfare is inescapable and in which the wisest policy is to seek to become the dominant power. On the other hand, if you believe that if there is such a thing as human nature, it is best exemplified by Lucy and her descendants, highly opportunistic scavengers who only developed the use of violence as a survival technique fairly late in the day and after human beings were well on the road to civilization, then you are more inclined to see the evolution of economic systems and the development of social and political institutions, rather than the inevitability of inter-state warfare, as the most important forces shaping international affairs.</div><br /><div align="left">As is evident from what I have written, my view is that Lucy, the real hominid, tells us a lot more about human nature than do Kubrick’s fictitious hominids. Human beings are principally driven by the need to make a living for themselves and their families. Without question, violence has played a very important role in our history, but violence is an adaptation to particular circumstances, not an instinctual driving force that inevitably controls the behavior of human beings. Under the right circumstances, there is no reason why the role of violence in human affairs cannot be reduced to a minimum. This applies in particular to the most destructive manifestation of human violence, inter-state warfare.</div><br /><div align="left"></div><div align="left">At the present stage of human development, economic conditions have brought us to a point where the virtual elimination of large-scale inter-state warfare is indeed a realistic eventuality. From the time of Lucy until relatively recently, virtually all human beings spent most of their lives confronting the fundamental economic problem of survival. Today, that problem has been solved for vast numbers of people. Because of the progress of economic globalization, there are now large numbers of people leading middle-class lives in China and other Asian countries, India, Russia, Latin America, and even parts of Africa and the Middle East, in addition to the traditionally wealthy nations of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Major inter-state warfare among these people would be nothing less than economic suicide; in this era of nuclear weapons, it would also be literal suicide. Unless one believes that there is such a thing as <em>thumos</em> – an inherent instinctual drive towards aggression and violence – it is nothing less than lunacy to think that large-scale inter-state warfare is likely to break out under these circumstances.</div><br /><div align="left">The greatest danger to the prospects for general peace among the advanced capitalist nations of today’s world comes not from the purported <em>fact</em> that human nature is inherently violent and aggressive, but rather, from the <em>belief</em> that human nature is inherently violent and aggressive. That is why I have labeled such a belief in human nature as a “pernicious myth”. If one believes in this myth, then one will act accordingly by being as violent and aggressive to others as you believe they intend to be towards you. As Kagan’s book demonstrates, a great many people do believe in the myth of a violent human nature, and many of them are in the position to control governmental policy, both in the United States and elsewhere. To the extent that people holding such an ideology are in a position to determine policy, the danger of inter-state warfare will remain a real one, notwithstanding the fact that economic reality clearly makes such actions absurd.</div><br /><div align="left">Fortunately, at the end of the day, economic reality is far more powerful in shaping events than the fantastic schemes of misguided ideologues such as Kagan. There is now good reason to think that this day may be coming sooner rather than later. I began writing this post in July 2008. The conflict between Russia and Georgia occurred a few weeks later. Kagan and the rest of the neo-cons, and most vociferously Senator McCain himself, were proclaiming victory for their view of the world. The dangers posed by a “resurgent Russia” were claimed to be very real and extremely urgent. Calls for preparation for the realistic possibility of a war with Russia became widespread. Vice Presidential candidate Palin could announce that we may well have to go to war with Russia, letting us know that in the meantime we could all rest assured that she was keeping an eye on what those dangerous Russians were up to because she was watching them out of her kitchen window.</div><br /><div align="left">It is now late September 2008 and already, the world has changed considerably. Russia is already getting a sense of the limitations that will be placed on the aggressiveness of its military actions in the world of economic globalization. There have been substantial capital outflows from Russia in the weeks following the Georgian conflict. <a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/09/georgia_opportunity_cost_8b.html#comments">http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/09/georgia_opportunity_cost_8b.html#comments</a> This has not happened because there are ideologically-driven Western investors who want to punish Russia for its actions in Georgia. Rather, the capital outflows from Russia are the result of the fact that investors are understandably queasy about putting large amounts of their money in a country whose government has shown a propensity for recklessness by engaging in brinksmanship and military adventurism. The Russians are getting a lesson in what it means to be part of the global economy, and I strongly suspect that the lesson is getting through. The Russians are far more interested in keeping their booming economy on an upward trajectory than they are in flexing a bit of military might in the pesky, but ultimately largely irrelevant neighboring state of Georgia.</div><br /><div align="left">The much more significant intrusion of economic reality upon the fantastical schemes of the neo-cons, however, is taking place here in the United States. The American financial system is currently on the brink of a total collapse due to excessive overall debt and financial institutions’ non-transparent investments in “off-balance sheet” derivative products. In order to avoid an economic catastrophe on a scale unknown since the 1930s, the Federal government has committed to bailouts of major financial institutions at a cost well in excess of $1 trillion.</div><br /><div align="left">These economic developments make the Kagan/McCain assertion that we must get busy preparing for a war with China and/or Russia, while we are already militarily overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan, utter fantasy. After laying out hundreds of billions of dollars to save the American financial system from the consequences of profligate investments, the United States government will hardly be in a position to finance the kind of massive military build-up that Kagan and McCain are urging. Indeed, the cost of this enormous bailout of the financial industry will have to be paid for through expanded American borrowings from foreign sovereign wealth funds, in large part from China and Russia, the very countries against which Kagan and McCain think we should be preparing for war. Many things changed in America as a result of the financial crisis of September 2008; among the most beneficial of those changes may well be the sounding of the death knell for the neo-con/PNAC dream of establishing a new American empire.</div><br /><div align="left">On a partisan note, I point out that Senator Obama’s statement on the financial crisis, delivered on September 19, 2008, specifically highlighted the global ramifications of the crisis and the need for the United States to work with the nations of the G-20 to develop new financial regulatory regimes that can address the needs of the globalized economy for the twenty-first century. <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/2008/09/19/statement_from_obama_on_emergi.php">http://www.barackobama.com/2008/09/19/statement_from_obama_on_emergi.php</a> I realize that I am a very dedicated supporter of Senator Obama, and I am more than a little predisposed to gush about the wisdom of just about anything he says; I have previously written in praise of Obama’s understanding of the interconnectedness among America’s need for domestic political and economic reform, redirecting America’s foreign and military policy, and changing America’s relationship with the global economy. <a href="http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2008/04/its-all-connected.html">http://democraticcore.blogspot.com/2008/04/its-all-connected.html</a> Obama is virtually the only politician who has emphasized the relationship between the current financial crisis and the need for reform in America’s relationship with the rest of the world. I find it particularly heartening that Obama specifically referred to the G-20 as the entity with which the United States must coordinate the shaping of this new financial order – the old G-7, plus Russia, plus other new economic powers such as China, India, and Brazil – reflecting his understanding that the United States must look beyond the old global powers in Western Europe and Japan in making a place in the twenty-first century global economy.</div><br /><div align="left">There are still people out there who believe in the myth of an inherently violent human nature, and should they be in a position to make policy in a McCain Administration, I fully expect that they would beat the drums of the ongoing dangers of major inter-state warfare. However, in the face of an economic reality that has made it clear that the demands of economic interconnectedness make all other considerations seem puny by comparison, it seems doubtful that this drumbeat will find many receptive ears.</div><br /><div align="left"></div><div align="left">In short, neither <em>thumos</em>, nor the ghosts of Kubrick’s murderous, but fictitious, hominids, can alter the reality of the world of economic interconnectedness that defines human existence in the twenty-first century. “The return of reality” has served notice that "the return of history” should be placed on the junkpile of the many discredited myths that have bedeviled the history of the human race.</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-20017792459502771872008-08-29T20:34:00.000-07:002008-08-29T20:45:18.626-07:00The Forgotten Hero Of The Democratic Convention: George McGovernOf course, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">Barack</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">Obama</span> was the hero of the Democratic convention. He re-defined American politics. He gave us a frame for the issues of our time that I truly believe will give us generations of progressive government. We can't count our victories yet, and we all have a lot work to do, but after hearing Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">Obama's</span> speech last night, you're going to have a hard time convincing me that we can lose.<br /><br />However, I'd also like to step back a moment and acknowledge a great American who in many ways made Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">Obama's</span> triumph possible. He has been one of my heroes since I rang something like ten thousand doorbells for him thirty-six years ago: George McGovern.<br /><br />Most people think of George McGovern only as the failed Presidential candidate of 1972, the ultimate liberal loser. He was so much more than that. Like <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">Obama</span> he was a powerful and courageous orator. He dared to stand up on the Senate floor and proclaim, "This chamber reeks of blood!" because of its support for the Vietnam War. He was a genuine war hero who flew numerous missions over <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">Europe</span> during World War II - but rarely mentioned the fact to further his political career. He ran an honest and honorable campaign, and the memories of my work in that campaign will always remain a constant source of hope and inspiration for me. And until this year, he was the only Presidential candidate of the Democratic Party who put forward an unabashedly progressive agenda - <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">Obama's</span> clarion call for radical progressive tax reform could have come straight out of the McGovern platform.<br /><br /><br />However, George McGovern's most lasting legacy was the work of the McGovern Commission, which completely revised the rules of the Democratic Party and brought about what may be one of the most sweeping, and certainly most under-appreciated, changes in the way American democracy works. That is George McGovern's contribution that made last night possible.<br /><br />Much of the anger of the 1968 Democratic convention was process driven. Few remember, and many young people do not even know, that most of the delegates at the 1968 convention were not selected through primaries or caucuses. Most delegates were selected by the state committees of the Democratic Party, which were, for all intents and purposes, "smoke-filled rooms." What enraged liberal activists in 1968 was not merely the fact that the Democratic Party had rejected the antiwar movement, it was the fact that it had rejected democracy. In primary after primary (in the relatively few states that actually had binding primary elections), the voters chose the antiwar candidates, Kennedy and McCarthy. It seems astounding today, but Humphrey did not win a single primary. Yet, because of the backing he received from LBJ and other power brokers within the party, Humphrey was the inevitable nominee. That fact, even more than the substantive issues that were at stake, was what drove activists to the streets of Chicago.<br /><br /><br />In the wake of the disastrous 1968 convention and the defeat of the Democratic Party, George McGovern chaired a Commission to draft new rules for the procedures for the selection of delegates. Most party insiders would have favored cosmetic changes that left the fundamentals of the old system intact. That was not George McGovern's way. The McGovern Commission drafted new rules that required that every delegate be selected by means of some form of democratic electoral process, either a primary or a caucus. "Winner take all" primaries were abolished. The McGovern Commission rules required that the make-up of the convention that would choose the Presidential nominee of the Democratic Party represent the will of the voters, not the party bosses.<br /><br />McGovern paid a steep price for these reforms. In 1972, McGovern himself was the first nominee selected through this newly-mandated democratic process. This did not sit well with some of the powers-that-be. A particularly <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7">loathsome</span> organization called "Democrats for Nixon" came into being. It was not just McGovern's opposition to the Vietnam War and his espousal of a strong progressive agenda that turned the bosses against McGovern. It was the fact that they didn't select him and couldn't control him.<br /><br /><br />I believe that in time scholars of American political history will recognize the reforms of the McGovern Commission as one of the great milestones in the development of American democracy. It has taken the scope of our democracy to a whole new level. Combined with the growth of the internet that has created the potential for broad-based fund raising, first explored in the Dean campaign in 2004 and developed more dramatically through the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9">Obama</span> campaign this year, the process opens the door to change agents who want to upset the status <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10">quo</span> and move the party in a different direction. In many ways, it is this process that has supplanted the need for third parties. If we don't like the direction in which the Democratic Party is headed, we have the power to change it.<br /><br /><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11">Barack</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12">Obama</span> stood on many shoulders when he accepted the Democratic Party's nomination last night. Among them were the strong shoulders of a prairie populist, George McGovern.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-27717820099192465882008-08-20T12:07:00.000-07:002008-08-25T07:13:38.493-07:00The Shady History of Cindy Hensley McCain's FamilyI have been working on a new post of a somewhat philosophical nature. I've gotten bogged down in it and it is taking me some time to figure out exactly what I want to say. So in the meantime, I've decided to go with raw partisanship.<br /><br />In wandering around the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">internet</span></span></span>, I came across some stories about the very shady history of the family of John McCain's wife, Cindy Hensley McCain. In fact, as soon as I saw the stories, the name "Hensley" rang a bell with me, being pretty familiar with the annals of major white collar crime in America. I had just never made the connection to McCain's wife.<br /><br />The stories raised some very pointed questions about the sources of the Hensley family wealth, a family fortune that has made John McCain a successful politician and one of the wealthiest members of Congress. Specifically, these questions relate to the criminal history of various members of the Hensley family, including Cindy McCain's father, Jim Hensley, and the alleged connections the family has had to organized crime. These questions are certainly worthy of scrutiny, and hopefully, they will find their way out of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">blogosphere</span></span></span> and into the mainstream media.<br /><br />At the outset, I would like to point out one of the shortcomings of some of these stories as they appear on the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">internet</span></span></span>. The stories often appear in highly unreliable right-wing, anti-Semitic and racist websites. Indeed, much of the information on the Web relating to the criminal connections of the Hensley family comes from right-wing sources (including Jerome <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">Corsi</span></span></span>) who have long-standing vendettas against McCain. Unfortunately, these tainted sources may have caused many people in the media to shy away from the story, assuming that it is merely the lunatic ravings of McCain's right-wing enemies. But the information is real, and it can be verified through numerous sources independent of the right-wing lunatic fringe.<br /><br />A second problem with this story is, why is it relevant? Much of the information about the Hensley family's criminal past goes back many years, and one can legitimately ask what bearing this should have on McCain's current candidacy. I believe the story is relevant for several reasons.<br /><br /><br />First, the Hensley family wealth, and the political connections that went along with it, have been the key to McCain's success. The Hensley family history is well-known in Arizona. Even better known is the history of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">Kemper</span></span></span> Marley, the principal benefactor of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">Hensleys</span></span></span> and a man who was, in possibly every sense of the word, the Godfather of the Arizona Republican Party. When John McCain married Cindy Hensley, starting his political career almost immediately after they got married, it is inconceivable that McCain could have been ignorant of the connections he was making.<br /><br />In fact, when the controversy recently arose about McCain's inability to recall how many homes he and his wife own, he told Katie <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">Couric</span></span> on <em>60 Minutes</em> that he had been "blessed" to have <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7">benefited</span> from the wealth of the Hensley family. McCain also described his father-in-law Jim Hensley as a "role model" who had succeeded in business by fulfilling the American Dream. <a href="http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0808/12754.html">http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0808/12754.html</a> McCain did not mention that Hensley was a convicted felon with ties to organized crime figures.<br /><br />The unsavory Hensley history also links directly with some of the most distasteful aspects of McCain's own career. The <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7">Hensleys</span></span></span> introduced McCain to Charles <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8">Keating</span></span></span>, a long-standing friend of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9">Hensleys</span></span></span> and a co-<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10">venturer</span></span></span> in a shopping mall in which the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11">Hensleys</span></span></span> invested a great deal of money (approximately $400,000). <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_13"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12">Keating</span></span></span> contributed heavily to McCain's campaigns and provided private jets for McCain's usage. McCain returned the favor.<br /><br />Finally, the most egregious aspect of the story is the way this has all been covered up by the mainstream media. For that reason alone, the story of the Hensley family's criminal background is highly relevant to the current campaign.<br /><br />A good place to start looking at this story is with the puff-piece cover story that <em>Newsweek</em> ran about Cindy McCain in its June 30, 2008 edition entitled "In Search of Cindy McCain." <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/142650">http://www.newsweek.com/id/142650</a> The full extent of what Newsweek reported about the history of the Hensley family wealth is as follows:<br /><br /><br />"Her [Cindy's] father, Jim Hensley, was one of the most prominent men in the state. A World War II bombardier, he was shot down over the English Channel. After the war, he and his wife, Marguerite, borrowed $10,000 to start a liquor business. Through the years, it grew to become one of the largest <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_14"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_13">Anheuser</span></span></span>-Busch distributorships in the country."<br /><br /><br />A reader of this story would view the Hensley success story as a sort of Mom and Pop operation that made good through old-fashioned hard work. The truth appears to be a good deal more complicated, and sordid. An article entitled "Haunted By Spirits", which appeared in the <em>Phoenix</em> <em>New Times</em> in February 2000, provides an excellent overview of the story. <a href="http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2000-02-17/news/haunted-by-spirits/1">http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2000-02-17/news/haunted-by-spirits/1</a><br /><br /><br />In fact, the funding for the Hensley liquor distributorship did not come from a mere "loan"; it reputedly came from <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_13"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_15"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_14">Kemper</span></span></span> Marley. Marley is the key figure in the history of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_14"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_16"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_15">Hensleys</span></span></span>, and therefore McCain, and a towering figure in Arizona politics. Marley was also a known criminal who is widely believed to have had extensive connections to organized crime. Jim Hensley had worked for Marley going back to the 1920s, when Marley was the most powerful bootlegger in Arizona. After World War II, Hensley again went to work for Marley, who had by then started a major liquor distributorship, United Distributors, following the repeal of Prohibition.<br /><br /><br />In 1948, Jim Hensley and his brother, Eugene Hensley, were convicted in Arizona Federal Court of conspiracy to falsify the records of United Distributors. According to the testimony at trial, the Hensley brothers had created phony invoices to cover up unreported cash sales of liquor out of the business. Eugene Hensley was sentenced to one year in prison and Jim Hensley received a sentence of six months, which was later suspended. Marley was not charged, and neither Hensley testified.<br /><br /><br />Jim Hensley was again indicted for Federal liquor violations in 1953. This time Hensley, as well as Marley's company, were acquitted. A young Arizona lawyer named William Rehnquist was part of the defense team.<br /><br /><br />Jim Hensley started his <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_15"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_17"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_16">Anheuser</span></span></span>-Busch distributorship in Phoenix in 1955. Allegedly, Marley bestowed this business upon Hensley as a favor for having kept his mouth shut during the earlier criminal trials. According to <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_16"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_18"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_17">AmericanMafia</span></span></span>.com, Marley was closely connected with Peter <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_17"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_19"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_18">Licavoli</span></span></span>, Jr., a Detroit mobster who relocated his operation to Arizona in the 1940s and became known as the "Mafia Prince" of Arizona. <a href="http://www.americanmafia.com/Feature_Articles_219.html">http://www.americanmafia.com/Feature_Articles_219.html</a> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_18"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_20"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_19">AmericanMafia</span></span></span>.com, a non-political website containing the writings of well-known crime writers and former law enforcement people, describes the linkages among Hensley, Marley, and the Mafia:<br /><br /><br /><p>"Take the recent example of Senator John <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_19">McCain</span>, Presidential candidate and Senator from Arizona. Very few people outside the world of organized crime realize that the father of the Senator's second wife is James W. Hensley. And who was James W. Hensley, you ask. He was an Arizona businessman who fell in with the wrong crowd a while back, and ended up taking the rap for a wheeler-dealer named <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_20"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_21"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_20">Kemper</span></span></span> Marley, Sr. over a liquor violation case back in 1948. Although Hensley was represented by the best defense Arizona cash could buy, the services of future Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Justice William Rehnquist, he got slammed away for a whole year. But it all worked out. When Hensley strolled out of the joint, Marley bought his silence with a lucrative Phoenix-based Budweiser beer distributorship. So, who is this <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_21"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_22"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_21">Kemper</span></span></span> Marley Sr? To answer that you have to go back to a sweltering summer day in 1976 when Don <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_22"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_23"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_22">Bolles</span></span></span>, a reporter for the Arizona Republican Newspaper, stepped into his <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_23"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_24"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_23">Datsun</span></span></span>, put his foot on the peddle and was blown to bits. Parts of the reporter's body were found ten feet from the burning car. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_24"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_25"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_24">Bolles</span></span></span> had been poking into Arizona's local and state governments and discovered a land fraud ring, influence peddling, and shady deals that appeared to lead to the very top of Arizona's power structure and to Senator Barry Goldwater's doorstep. If the purpose of murdering <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_25"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_26"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_25">Bolles</span></span></span> was to cover a series of crimes, it was a big mistake. An enraged news media descended on Arizona, determined to uncover the facts behind the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_26"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_27"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_26">Bolles</span></span></span> killing. The investigation led to a Phoenix liquor magnate and one time Bookie named <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_27"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_28"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_27">Kemper</span></span></span> Marley Sr., who had ties to Arizona's resident Mafia Prince, Peter <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_28"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_29"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_28">Licavoli</span></span></span>. Marley was a major financial and political power in the state and wanted to take back his seat on the Arizona Racing Commission. He had already been appointed to the post in 1976 by the Governor, only to resign several days later when his ties to organized crime surfaced. The reporter who made the connections between the mob and Marley was Don <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_29"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_30"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_29">Bolles</span></span></span>."</p><p>Interestingly, when the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_31"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_30">Obama</span></span> campaign began running ads criticizing McCain for his inability to recall how many homes he owned, McCain responded by running an ad attacking <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_32"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_31">Obama</span></span> for having purchased his family's one home in part by arranging for a loan from Antonin <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_33"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_32">Rezko</span></span>, whom the McCain campaign emphasized is a "convicted felon." McCain is the beneficiary of far greater financial <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_34">largess</span> derived from Jim Hensley, also a "convicted felon."</p><p>Notably, Hensley's criminal record did not prevent him from owning a liquor distributorship, at least not in the eyes of Arizona authorities. Hensley filed a false disclosure form in 1988 concealing his Federal conviction, but Arizona authorities took no action against Hensley. </p><p>The Budweiser distributorship was not the only business venture that the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_30"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_35"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_33">Hensleys</span></span></span> entered into with Marley. In December 1952, Jim and Eugene Hensley purchased a controlling interest in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_31"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_36"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_34">Ruidoso</span></span></span> Downs, a racetrack in Albuquerque. However, subsequent litigation revealed that a concealed owner of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_32"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_37"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_35">Ruidoso</span></span></span> was Teak Baldwin, a well-known Arizona bookmaker and associate of Marley. According to the New Mexico State Police, the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_33"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_38"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_36">Hensleys</span></span></span> and Baldwin were acting as fronts for Marley in the venture. Baldwin would later be convicted of tax evasion. In 1955, Jim Hensley sold his stake in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_34"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_39"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_37">Ruidoso</span></span></span> to his brother Eugene.<br /></p><br /><br /><p>In 1966, Eugene Hensley was convicted of Federal tax evasion for having skimmed large amounts of money out of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_35"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_40"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_38">Ruidoso</span></span></span> to make improvements on his home in Scottsdale and to transfer funds to his family. (The cases of <em>Hensley v. United States</em>, 406 F.2d 481 (10<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_36"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_41"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_39">th</span></span></span> Cir. 1968) and <em><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_37"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_42"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_40">Ruidoso</span></span></span> Racing Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue</em>, 476 F.2d 502 (10<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_38"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_43"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_41">th</span></span></span> Cir. 1973) are very well-known in the law of tax fraud). The United States Tax Court described the evidence of Hensley's fraud as "overwhelming." Eugene Hensley was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Before reporting to prison, Hensley <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_39"><span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_44"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_42">transfered</span></span></span> ownership of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_40"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_45"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_43">Ruidoso</span></span></span> to <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_41"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_46"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_44">Newco</span></span></span> Enterprises, which immediately entered into a long-term contract with <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_42"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_47"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_45">Emprise</span></span></span> Corporation. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_43"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_48"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_46">Emprise</span></span></span> had a long history of problems with governmental authorities as a result of organized crime connections. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_44"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_49"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_47">Emprise</span></span></span> reorganized and moved its operations to Arizona, with strong backing from <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_45"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_50"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_48">Kemper</span></span></span> Marley. Marley had contributed heavily to then Arizona Governor Raul Castro, and Castro appointed Marley to Arizona's racing commission in 1976. </p><p>Marley's dubious activities drew the attention of Don <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_46"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_51"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_49">Bolles</span></span></span>, an investigative reporter for the <em>Arizona Republic</em>. As a result of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_47"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_52"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_50">Bolles</span></span></span>' revelations, Governor Castro removed Marley from the racing commission. In June 1976, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_48"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_53"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_51">Bolles</span></span></span> was killed by a car bomb. The organization Investigative Reporters and Editors ("IRE") started the "Arizona Project" to probe the background of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_49"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_54"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_52">Bolles</span></span></span>' murder. <a href="http://www.ire.org/history/arizona.html">http://www.ire.org/history/arizona.html</a> A tow-truck driver and dog track operator, John Charles <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_50"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_55"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_53">Adamson</span></span></span>, pleaded guilty to having planted the bomb that killed <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_51"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_56"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_54">Bolles</span></span></span> and testified against two others who had hired <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_52"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_57"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_55">Adamson</span></span></span> to commit the murder. <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_53"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_58"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_56">Bolles</span></span></span>' last words were, "<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_54"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_59"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_57">Adamson</span></span></span>, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_55"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_60"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_58">Emprise</span></span></span>, Mafia." <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_56"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_61"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_59">Adamson</span></span></span> later testified that he was told by the man who paid him to plant the bomb that killed <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_57"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_62">Bolles</span></span> that Marley had wanted <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_58"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_63">Bolles</span></span> killed, as well as then Arizona Attorney General Bruce Babbitt, who was conducting an antitrust investigation of the Arizona liquor industry. Marley was never charged for the murder of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_59"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_64">Bolles</span></span>. </p><p>In the wake of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_60"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_65">Bolles</span></span>' murder, the subject of organized crime infiltration of Arizona businesses and politics became a matter of national attention. In March 1977, the <em>Albuquerque Journal</em> ran a major story about the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_61"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_66">Hensleys</span></span> and their connections to organized crime, which was re-reported in the <em>New Mexico Independent</em> this past June. <a href="http://newmexicoindependent.com/view/the-politics-of-beer">http://newmexicoindependent.com/view/the-politics-of-beer</a> <em>Time</em> magazine ran a major story in March 1977 entitled "Putting the Heat on the Sunbelt Mafia" addressing Marley's alleged role in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_62"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_67">Bolles</span></span>' murder. <a href="http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,914845-3,00.html">http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,914845-3,00.html</a> </p><p>It is in this context that John McCain comes on the scene. McCain met Cindy Hensley in early 1979, he divorced and remarried in 1980, and after retiring from the Navy, McCain settled in Arizona and promptly went to work for the Hensley distributorship in a "public relations" capacity. The job gave McCain a handsome salary and a high profile in the state. </p><p>It is important to remember a few facts about McCain's personal background. McCain was a Navy brat, born in the Panama Canal Zone, who spent his entire life moving around military bases and never setting down roots. He had no personal connections to Arizona, or indeed, to anyplace else. If he was intent upon establishing a political career, it was essential that he establish strong connections with the local political establishment. It strains <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_63">credulity</span> to believe that McCain was unaware of the Hensley family history and the family's close connections to Marley, one of the most powerful men in the state. </p><p>In 1982, less than two years after marrying Cindy and going to work for Hensley Distributors, McCain ran for a seat in Congress. The seat in Arizona's First Congressional District was open because of the recent retirement of Republican Congressman John Rhodes. The Hensley family bought a house in the District in order to enable McCain to run. McCain won the election, angrily challenging "carpetbagger" allegations that were made against him by pointing to his status as a Prisoner of War in Vietnam.</p><p>In 1986, McCain took over the Senate seat long held by Barry Goldwater, another recipient of Marley's support. As noted, another Hensley family friend and business partner, Charles <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_64"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_68">Keating</span></span>, helped finance McCain's rise. The members of the Hensley family, including Cindy and her father, were also business partners with <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_65"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_69">Keating</span></span> in an Arizona shopping mall. The Hensley investment in that <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_66"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_70">Keating</span></span> venture was made through the same real estate partnership that purchased the home in Arizona's First Congressional District that launched McCain's political career.</p><p>McCain would later reach out to Federal regulators on <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_67">Keating's</span> behalf when <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_68">Keating's</span> massive savings and loan fraud began to unravel. McCain was officially chastised by the Senate for showing bad judgment in his dealings with <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_69">Keating</span>, although he escaped the more severe discipline meted out to other Senators. McCain adamantly refused to answer questions, however, about the Hensley family's business relationships with <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_70">Keating, calling reporters from the <em>Arizona Republic</em> "idiots" and "liars" for having inquired about the Hensley transactions.</span> Once again, McCain relied upon his background as a POW in Vietnam to deflect any questions challenging his integrity.</p><p>I think this is a story worth knowing about. It would be nice if somebody reported it. </p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-73062358267736313292008-07-13T21:16:00.000-07:002008-07-15T19:03:50.598-07:00Liberals Should Calm Down About The New Surveillance StatuteIn my earlier blog, I had posted a comment that was sharply critical of Bush’s <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">warrantless</span></span> electronic surveillance program. <a href="http://truthvsbush.blogspot.com/2006/02/september-11-2001-day-that-will-long.html">http://truthvsbush.blogspot.com/2006/02/september-11-2001-day-that-will-long.html</a> I therefore feel a certain obligation to comment on the controversy surrounding the recently enacted amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">FISA</span></span>”). This legislation has attracted particular attention because of Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">Obama</span></span>’s support for it, which has drawn intense criticism from the left, leading to accusations that he is flip-flopping or selling out. As described below, I believe that this criticism of Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">Obama</span></span> is grossly unjustified, and that the concerns about the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">FISA</span></span> statute raised by civil liberties groups are overblown.<br /><br />First, let me reiterate my strong objection to the illegal program of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">warrantless</span></span> surveillance that the Bush Administration conducted. However, let me also emphasize that the basis for my objection was that Bush’s program clearly violated <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">FISA</span></span> – a felony violation under the statute – and circumvented the scrutiny of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7">FISA</span></span> court. This was an abuse of Executive power, violating the separation of powers mandated by the constitution. In addition, by conducting surveillance outside of the scrutiny of any court, Bush pursued a program that was opaque and unaccountable. The simple fact is that even today, no one outside of the Bush Administration itself knows exactly what sort of surveillance was conducted. For all we know, the surveillance could have targeted Bush’s political opponents. It was precisely such abuses that the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8">FISA</span></span> statute was designed to prevent, by creating a specialized, highly-secret “<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9">FISA</span></span> court” that would review and authorize foreign intelligence electronic surveillance, so as to prevent Presidents from conducting abusive, politically-oriented electronic surveillance under the purported rubric of “national security.” In my earlier posting, however, I was also careful to point out that if there were any deficiencies in the existing <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_10">FISA</span></span> statute that impeded the legitimate needs of the government to conduct the fullest possible surveillance of terrorist organizations such as Al <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_11">Qaeda</span></span>, then the appropriate remedy would be to ask Congress to amend the statute; the remedy would not be simply to ignore the statute altogether, as Bush did.<br /><br />The new statute is an attempt by Congress to fix perceived weaknesses in the old <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_12">FISA</span></span> statute. Many objections to the old statute may well be legitimate. In attempting to address these problems, the new statute does not abandon the requirement of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_13"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_13">FISA</span></span> court review and authorization. The new statute is by no means an affirmation of what the Bush Administration did; if anything, it is a repudiation of Bush’s actions, by making it clear that legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance can be conducted consistent with the law and under the scrutiny of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_14"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_14">FISA</span></span> court, so as to prevent abuses of Presidential power.<br /><br />In my opinion, there is absolutely nothing on the face of the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_15"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_15">FISA</span></span> statute that in any way violates the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, there are some debatable technical aspects of the new law, as I discuss below, and it will take some time to see how the law works in practice, in order to determine whether or not it succeeds in striking a proper balance between protecting legitimate privacy interests and enabling the government to gather intelligence about terrorist organizations to the fullest possible extent. On its face, however, the new statute appears to be a reasonable attempt to reconcile these interests in a manner fully consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.<br /><br />I cannot emphasize this point too strongly. The hyperbole that has been circulated about the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_16"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_16">FISA</span></span> statute is astounding. The ACLU has recently announced that it is filing a lawsuit to challenge the new statute, claiming that the new law is “<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_17"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_17">un</span></span>-American” and sounds the virtual death knell of the Bill of Rights (and parenthetically, also provides a good opportunity for the ACLU to solicit donations). On a recent television program, law professor Jonathan <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_18"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_18">Turley</span></span> described the statute as marking the end of the Fourth Amendment, claiming that the statute would permit Presidents to conduct <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_19"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_19">warrantless</span></span> surveillance of all Americans’ communications without any limitations. Even a cursory reading of the statute reveals that <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_20"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_20">Turley</span></span>’s statements are utter poppycock. (To make an <em>ad <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_21"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_21">hominem</span></span></em> aside, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_22"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_22">Turley</span></span> strikes me as the new Alan <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_23"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_23">Dershowitz</span></span>, a publicity-seeking self-promoter and not a serious legal scholar; I note that <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_24"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_24">Turley</span></span>, now the darling of the civil libertarian left, originally became known as a TV pundit because of his vigorous support of the Republicans’ impeachment of Bill Clinton, something that in my view, was little more than an attempted coup d’<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_25"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_25">etat</span></span>).<br /><br />There are two principal aspects of the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_26"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_26">FISA</span></span> statute on which public attention has concentrated. First, it expands the jurisdiction of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_27"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_27">FISA</span></span> court to approve foreign intelligence surveillance in a broader range of circumstances than is permissible under prior law. It is simply untrue, however, that the new statute would authorize blanket <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_28"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_28">warrantless</span></span> surveillance of all Americans’ communications. In my judgment, these modifications to the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_29"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_29">FISA</span></span> statute are reasonable and fully consistent with the Fourth Amendment, as discussed below.<br /><br />Second, the new statute grants a form of civil immunity to telecommunications companies that assisted the Bush Administration in conducting surveillance without authorization of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_30"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_30">FISA</span></span> court during the period between September 11, 2001 and January 2007 (by way of shorthand, I refer to this issue as that of "<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_31"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_31">telcom</span></span> immunity"). This provision is more problematic, although again, I do not see that it raises any constitutional issues. I do agree with Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_32"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_32">Obama</span></span> that this provision should have either been deleted or delayed, since the new statute also contains a provision requiring various federal Inspectors General to report to Congress as to what exactly the Bush Administration did, and it would have been preferable for the immunity not to take effect until after Congress knows exactly what it is immunizing. The Bush Administration, supported by all Senatorial Republicans (except Senator Specter) and a handful <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_33">of Democrats</span> (not including Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_34"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_33">Obama</span></span>), was adamant in opposing these modifications to the immunity provisions. Given a choice between a <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_35"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_34">FISA</span></span> statute that included a flawed immunity provision, and no <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_36"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_35">FISA</span></span> statute at all, I believe that Senator <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_37"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_36">Obama</span></span> made the correct choice in voting for the new statute. By “correct” I mean not just that it was politically smart, although it clearly was, but that it was also in the best interests of the country.<br /><br /><strong>Background of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_38"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_37">FISA</span></span></strong><br /><br /><br />In order to understand my support for the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_39"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_38">FISA</span></span> statute, it is helpful to understand the history and evolution of Fourth Amendment law as it applies to the subject of foreign intelligence surveillance. The old <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_40"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_39">FISA</span></span> statute was enacted in 1978 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in <em>United States v. United States District Court,</em> 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (generally known as the “<em>Keith</em> case”), which held that President Nixon did not have the power under the Fourth Amendment to order <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_41"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_40">warrantless</span></span> electronic surveillance in cases involving “domestic security.” The Supreme Court left open the possibility that a more relaxed standard would apply under the Fourth Amendment in cases involving foreign intelligence where the activities of foreign powers and their agents are under scrutiny.<br /><br /><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_42"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_41">FISA</span></span> was enacted to provide a legal framework for electronic surveillance in the foreign intelligence arena in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in the <em>Keith</em> case. There were certain fundamental concepts at the heart of the original <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_43"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_42">FISA</span></span> statute. First, the statute provided that foreign intelligence surveillance may be conducted without a court order only if the Attorney General certifies that there is no reasonable likelihood that the communications of a U.S. person (a citizen or resident alien) will be intercepted. Second, if the Attorney General could not make such a certification, then foreign intelligence surveillance could only be conducted pursuant to an order issued by a specialized, highly secretive <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_44"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_43">FISA</span></span> court based upon a showing that the target of the surveillance was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (the post 9/11 Patriot Act redefined the term "foreign power" to include terrorist organizations). Third, the Attorney General would have to develop “minimization” procedures (I discuss the concept of minimization in more detail below) to ensure that the surveillance only served the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information and did not unreasonably invade the privacy of communications unrelated to foreign intelligence; these minimization procedures would have to be reviewed and approved by the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_45"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_44">FISA</span></span> court to ensure their compliance with the Fourth Amendment.<br /><br />The impetus for the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_46"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_45">FISA</span></span> statute emanated from the contention that the limitation of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_47"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_46">FISA</span></span> court’s jurisdiction to surveillance of foreign powers and their agents rendered the statute ineffective as a tool for gathering intelligence about terrorist organizations such as Al <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_48"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_47">Qaeda</span></span>. After all, organizations such as Al <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_49"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_48">Qaeda</span></span> do not publish membership directories, and it may not be possible to identify specific individuals as being “agents” of these organizations. Because of the inability of intelligence agencies to target specific individuals as agents of a foreign power, it is quite likely that intelligence agencies would be barred by the old <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_50"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_49">FISA</span></span> statute from conducting electronic surveillance that would undoubtedly yield a good deal of valuable intelligence about the activities of terrorist organizations.<br /><br />It was here that the Bush Administration chose to embark upon a course of action that was both grossly unconstitutional and monumentally stupid. Instead of asking Congress to amend the statute in order to expand the jurisdiction of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_51"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_50">FISA</span></span> court so that any deficiencies in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_52"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_51">FISA</span></span> could be cured in a manner consistent with the rule of law, Bush chose to act as though <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_53"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_52">FISA</span></span> did not even exist and authorized the conduct of rampant <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_54"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_53">warrantless</span></span> surveillance that completely bypassed the authority of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_55"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_54">FISA</span></span> court. Bush’s lawless course of conduct went on for approximately five and a half years. Finally, new legislation was proposed to deal with the shortcomings of the old <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_56"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_55">FISA</span></span> statute, which culminated in the recently-enacted statute that has caused so much controversy. As an ultimate display of Executive chutzpah, Bush commented that the new statute was “long overdue”; of course, the only reason it took so long was because of the numerous complications arising from the fact that Bush had chosen to don his familiar cowboy hat and ignore Congress and the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_57"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_56">FISA</span></span> court in conducting <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_58"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_57">warrantless</span></span> surveillance, thereby giving rise to the complex issue of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_59"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_58">telcom</span></span> immunity that has been the major sticking point in the enactment of the new statute.<br /><br />The new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_60"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_59">FISA</span></span> statute deals with the shortcomings of the old law by eliminating the limitation of the old statute of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_61"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_60">FISA</span></span> court jurisdiction to the surveillance of foreign powers and their agents. Instead, the new statute authorizes the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_62"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_61">FISA</span></span> court to enter an order permitting the surveillance of the communications of any non U.S. person, so long as there is probable cause to believe that the non U.S. person is located outside of the U.S. Communications of U.S. persons can be targeted for interception only if there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. person is both located outside of the U.S. and is acting as the agent of a foreign power. In this context, the new statute expressly prohibits "reverse targeting", <em>i.e</em>., the targeting of a non U.S. person as a pretext for conducting surveillance of a U.S. person. Most importantly, the new statute continues the requirement of “minimization” and empowers the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_63"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_62">FISA</span></span> court to review the minimization procedures in order to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment (I’ll discuss the crucial aspects of minimization below).<br /><br /><strong>Constitutionality of the New <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_64"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_63">FISA</span></span> Statute</strong><br /><br />The new statute clearly is going to generate a good deal more surveillance than was possible under prior law. This will likely be of benefit to intelligence agencies, although I actually have some concern that the new law will generate too much data and will prove to be of little practical use. However, the real question is whether the law is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. I have very little doubt that it is.<br /><br />It is very important keep in mind that the new statute applies to the interception of communications occurring, at least in part, outside of the U.S. The Fourth Amendment has little or no extraterritorial application. Since the beginnings of the Republic, courts have recognized that the Fourth Amendment permits <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_65"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_64">warrantless</span></span> “border searches” in order to control the flow of goods and people into the country. Air travelers must submit to <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_66"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_65">warrantless</span></span> searches, without probable cause, as a requirement for air travel. For similar reasons, the Fourth Amendment places little limitation on the government’s power to intercept telecommunications occurring outside of the U.S.<br /><br />There are two main reasons why the Fourth Amendment has little or no extraterritorial reach. First, activities occurring outside of the country raise issues of national security, not just domestic security, and as the Supreme Court emphasized in the <em>Keith</em> case, Fourth Amendment considerations in measuring the “reasonableness” of a governmental search in these two contexts are quite different.<br /><br />The second reason for the territorial limitations on the reach of the Fourth Amendment stems from the nature of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. As the Supreme Court emphasized in <em><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_67"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_66">Katz</span></span> v. United States</em>, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the first Supreme Court decision to hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to electronic surveillance and not just physical searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment protects “reasonable expectations of privacy.” When one makes a telecommunication outside of the U.S., one really cannot have any reasonable expectation that the communication is private. Can anyone seriously say that when one places phone calls to countries such as Egypt, Uzbekistan, or China, one does not expect that local government authorities are monitoring the calls? Indeed, very few countries in the world place restrictions on their government’s ability to conduct surveillance comparable to those imposed on the U.S. government by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, it makes no sense to construe the Fourth Amendment as limiting the power of the U.S. government to intercept extraterritorial telecommunications, when those communications are not really “private” in any reasonable sense.<br /><br />The real key to the workings of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_68"><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_67">FISA</span></span> statute, and the element that renders the statute constitutional, in both its old and new versions, is the requirement of minimization. Although the new statute only permits the targeting of non U.S. persons outside of the U.S. (and U.S. persons acting as foreign agents), it is inevitable that this surveillance is going to pick up the communications of many U.S. persons who may be on the receiving or sending end of the communications being intercepted. Does this fact render the new statute unconstitutional? The answer is, not necessarily, and this is why the requirement of minimization is crucial.<br /><br />The problem of minimization is inherent in all electronic surveillance, not just surveillance conducted under the old and new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_69">FISA</span> statutes. To draw an illustration from popular culture, government agents may have probable cause to believe that Tony Soprano is a nefarious criminal who discusses all sorts of criminal activity on his home phone. As such, the government can obtain a court order to tap Soprano’s phone. However, Carmela, Meadow, and A.J. may also use that phone to talk to friends and family to discuss their personal lives and all sorts of things having nothing to do with Soprano’s criminal activities; Tony himself may also conduct perfectly legitimate conversations with persons uninvolved in criminal activities. So, how do you prevent the wiretap from becoming a wholesale, unconstitutional invasion of the reasonable privacy expectations of both the Soprano family and the non-criminal people who communicate with them? The answer is minimization. The law requires the government to follow minimization procedures, such as by limiting the hours when the surveillance will take place, or by targeting or eliminating certain incoming or outgoing phone numbers based on an analysis of which ones are most likely to be related to Tony’s criminal activities.<br /><br />Similar minimization requirements apply under the old and new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_70">FISA</span> statutes. In order to obtain a surveillance order from the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_71">FISA</span> court, the government must certify that it has in place minimization procedures to ensure that the surveillance only captures communications relevant to the gathering of foreign intelligence. Again, the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_72">FISA</span> statute specifically requires the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_73">FISA</span> court to approve the minimization procedures in order to ensure that the surveillance complies with the Fourth Amendment. While intelligence agencies are understandably secretive about the minimization procedures they employ so as to avoid giving a road map to targets as to how to avoid surveillance, it is generally believed that the procedures employ “algorithms” such as word searches or formulas involving patterns of communications with individuals in specific countries in order to minimize the interception of communications unrelated to foreign intelligence.<br /><br />It should be emphasized that it is actually in the interest of the intelligence agencies to have meaningful minimization procedures, not only for the protection of privacy rights, but also to make the surveillance productive from an intelligence-gathering perspective. As noted above, I do have some concern that the new law is <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_74">overinclusive</span>, and will result in the interception of so many irrelevant communications that the ones truly useful to intelligence gathering will be lost. Effective minimization is essential to being able to “separate the wheat from the chaff.”<br /><br />It will take some time to see if <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_75">FISA</span>’s minimization rules – which are completely unchanged by the new statute – strike an appropriate balance between the need to gather foreign intelligence information and the protection of privacy. What is important, however, is the fact that this will be worked out under the supervision of the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_76">FISA</span> court. And again, the statute specifically directs the <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_77">FISA</span> court to tailor the minimization rules in order to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment. The notion being promulgated by alarmist opponents of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_78">FISA</span> that the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_79">FISA</span> statute empowers the Executive branch to engage in wholesale invasions of privacy, without any check by the Judiciary, is untrue.<br /><br /><strong>Technical Problems With The New <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_80">FISA</span> Statute</strong><br /><br />Before turning to the issue of <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_81">telcom</span> immunity, I’d like to refer to three technical aspects of the new <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_82">FISA</span> statute that are potentially problematic, although they do not rise to the level of creating a constitutional issue. First, there is a provision empowering the Executive to engage in <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_83">warrantless</span> surveillance when “exigent circumstances” are present. The old FISA statute also contained such a provision, and it required that such warrantless interception in exigent circumstances would be permitted so long as the government made an application to the FISA court to approve the interception within seventy-two hours (three days) of beginning the interception. The new statute is essentially the same, except it extends the time period for the government’s application from three days to seven days. I personally do not see the need for this change, as it is difficult to foresee a situation in which a period of three days would be insufficient to submit an application to the FISA court. However, I also don’t see that the difference between three days and seven days raises a constitutional defect in the new statute. And looking at the big picture, I agree with Obama’s assessment that the public’s need for comprehensive foreign intelligence capabilities outweighs what seems to me to be a minor technical defect in the statute.<br /><br />The second technical issue in the new statute concerns a provision that states that if the FISA court rejects the government’s application to conduct an interception, the government may continue conducting the interception while it pursues an appeal from the FISA court’s ruling. This in itself seems appropriate. If the appeals court were to overturn the FISA court and rule that the interception should have been authorized, then it would be, of necessity, too late to undo the FISA court’s mistake, as the opportunity to intercept the communications would have already been lost. All that the new FISA statute does is to impose an automatic stay of the FISA court’s ruling pending appeal; such stays are a well-accepted aspect of American jurisprudence, and there is hardly anything radical about this aspect of the new FISA statute.<br /><br />A more troubling aspect of this provision states that if there is ultimately a ruling by the appellate court that the interception should not be authorized, then the government may nevertheless keep and use the communications it has intercepted to that point. Here, it seems clear to me that the Fourth Amendment would be violated if the government attempted to use the illegally-obtained interceptions in connection with a criminal prosecution, and the statute does explicitly prohibit the use of such evidence in any court proceedings. However, it is important to recall that the purpose of both the old and new FISA statutes is to enable the government to gather foreign intelligence, and not to pursue criminal prosecutions. In that context, I am much less troubled about the prospect of the government being able to use the information for intelligence purposes, notwithstanding any ultimate ruling by the courts on the validity of the government’s application.<br /><br />The third technical problem concerns the provision in the new statute prohibiting "reverse targeting" of U.S. persons. Opponents of the statute contend that this provision lacks sufficient "teeth". I'm not sure that I understand this argument, as the new statute clearly empowers the FISA court to review "targeting procedures" so as to prevent the intentional acquisition of communications occurring wholly within the U.S.<br /><br /><strong>The Problem of Telcom Immunity</strong><br /><br />As emphasized previously, the problem of telcom immunity arises only because the Bush Administration chose to ignore both the FISA statute and the constitutional principle of separation of powers by conducting warrantless surveillance, instead of asking Congress to amend the FISA statute. Numerous telecommunications companies acceded to the Bush Administration’s requests for assistance in this venture. The legal status of these companies is now at issue.<br /><br />FISA includes a provision stating that any “person” who engages in a violation of FISA is, in addition to facing potential criminal liability, civilly liable to anyone whose communications were wrongfully intercepted. The amount of the liability is the greater of the plaintiff’s actual damages, or liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100 for each day of unlawful surveillance.<br /><br />It should be noted that FISA states that any “person” may be held civilly liable; the statute does not authorize lawsuits against the government itself. Civil suits against the government are generally barred by the doctrine of “sovereign immunity”, unless there is a specific statute authorizing such a lawsuit, and as noted, there is no such authorization in FISA.<br /><br />FISA suits may, however, be brought against individual government officials who participated in any surveillance in violation of FISA, potentially including Bush himself. Many such suits have in fact been filed. There is nothing in the new FISA statute that would change this, so the potential for suing Bush, Cheney, <em>et al</em>., still exists. Most such lawsuits have thus far been unsuccessful because of the plaintiff’s inability to prove “standing”, <em>i.e</em>., showing that the plaintiff was in fact the target of warrantless surveillance.<br /><br />Numerous lawsuits have also been filed against telecommunications companies. Presumably, these lawsuits would face the same standing hurdle that has thus far doomed lawsuits filed against government officials. I therefore fail to understand the claim of FISA opponents such as the ACLU that telcom immunity is part of the Bush Administration's "cover-up", and that suits against telecommunications companies are the only way we can pursue this matter in the courts and get to the truth. If a plaintiff can prove standing, he or she can still sue responsible government officials, and if the plaintiff cannot prove standing, then a lawsuit against a telecommunication company will be no more viable than a lawsuit against a government official.<br /><br />Assuming, however, that the standing obstacle could somehow be overcome, there is another issue that is raised by lawsuits against telecommunications companies, and that is what leads to the thorny issue of telcom immunity. As noted, you can’t sue the government for violating FISA because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. There is a related legal doctrine known as “private contractor immunity” which holds that when a private party acts at the behest of the government in carrying out a governmental function, then the private party is also immune from suit by an extension of sovereign immunity. The private contractor immunity doctrine is quite controversial, and it is not clear-cut that that the doctrine would apply to a suit against a telecommunications company that participated in a violation of FISA. However, the concern of the telecommunications companies is that they would not even have an opportunity to raise the issue, and therefore could not get a fair hearing in a civil lawsuit.<br /><br />The reason for this is the continuing secrecy that has cloaked the Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance program. Indeed, to date, the Bush Administration has not even officially admitted that the program existed. Thus, the fear of the telecommunications companies is that if they raised the defense of private contractor immunity, the Bush Administration would refuse to provide any information in court that might show what the companies did and why they did it. The result could well be that the telecommunications would be denied the opportunity to raise the defense of private contractor immunity, not because the defense lacks merit, but simply because of the Bush Administration’s refusal to provide any information about the warrantless surveillance program. While many liberals may not be very concerned about fairness to telecommunications companies, a fair-minded view of the situation would have to concede that these companies do have a point in raising the issue of the need for some form of civil immunity.<br /><br />The new FISA statute deals with the issue in a compromise fashion, although opponents of the statute prefer to categorize this as a capitulation to the demands of the Bush Administration and the telecommunications companies. Under the new statute, lawsuits against telecommunications companies for assisting in warrantless surveillance during the period from September 11, 2001 to January 17, 2007 will be dismissed if the Attorney General files a certification stating that the assistance provided by the company was done pursuant to a written directive from the President, and that the purpose of the interception was to prevent a terrorist attack against the U.S. The court in which the lawsuit is pending is empowered to conduct discovery and require the production of additional information from the government in order to determine whether or not the certification is in fact supported by substantial evidence.<br /><br />Obama’s position was that the telcom immunity provision should have been deleted, or at least held in abeyance, until we know more about what actually occurred in Bush’s warrantless surveillance program. Granting any form of immunity now seems like “buying a pig in a poke”. Notably, in one of the highly salutary provisions of the new statute, the offices of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, and National Security Agency, are required to submit reports to Congress concerning the nature and scope of Bush’s warrantless surveillance program. One of the unsuccessful amendments to the new statute supported by Obama and others would have delayed the effectiveness of the telcom immunity provision until after the completion of these reports.<br /><br />Given the intransigence of the Bush Administration and the Congressional Republicans in supporting telcom immunity, Obama made the correct call in determining that the shortcomings in the immunity provision do not provide a sufficient reason for voting against the statute. My reasoning is as follows:<br /><br />First, there is no reason to view the certification procedure set forth in the telcom immunity provision as a meaningless exercise. Immunity will be granted only if a court determines that there is substantial evidence establishing that the company acted at the specific written directive of the President, and that the purpose of the interception was to prevent a terrorist attack against the U.S. Under this provision, some measure of judicial scrutiny will be brought into the process, and immunity will not be given out on a wholesale basis. Most importantly, immunity will not be available in any case in which the surveillance was conducted for improper or political purposes, unrelated to the prevention of a terrorist attack against the U.S.<br /><br />Second, if Obama becomes President, there is no reason why he cannot authorize full disclosure of the extent of wrongdoing committed by the Bush Administration in conducting warrantless surveillance. Specifically, there is no reason why Obama cannot disclose the identities of any persons whose communications were wrongfully intercepted. Such persons could then readily establish standing to bring suits against individual officials in the Bush Administration. As noted, the new FISA statute does not grant immunity, civil or criminal, to officials of the Bush Administration who participated in violations of FISA.<br /><br /><strong>Stop Dumping On Obama</strong><br /><br />In sum, the enactment of the new FISA statute does not mean that the constitution is dead. Nor does it mean that Obama is a dishonest politician unworthy of our support. On the contrary, Obama’s well thought-out position on the new FISA statute indicates to me that he is a careful legislator, capable of understanding important nuances, fully cognizant of the fact that compromise is the essence of the democracy.<br /><br />A reader may wonder why any credence should be paid to what I have to say on this issue, when constitutional “experts” such as Professor Turley and the ACLU have been so vehement in their opposition to the new FISA statute. Notably, Morton Halperin, a well-known civil libertarian who was himself the target of unlawful warrantless surveillance during the Nixon Administration, has spoken publicly in favor of the new statute. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/opinion/08halperin.html?_r=1&em&ex=1215662400&en=0686287e0ee393f0&ei=5087%0A&oref=slogin">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/opinion/08halperin.html?_r=1&em&ex=1215662400&en=0686287e0ee393f0&ei=5087%0A&oref=slogin</a> The ACLU has a particular view about constitutional law, a view that, for the most part, has never been accepted by the Supreme Court or any other court, and is well outside of the mainstream of constitutional analysis. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the ACLU opposed such widely-supported security measures as airport inspection procedures. The ACLU also opposed the old FISA statute, which it also believes to be unconstitutional.<br /><br />Civil libertarians are fond of quoting Benjamin Franklin’s aphorism that “those who would exchange liberty for security deserve neither.” In considering how much weight to give to that remark, I am tempted to quote a line from the song that Benjamin Franklin’s character sings in the musical “1776”:<br /><br />“The things I write, are only light, extemporanea.”<br /><br />While Franklin's quip is a useful reminder of the need to protect constitutional rights in times of national emergencies, it is, in many ways, better suited to being used as a bumper sticker rather than a foolproof guide to public policy. In fact, we balance personal liberty against public safety all the time: when we require airline passengers to permit their persons and belongings to be searched, or for that matter, when we require all Americans to file accurate tax returns laying bare the details of their financial lives. Life is more complicated than is imagined by the ACLU and its supporters.<br /><br />So, I would urge liberals to calm down. Stop, think, and remember: we have a unique opportunity this year to elect a new President who is really, really special.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-9121922567800799192008-06-13T14:32:00.000-07:002008-06-18T07:35:32.534-07:00An Island Of SanityTwo back-to-back stories recently appeared in the <em>New York Times</em> business section that caught by attention.<br /><br />The first story concerned Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. and his role in ongoing trade negotiations with China. On June 11, 2008, the <em>Times</em> ran a story headed, "Paulson's Path To China: Making Some Progress, But Still Miles to Go." <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/business/worldbusiness/11trade.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/business/worldbusiness/11trade.html</a> The article discusses the efforts being made by Secretary Paulson to maintain good trade relations with China in the face of possible hostile protectionist legislation in Congress. The article begins by noting the importance of America's economic relationship with China to Paulson's mission as Treasury Secretary:<br /><br />"Two years ago, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. left Goldman Sachs and joined the Bush administration, hoping to use his expertise and contacts to ease economic tensions with China. His other goal was to stop Congress from passing legislation that might make tensions worse."<br /><br />The story recounts the efforts that Paulson has made to persuade the Chinese to revise certain of their monetary and regulatory policies that have impeded American exports, and that have drawn the wrath of protectionist voices in the U.S. However, the article also describes Chinese displeasure with many of the policies of the Bush Administration, particularly the irresponsible fiscal policies that have brought about the rapid depreciation of the dollar, "choking the global economy with high oil and food prices" and shrinking "the value of reserves held by China and other countries."<br /><br />While the article concentrated primarily on the economic issues entailed in Paulson's valiant efforts to maintain rationality in Sino-American relations, the article might also have noted the potential inconsistency between Paulson's determination to ensure that the United States-China relationship continues "growing in a positive direction," as Paulson recently told the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the increasing saber rattling about China emanating from numerous neoconservatives. Pundits such as Robert Kagan and William Kristol, both key advisers to Senator McCain, have become increasingly bellicose in their talk about China and their warnings about the need for the U.S. to prepare for a potential military confrontation with China (as well as Russia). Kagan's new book, <em>The Return of History and The End of Dreams</em>(Kagan's book will be the subject of an upcoming blog) is an unabashed call to arms for the U.S. to prepare for an inevitable confrontation with the "autocratic" powers of the world, the most important of which is China. Indeed, Kagan's strategic vision underlies McCain's proposal for the U.S. to become the leader of a "league of democracies" that will carry on the fight against the supposed implacable bastions of authoritarianism in China and Russia.<br /><br /><p>In sum, Paulson's efforts to promote a vigorous and mutually-beneficial economic relationship between the U.S. and China face resistance from both the Left and the Right. From the Left, there are protectionist forces in Congress and the media urging economic retaliation against China and seeking to blame free trade for all of the ills of the American economy. From the Right, there are the neoconservatives, rejecting the idea that global peace can be promoted through economic integration and spoiling for military confrontation with America's potential rival for superpower status. Parenthetically, it is the aggressive military posture promoted by the neoconservatives that also gives rise to the irresponsible fiscal policies pursued by the Bush Administration (see my earlier post, "It's All Connected"). Those are the very fiscal policies that the Chinese correctly view as a source of great danger to their own economic well-being.</p><p>The second story concerned the announcement of economist Jason Furman as a leading economic adviser to Senator Obama. On June 12, 2008, the <em>Times</em> ran a story headed, "Union Critical of Obama's Top Economics Aide." <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/12econ.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/12econ.html</a> Before signing on with the Obama campaign, Furman had previously been the Director of the Hamilton Project, a policy research group and part of the Brookings Institution. In that capacity, Furman had worked closely with former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, the principal organizer of the Hamilton Project. Furman is well-known for his support of free trade, in particular, having written favorably about Walmart as a business model for the 21st Century's global economy that produces many benefits for workers and consumers. The announcement of Furman's appointment by the Obama campaign drew the ire of the President of the AFL-CIO, who criticized Furman as a friend of "Wall Street", whose support for free trade "is causing working families real pain." Other populist opponents of free trade also expressed concern about Obama's appointment of Furman.</p><p>There is an obvious linkage in these two stories. Both stories relate to free trade and protectionist opposition to it, particularly within the ranks of the Democratic Party. However, there is a more specific, particularized connection between the stories: both stories relate to the fabulously successful Wall Street investment banking firm of Goldman Sachs. Secretary Rubin and Secretary Paulson both served as Chairs of Goldman Sachs prior to their government service.</p><p>Goldman Sachs is a good example of what may well be the best that America can produce. It is a manifestation of what Lisa Endlich aptly described in her book about the firm as "the culture of success." It is a firm populated by people who are driven, dedicated, phenomenally ambitious, and unsatisfied with anything less than absolute excellence. It is sort of like the financial world's equivalent of the Marine Corps. I would like to think that I once worked for another government office, the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, that had a similar work ethic and esprit de corps. The main difference is that the partners at Goldman Sachs are extraordinarily rich. </p><p></p><p>In many respects, Goldman Sachs has been the one constant -- an "island of sanity" -- in the hyper-partisan atmosphere that has polluted American politics for the past twenty-five years. When Paulson was named by Bush as the new Treasury Secretary, one Democratic wag was prompted to comment that the Bush Administration was in such desperate straits that it was being forced to "scrape the top of the barrel." Democrats would be well-advised to resort to the same barrel. Obama's selection of Furman as a top economic adviser indicates that he is doing so. </p><p></p><p>Goldman Sachs is something of a bete noir in ideological circles on both the far Right and the far Left. When Paulson's designation as Treasury Secretary was first announced, it drew opposition from elements of the extreme Right. Rightists faulted Paulson for his support for environmental causes, and in particular, for his support of the Kyoto Treaty on global warming. Rightists also accused Paulson of showing insufficient support for "traditional property rights", which apparently means the untrammeled use of private property to rape the earth. </p><p>Hostility to Goldman Sachs is equally resounding on the Left. The mere mention of "Rubinomics" is certain to cause apoplexy among "populists" on the Left. Goldman Sachs is the poster child for the view that the Clinton Administration was too solicitous of the needs of "Wall Street." As the recent criticism of Furman makes clear, there is a lingering fear in these circles that an Obama Administration will have similar inclinations.</p><p>Goldman Sachs is an excellent illustration of the fact that traditional Marxian class-based analyses are totally misplaced in today's world. In our mature capitalist society, political and social divisions are based on ideology and beliefs, not on class. On the one side you have people like Rubin, Paulson, and Furman: people who are tolerant, scientific and non-dogmatic in their perspectives on life, willing to take a globalized view of the future of humanity, and seeing the promotion of connectivity and commerce as the best way to achieve global peace and prosperity. Robert Rubin's outstanding memoir, <em>In An Uncertain World</em>, encapsulates the mind-set perfectly. On the other side you have their opponents on both the Right and the Left: jingoistic, dogmatic, short-sighted, intolerant, and seeing confrontation, often of a military nature, as the principal component of global strategy. I know which group I prefer, and the divide has nothing to do with economic class.</p><p>Obama has often spoken of the need to break through the partisan logjam that has crippled the American political system. In Goldman Sachs, we see the model for a culture that can lead the way out. A commitment to excellence, growth, innovation and opportunity -- these are the attributes of a better America for the 21st Century. </p><p></p><p></p><p> </p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-88020583234866198442008-04-04T11:26:00.000-07:002008-04-11T12:47:16.235-07:00WelcomeWelcome to my new blog. I previously blogged under the name, "Truth vs. Bush." <a href="http://www.truthvsbush.blogspot.com/">http://www.truthvsbush.blogspot.com/</a>. However, I thought that this name had become a bit out of date. I can't imagine how that duck could possibly get any more lame.<br /><br />Accordingly, I have adopted the new name, "Democratic Core." The name has lots of meanings. I consider myself a Democrat to the core. Expressing opinions on political issues, as I am doing in this blog, is at the core of democracy.<br /><br />I also picked the name because of my interest in the writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett. My wife accuses me of having a "man crush" on Barnett. I don't think that's the case. I just find him to be a very interesting and original thinker and writer. While there are some major points on which I disagree very strongly with Barnett -- for example, he supported the Iraq War, and as readers of my old blog know, I opposed it to my "core" -- but on balance, I find that Barnett offers about the most insightful analysis of the current state of the world that one is likely to find. He is challenging and he cuts across traditional Left/Right ideological categories, a position in which I occasionally find myself. Anyone interested should take a look at Barnett's blog, <a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/">www.thomaspmbarnett.com</a>.<br /><br />Anyway, the connection between the name of this blog and Barnett's writings has to do with the term "Core." Barnett uses the term "Core" to refer to the parts of the world that are connected to the global economy, or, what he calls "the functioning Core of globalization."<br /><br />Thus, here I am - writing in the Core, a member of the Democratic Party, and a believer in democracy. I hope you enjoy what I have to say.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6627754946650436130.post-34107551754379415632008-04-04T11:23:00.000-07:002008-04-25T14:34:31.673-07:00It's All ConnectedDuring recent weeks, Senator Barack Obama delivered three noteworthy speeches: (1) on the subject of racial divisions in America; (2) on American foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the war in Iraq; and (3) on the state of the American economy, again, particularly as it relates to the cost of the war in Iraq. The speeches can be read in their entirety on the Obama campaign website, <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/">http://www.barackobama.com/</a>. Better yet, view them - one of Obama's secret weapons is You Tube, since it makes it possible for the electorate to view his speeches in their entirety, instead of the snippets provided by the mainstream media.<br /><br />The first of these speeches drew by far the greatest attention. It was, quite rightly, widely applauded as an "historic" political event. The historic nature of the speech derives not only from the extraordinarily eloquent and insightful content of the speech, but also from the symbolism inherent in Senator Obama’s campaign, namely, the fact that he is the first person of African ancestry with a meaningful opportunity to be elected President of the United States.<br /><br />Looking beyond the symbolism of his campaign and the eloquence of his speeches, however, I am frequently impressed by the analytical nature of Obama’s addresses. To a greater extent than any politician in recent memory, Obama uses careful analysis, including detailed understanding of historical reference points, in order to advance his arguments.<br /><br />The juxtaposition of the three speeches that Obama delivered during recent weeks is, in my opinion, not an accident. In fact, the three speeches are interconnected in that they all relate to certain common and fundamental questions that are at the heart of the issues that are at stake in this year’s election. Those questions are:<br /><br />(1) What is the nature of the relationship between the American government and the American people?<br /><br />(2) What is the nature of America's relationship with the rest of the world?<br /><br />(3) What is the nature of the ideology that will drive America’s actions during the Twenty-First Century?<br /><br />Obama's speeches propound answers to these questions that will set America on a fundamentally new direction in the Twenty-First Century.<br /><br /><strong>I. A More Perfect Union</strong><br /><br />Before we can begin to think seriously about America's role in the world, we first need to understand ourselves, and recognize both our divisions and our common goals. Appropriately, that is where Obama starts. Obama sums up his purposes in his own typically eloquent words:<br /><br />"This was one of the tasks we set forth at the beginning of this campaign - to continue the long march of those who came before us, a march for a more just, more equal, more free, more caring and more prosperous America. I chose to run for the presidency at this moment in history because I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together - unless we perfect our union by understanding that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the same direction - towards a better future for our children and our grandchildren."<br /><br />A great man once said, "Why dost thou behold the mote in thy neighbor's eye, but consider not the beam in thine own eye?" That is the dilemma that Obama seeks to grapple with in his first speech. It is generally known as Obama's "race speech", although Obama himself entitled the speech, "A More Perfect Union." I will join in the chorus of praise that generally accompanied the speech: I believe that it is one of the greatest political speeches in American history. It is a great speech because it makes an attempt to look honestly at divisions within American society. The speech is an attempt to reconcile sincere, but mature, patriotism, with a direct account of the flaws in American society. America cannot very well claim to be in a position of leadership in addressing the problems faced by the people of the world in the Twenty-First Century era of globalization, if America cannot address its own internal divisions. In short, Obama is asking us to remove the beam from our own eye, so that we can better help our neighbors remove the motes from their eyes.<br /><br />In order to begin to address the three fundamental questions that I have articulated at the outset, and even more basically, in order to understand why these questions are so fundamental, it is first necessary to step back and look at the nature of the world today. There is a basic dichotomy that defines the state of the world; that is, the division between the parts of the world that are connected to and participants in the globalized economy, and the parts that are not. This dichotomy was first articulated by the radical sociologist and theorist of globalization Immanuel Wallerstein, who coined the terms "Core" and "Periphery" to categorize the connected vs. the unconnected parts of the world. This analytical framework was cribbed by the neo-liberal military strategist Thomas P.M. Barnett in his book, <em>The</em> <em>Pentagon’s New Map</em>, which re-christened Wallerstein’s categories as the "Core" and the "Gap." Regardless of the nomenclature used, the key factor basic to any understanding of today's world is connectivity, namely, the division between those parts of the world that are connected to and participating in the global economy, and those that are not.<br /><br />Wealth vs. poverty is not the only difference that exists between the parts of the world that are participating in the global economy as compared to those that are not. Communities that are participating in the global economy have the basic infrastructure that enables their members to be successful economic actors. Thus, the connected "Core" communities have attributes such as good educational systems, since uneducated workers cannot succeed in the global economy; good health care systems, since chronically ill workers cannot succeed in the global economy; and good legal systems and respect for the law, since business cannot flourish in a violent, corrupt, unjust, and lawless environment. To be sure, these attributes will inevitably contribute to the advancement of the economic fortunes of the community, but again, it is important to emphasize that it is these underlying characteristics or the lack thereof, and not the resulting wealth or poverty, that determine whether or not a community is a successful participant in the global economy.<br /><br />Generally, analysts such as Wallerstein and Barnett have viewed this dichotomy in an international context, classifying particular nations as either "Core" or "Gap." However, the discrepancy is really more deep-seated, existing at the community level. Thus, it is the case that some portions of a particular country may be connected to the global economy, while other portions of the same country are not. This dichotomy exists most dramatically in the countries that have most recently become connected to the global economy, namely, China, India, Brazil, and Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. Throughout these countries, we see that while much of the population, particularly in urban centers, is now participating in the global economy, much of the rest of the population, particularly in rural areas, remains unconnected. At the other extreme, we may think of nations with well-established capitalist economies, such as Western Europe and Japan, as consisting almost entirely of populations that are connected to and participating in the global economy. However, because of labor shortages, immigration is likely to be a major economic force in these countries in the next decade – it already is in Western Europe – and as a result, we are likely to see the growth of "Gap-like" communities within these countries.<br /><br />The situation in the United States is quite different from that of other advanced capitalist economies, such as Western Europe and Japan. The United States is a country whose history has been shaped entirely by immigration, and accordingly, it is a country that has an extraordinarily high degree of diversity among its peoples, and its relationship to the global economy is therefore a very complex one. On the one hand, we tend to think of the United States as sitting at the pinnacle of the global economy, and in many respects, it is. Nevertheless, there are unquestionably pockets of the American population whose ability to participate in the global economy is restricted. An obvious example of this is the community of recent undocumented immigrants, primarily from Latin America, whose illegal status within the United States restricts their ability to become fully functioning participants in the American economy. Another example may well be the blue collar industrial workers living in the American "rust belt." Because the United States has lagged in pursuing policies that will maintain the competitiveness of certain American heavy industries, notably industries such as steel and automobiles, the "rust belt" community is also finding itself less and less connected to, and therefore less capable of participating in, the global economy.<br /><br />The African-American community is the most glaring example of a segment of American society that lags behind the rest of the country in its ability to participate in the global economy. As Obama emphasized in his speech, the history of the African-American community accounts for its unique status in American society. Africans were brought to America under conditions of brutal enslavement, were treated as non-human property for centuries, and were denied basic human rights until less than fifty years ago. It is hardly surprising that racial bitterness and division exist in the United States. As a result of its persistent treatment as an inferior segment of American society, the African-American community has frequently endured the conditions that prevail in Barnett’s "Gap", namely, an inferior educational system, inadequate health care and other social services, and a legal system that is discriminatory and oppressive. These are precisely the conditions that impede the African-American community’s ability to enjoy the benefits of full participation in the American, and therefore the global, economy.<br /><br />This, then, is the subtext of Obama’s justifiably celebrated speech on the subject of American race relations. The issue of racial division must be viewed in the broader context of the lack of connectivity of certain segments of American society. Historically, many politicians, aided and abetted by the media, have sought to perpetuate these various divisions of race, ethnicity, and class, in order to advance narrow short-term political interests. Obama candidly acknowledges that there are figures in both the white and black communities who are guilty of exploiting these divisions for their own ends. The consequence of this perpetuation of division is that this lack of connectivity persists within the United States itself – an extraordinary, and shameful, fact considering America’s status as the leader of the global economy.<br /><br />Seizing upon the Constitution’s charge of forming a "more perfect union", Obama calls for the rejection of the politics of division:<br /><br />"At this moment, in this election, we can come together and say, 'Not this time.' This time we want to toalk about the crumbling schools that are stealing the future of black children and white children and Asian children and Hispanic childrean and Native American children. This time we want to reject the cynicism that tells us that these kids can't learn; that those kids who don't look like us are somebody else's problem. The children of America are not those kids, they are our kids, and we will not let them fall behind in a 21st Century economy. Not this time."<br /><br />Obama clearly defines the proper role of government as being the promotion of connectivity, and the creation of an infrastructure – education, health care, justice – that will lead to the empowerment of all groups in America to be able to participate in the global economy. Obama answers the first of my three questions quite clearly. The relationship between the American government and the American people must be based on the principle of unity, not division. The essential role of the government must be as unifier, an engine to promote connectivity among all groups in American society, so that all Americans can enjoy the benefits of full economic participation, and have the opportunity to develop their individual abilities to the fullest extent.<br /><br />Understanding this fundamental point -- that America must first empower all of its own citizens as full-fledged participants in the global economy before it can presume to take on the mantle of world leadership -- leads directly to the linkage to Obama’s second speech, dealing with the war in Iraq and American foreign and military policy in general.<br /><br /><strong>II. The Iraq War and America's Role In The World</strong><br /><br />What we call "foreign policy" is basically a formulation of my second question above, namely, defining America’s relationship with the rest of the world. During the Bush Administration, America has defined its relationship with the rest of the world primarily in terms of military domination. This view of America’s relationship to the rest of the world was famously articulated by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), an organization that arose in the late 1990's and was headed by future leaders of the Bush Administration such as Dick Cheney and many prominent "Neo-Conservatives", such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol.<br /><br />The PNAC worldview is based on the premise that in the aftermath of the Cold War, America is the sole superpower left in the world, and that if the U.S. acts quickly to consolidate its position through aggressive military action throughout the world, but particularly in resource-rich areas such as the Middle East, before "rising China" can become a rival superpower, America can establish a regime of long-term global domination unrivaled by any power since the time of Rome. The PNAC view holds that the U.S. is able to dominate the global economy by reason of its military prowess, and that America’s relationship with those parts of the world not connected to the global economy should therefore be based upon the liberal use of military force in order to eliminate any potential dangers to American hegemony emanating from the unconnected portions of the world, and to enable the U.S. to continue exploiting the natural resources of those countries.<br /><br />The Bush Administration's adherence to the PNAC blueprint is uncannily faithful. The most blatant manifestation of the Bush Administration's implementation of the PNAC vision of America’s role in the world is the Iraq War, but it can be seen in all aspects of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy, namely, in its emphasis on unilateralism and militarism, and its general disdain for diplomacy.<br /><br />The nature of America’s relationship with the rest of the world derives primarily from the ideology that drives the actions of America’s leaders – my third question set forth at the outset. The dominant ideology held by America’s decision makers during the Bush years is basically the ideology described and explored in Walter Russell Mead’s brilliant 1999 essay, "The Jacksonian Tradition." This ideology is characterized by extreme jingoism, unquestioned faith in military force as the basis for solving problems, disdain for diplomacy, and a general suspicion of intellectualism. These characteristics describe the Bush Administration to a tee.<br /><br />McCain embodies this same "Jacksonian" ideology. If anything, McCain seems even more enthusiastic about the militarization of American foreign policy than Bush has been, with his invocation of the Beach Boys’ song "Barbara Ann", rephrased as "Bomb Iran", and his cavalier acceptance of the prospect of a 100-year military occupation of Iraq by the United States. While McCain’s most recent foreign policy speech did promote limited ideas about the necessity of multilateralism, on the surface, a departure from the Bush Administration’s policies, but in actuality, McCain was merely calling for the world’s "democracies", <em>i.e</em> ., the nations of Western Europe, to play a larger role in supporting the United States in its military adventures in the Middle East, and presumably, elsewhere. McCain’s vision of America’s relationship to the rest of the world continues to rest very much on an "Us versus Them" paradigm, in which "We" will continue to maintain a position of dominance through the aggressive exercise of military force.<br /><br />This "Jacksonian" ideology also shapes the Bush Administration’s view of the domestic relationship between the American government and the American people. Thus, the Bush Administration’s policies have been characterized by a decrease in respect for the rule of law and the growing use of brute force, including suspension of habeas corpus, use of torture, warrantless electronic surveillance, etc. The right wing of the Republican Party favors policies of subjugation both in America's relationship with the rest of the world, and in dealing with the unconnected segments of the American population, as, for example, in aggressive efforts to employ criminal prosecutions against undocumented aliens. A good illustration of the fact that the Bush Administration’s domestic policies mirror its militarization of American foreign policy can be seen in the fact that the United States now has a higher percentage of its population in prison than any other nation in the world. The racial inequalities implicit in this statistic are staggering.<br /><br />McCain has occasionally stepped back from some of the more extreme manifestations of the right-wing Republican domestic agenda, but he has ultimately gone along with those policies. Indeed, during this campaign, McCain has become pretty much an uncritical advocate for the policies of the Bush Administration, both foreign and domestic. This is shown by his recent retreat in his opposition to the use of torture and the backing off from some of his more liberal immigration policies in favor of the "border security" rhetoric favored by the Republican Right.<br /><br />Obama's speech on the Iraq War directly links the domestic and foreign consequences of the Bush Administration's implementation of policies derived from right-wing Republican ideology:<br /><br />"What we've seen these last few years is what happens when the rigid ideology and dysfunctional politics of Washington are projected abroad. An ideology that does not fit the shape of the times cannot shape events in foreign countries. A politics that is based on fear and division does not allow us to call on the world to hope, and keeps us from coming together as one people, as one nation, to write the next great chapter in the American story."<br /><br />While both Democratic candidates reject the right-wing Republican domestic policy agenda, there are good reasons to believe that Clinton is a great deal more comfortable with the Republican policy of the militarization of foreign relations than Obama is. Clinton supported the Iraq War and has supported the Bush Administration’s policy of bellicosity towards Iran. While Clinton may have felt the need to adopt these warlike postures in order to counteract any public perception that a female President would be a "weak" leader, it is nevertheless significant that Clinton’s campaign rhetoric has consistently bristled with militaristic symbols. The infamous ads featuring the "3 A.M. telephone call" and the invocation of the "Commander In Chief test" are good examples of the Clinton campaign’s embrace of the bellicose "Jacksonian" ideology of Bush and McCain. Similarly, Clinton’s intense criticism of Obama’s statement that he would be willing to engage in negotiations with any world leader, including the leaders of Iran, further illustrates the Clinton campaign’s support for the continued militarization of foreign policy.<br /><br />Obama's foreign policy statements, particularly as consolidated in his most recent foreign policy address on the Iraq War, suggest a fundamentally different direction in American foreign policy. As in Obama's speech on race, which, as suggested above, was really a speech about broader issues concerning the relationship between the American government and the American people, the central theme in Obama's approach to foreign policy is connectivity. The United States should be less concerned with the goal of extending its authority through the unilateral exercise of military power, and should instead focus on the establishment of more and stronger international connections that will make it possible for the United States to deal with problems of the Twenty-First Century that are truly global in scope.<br /><br />Obama views international terrorism, the problem that the Republicans emphasize to the exclusion of virtually everything else, as one such problem requiring global solutions. However, Obama identifies many other problems that can be addressed only through international cooperation, including global climate change, genocide and consequent refugee problems, nuclear proliferation, and the threat of global pandemics. The solution to these problems lies in the strengthening of global connections, not only in the form of concerted multilateral military action, but also through new diplomatic initiatives, through a serious commitment to the eradication of extreme poverty throughout the world, through renewed global commitment to address climate change, through vast expansion of non-military international agencies such as USAID and the Peace Corps, and through a re-dedication to cooperation with international organizations such as NATO and the UN.<br /><br />Opposition to the Iraq War is, of course, a unifying theme of Obama's foreign policy approach. However, it is incorrect to view Obama as any sort of pacifist or unthinking anti-militarist. Obama's recurring theme in this regard, going back to his celebrated 2002 speech setting forth the reasons for his opposition to the Iraq War, is that he is not opposed to all wars, but only "dumb wars." Plainly, Obama defines the Iraq War as such a "dumb war", but it is important to recognize the reasons why he does so. Obama's criticism of the Iraq War was that it was started without any strategic vision. Obama emphasizes that without any overrarching strategy in mind, it becomes impossible to talk about whether the war has been "won" or "lost", and the inevitable result is precisely what we have, namely, a war with no end in sight. Lacking any global strategy, the Iraq War becomes nothing more than a pointless, but extremely costly, exercise of brute military force:<br /><br />"When you have no overarching strategy, there is no clear definition of success. Success comes to be defined as the ability to maintain a flawed policy indefinitely. Here is the truth: fighting a war without end will not force the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future. And fighting a war without end will not make the American people safer."<br /><br />Thus, Obama rejects the notion that the United States either can or should seek to expand its global influence merely by reason of the fact that it is the world's strongest military power. Rather, Obama identifies the occasions requiring America's use of military force as being carefully calibrated to achieving the immediate objectives at hand. This means that the use of force should almost invariably be confined to multilateral operations and carried out with the explicit goal of promoting connectivity, not subjugation.<br /><br />Obama sees the need for a new American global strategy suited to the demands of the Twenty-First Century as being rooted in both desirability and necessity. In fact, the open-ended military conflicts initiated by the Bush Administration, which McCain appears intent upon continuing, are untenable as a practical matter. The American military is today dangerously overextended as a result of the Iraq War. And, the economic costs of the war are enormous and ultimately unsustainable. This, then, leads directly into Obama's third recent speech, dealing with the state of the American economy, particularly as it relates to the costs of the Iraq War.<br /><br /><strong>III. The Iraq War and Fiscal Irresponsibility</strong><br /><br />The direct cost of the Iraq War, approximately $1 trillion, is in itself staggering. However, Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has recently calculated that the direct and indirect costs of the Iraq War are more in the neighborhood of $3 trillion. This includes costs such as long-term health care for injured veterans and the replacement costs for military equipment lost in the war.<br /><br />Obama emphasizes the extent to which the costs of the Iraq War have diverted funds that could otherwise be used for purposes needed to shore up the American economy, such as for spending on infrastructure reconstruction, for poverty reduction, for universal health care, as well as for modernization of the American military itself. This diversion of resources, in turn, impedes the accomplishment of the goals articulated in Obama's first two speeches, namely, improvement of connectivity for disadvantaged groups within the United States itself in order to create a "more perfect union", and the promotion of connectivity throughout the world in order to promote the progress of economic globalization.<br /><br />Obama also emphasizes an additional economic cost of the Iraq War, namely the damage inflicted upon the American economy by the manner in which the Bush Administration has chosen to finance the war. While carrying on this enormously costly war, the Bush Administration has not only failed to increase taxes in order to pay for the war, it has actually implemented huge tax reductions, almost entirely for the benefit of the wealthiest Americans. This policy is unprecedented in American history; indeed, the economic policies of the Bush Administration represent a level of fiscal recklessness virtually unmatched by <em>any</em> country in modern history. Again, there is every reason to believe that these policies would continue to be followed in a McCain Administration. While McCain advocated "straight talk" on tax cuts in his past life, he has now become an ardent supporter of the Bush Administration's tax cuts, giving every indication that he would be content to allow this fiscal irresponsibility to continue into the future.<br /><br />Obviously, Bush has had to pay for his war somehow, and since the Republicans have no interest in increasing tax revenues, they have instead financed their war through massive borrowings, primarily from foreign governments. In effect, Bush has set the United States on a course of arrogant, clumsy, and unilateral, but extremely expensive, military adventurism, and has insisted that the rest of the world pick up the tab his folly. No other country in the world could possibly get away with this sort of behavior. Imagine if some other country, say Argentina, sought to embark on a program of such deliberate fiscal irresponsibility -- an international body such as the IMF would promptly cut off credit to the country and insist that it get its financial house in order. However, because of the status of the United States as the dominant power in the world, a status derived in part by America's military prowess, it is impossible for international institutions to take meaningful action to put an end to America's fiscal recklessness. As such, the rest of the world has little choice but to underwrite Bush's irresponsible policies.<br /><br />Some people have expressed concern that Bush's policies are causing the United States to be "in hock" to foreign governments, notably China. These concerns, however, have a xenophobic ring to them, and in my view, miss the point. An apt analogy for the fiscal policies of the Bush Administration would be to the actions of a schoolyard bully who seeks to support himself by extracting milk money from weaker classmates. In a sense, the bully could be viewed as being "in hock" to the nerds who fork over their milk money, but that is not really an accurate view of what is going on in such a situation.<br /><br />It is also important to look at the consequences of the Bush Administration's irresponsible fiscal policies from the perspective of the lender nations, such as China. The Republicans' free-wheeling credit policies have now permeated the entire American economy, resulting in some noteworthy financial collapses. As a result, the American economy is well on the way into a recession, probably a very severe one. In a desperate attempt to mitigate such a recession and to "stimulate" the American economy, the Federal Reserve has continually reduced interest rates. This means, however, that a lender nation such as China is now being required to lend out substantial amounts of its national wealth to the United States, in the form of U.S. Government bonds, on terms that are increasingly unfavorable. This course of events can be extremely harmful to the Chinese economy. And while many Americans might be tempted to say that they do not care what happens to the economy of China, such an attitude is not tenable in today's global economy. American businesses have enormous investments in China; many American businesses, including America's largest corporation, Walmart, are highly dependent upon Chinese trade. The economic dangers to the United States posed by a possible economic crisis in China cannot be ignored by America's leaders.<br /><br />Obama's economic speech, although I consider this in many ways to be the weakest of Obama's three speeches (see discussion below), nevertheless accurately pinpoints the root cause of these economic problems in the arrogant foreign policies of the Bush Administration, and the jingoistic delusion of American supremacy on which Bush's policies are based. It is the same mindset that has caused the Bush Administration to carry out a pointlessly destructive war in Iraq that has also caused it to wreak havoc in the global economy through policies of gross fiscal irresponsibility. If the leaders of the government of the United States, <em>i.e</em>., the Bush Administration, believe that America's status as the world's sole superpower entitles it to wage unilateral warfare, without even a colorable argument that such warfare is necessitated by America's security interests and without any strategic vision as to the reasons for doing so, then it is certainly no great leap for the same leaders of the United States government to assert that the American public should not have to pay for such warfare and that America is entitled to have the rest of the world extend it the credit to pay for these military misadventures; in other words, America's brute stength entitles it to act like the schoolyard bully shaking down the nerds for their milk money.<br /><br />That is the strongest aspect of Obama's critique of the economic consequences of the Iraq War. Above all else, Obama emphasizes that American policies -- foreign, domestic, and economic -- must be driven by principles of responsibility. Amerca cannot embark on military adventures without a clear strategic purpose, wasting its own blood and treasure in the process, and expecting the rest of the world to make up the deficit. The consequences of the Bush Administration's irresponsibility have been devastating. Obama's candid recognition of these failures represents a major step forward towards a productive redirection of America's policies. Again, Obama's own summation says it best:<br /><br />"We can choose the path of unending war and unilateral action, and sap our strength and standing. We can choose the path of disengagement, and cede our leadership. Or, we can meet fear and danger head-on with hope and strength; with common purpose as a united America; and with common cause with old allies and new partners."<br /><br />While I hesitate to do so, I am constrained to end my discussion of Obama's speeches on a somewhat discordant note. As noted, I consider Obama's speech on economics to be the weakest of the three. In discussing the dire state of the American economy, Obama unfortunately lapses into occasional protectionist rhetoric in criticizing America's trade policies. In doing so, Obama panders to the resentments of workers who have been the primary victims of the failure of America's "rust belt" industries. These resentments are well represented in some of the powerful interest groups within the Democratic Party, particularly among labor unions and "populists" prone to blame economic globalization for all of America's ills.<br /><br /><p>Free trade, however, is not the villain in the piece. The causes of the decline of American industry lie elsewhere. Tax and regulatory policies have enabled industries, such as the American automobile industry, to continue producing inferior and outmoded products, unable to compete with far more efficient industries in countries such as Japan, Korea, and China. Indeed, many tax and regulatory policies affirmatively encourage industries to move out of the US. What is needed to revive American industries is not protectionism, but rather, a reevaluation of tax and regulatory policies in order to reward innovation and promote competition. Such an approach has achieved success in promoting efficient industries in many other countries, even in high-wage countries such as Germany. And, to the extent that there are structural factors that make certain American industries inherently less competitive, as in the case of labor-intensive industries in which low-wage countries have an unavoidable advantage, then what is required is re-training and policies designed to foster mobility for American workers, combined with careful maintenance of programs such as Social Security and Medicare, as well as the development of guaranteed universal health care, that will enable workers in such industries to survive the difficulties that may be unavoidable in periods of economic transition. </p><p>Genuine free trade is the great engine of economic connectivity, and it is absolutely critical that it not be impeded. I believe that the promotion of connectivity -- among Americans and between Americans and the rest of the world -- is the unifying theme running through each of Obama's speeches, and it is a theme that gives substance to his very positive vision of what America can accomplish in the Twenty-First Century, both for America's own citizens and for all of the people of the world. Obama's embrace of protectionist rhetoric is therefore jarringly inconsistent with the overall vision of connectivity that he presents. The political reality of today's Democratic Party, however, requires Democratic politicians to pay obeisance to the demonization of free trade. It is sobering to consider that a Democratic candidate for President may have a better chance of fostering an honest and mature discussion about America's racial divisions, than of engaging in a clear-headed debate about international trade.</p><p>During the Ohio primary, there was a minor flap resulting from reports that Austan Goolsbee, Obama's principal economic adviser, had told Canadian officials not to be concerned about Obama's anti-NAFTA speeches, that such speeches were mere political posturing. There was some question as to whether or not this meeting actually took place, or whether Goolsbee had actually made the statements that were attributed to him. Nevertheless, I tend to take some hope from the possibility that the reports were true.<br /><br />Goolsbee's own writings about "free trade" agreements such as NAFTA are instructive. Goolsbee has indeed criticized such agreements, but not from a protectionist standpoint. Rather, Goolsbee has argued that agreements such as NAFTA contain so many loopholes for the protection of politically-connected special interests, that they actually do as much to hinder genuine free trade as to promote it. Joseph Stiglitz in his book <em>Making Globalization Work</em> presents a similar critique of the so-called "free trade" agreements that the Bush Administration has been forcing down the throats of America's economically disadvantaged trading partners. American farm subsidies, which US trade negotiators have almost invariably sought to protect in negotiating "free trade agreements", stand out as a particular culprit in this regard. Such subsidies, while providing rich rewards to American agribusiness, have devastating consequences for some of the poorest nations of the world. Viewed from this perspective, the version of "free trade" that the Bush Administration has promoted does more harm than good to the advancement of global connectivity.<br /><br />We can only hope that in the general election, somewhat freed from the influences of pro-protectionist forces within the Democratic Party, Obama can advance a more nuanced argument about the failures of the Bush Administration's trade policies. Given Obama's rhetorical record so far, I have no doubt that he is up to the job.<br /><br /><strong>IV. Sealing The Connections</strong><br /><br />"<em>We</em> are all connected." This would be the simplest way of summing up the message of Obama's interconnected trilogy of speeches. It is summed up both by the content of the inspirational speeches for which Obama is rightly praised, and it is summed up in Obama's very existence. Never have the personal and the political come together so powerfully as in Obama's campaign. It all comes together in the form of a beautiful vision for America - and for the world:<br /><br />"I am the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas. I was raised with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in Patton's Army during World War II and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly line at Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. I've gone to some of the best schools in America and lived in one of the world's poorest nations. I am married to a black American who carries within her the blood of slaves and slaveowners - an inheritance we pass on to our two precious daughters. I have brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, uncles, and cousins, of every race and every hue, scattered across three continents, and for as long as I live, I will never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible. It's a story that hasn't made me the most conventional candidate. But it is a story that has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its parts - that out of many, we are truly one."</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1